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PREFACE
My interest In the stM^y of latin America developed
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I

was a graduate student at the University of

Massachusetts, V7here
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I
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and for his direction of the dissertation.
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wish to have a better director because Professor Wiarda
was alvjays prompt in his consideration of the work

submitted to him and raised stimulating questions about
the work.

The second member of my corainittee, Edward E. Feit,

Associate Professor of Political Science, was also

helpful in reading and commenting on the manuscript.
Iv

Jane M. Loy, Assistant Professor of History,
was

particularly helpful in questioning my "political
science
orientation" to the subject.

She made the historical

chapter. Chapter II, much stronger by her insightful

questions and comments,

I

also appreciate the contributior

of Lewis Hanke, Professor of History, who read the first

draft of the dissertation and made many valuable
suggestions.
Stuart L. Rich, Assistant Director for

Institutional Research, University of Maine at Orono,

deserves a special thank you for the hours spent editing
the manuscript.

His assistance

vjas

invaluable.

My typist, Mrs, Betsey M. Shaffer, has performed

valiantly under less than ideal circumstances.

I

appreciate her willingness to assume the job under short
notice and her ability to decipher the copy given her.
In addition, financial support from the Department
of Political Science, University of Massachusetts, enabled

me to complete my graduate studies.

I

appreciate the

department's support in the form of teaching

assistantshlps for two years and a lectureship for one
year.
V

Although many people contributed much to the
development of this study,

I
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any of its shortcomings.
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CHAPTERI
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
Introduction
In recent years, the field of comparative

government and politics has focused on the problems of
political development."^

Students of the discipline have

constructed a variety of frameworks and employed a

v/lde

range of approaches for analyzing the processes of

political development.

These framevjorks, or "models,**

have been employed to facilitate cross-national comparison.

Because it is impossible for any one student of

A few of the m.ost prominent examples are: Lucian
Little,
Pye, Aspects of P olitica l Developirent (Boston:
Modernization
Brov/n. I966); C. E. Black, The ^Dynamics of
Knopf. I965); Samuel P. Huntington. PolAMii£i
(New York:
Societies (New Haven: Yale University
Changing;
in
Order
Apter, Tlie Politics of Modernization
David
Pre ss7'T958 ;
of Chicago Press, 19o5); Gabriel
University
(Chicago:
Almond and G, Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparati ve Poll ticsj.
Little, Brown, I960J;
A Deve loprT'.ental Approach (Boston:
The Politics of
(eds.).
and Almond and James Coleman
University Press.
Princeton
Deve lopinp; Areas (Princeton:
;

2

comparative politics to know all the emerging nations In
detail, various frameworks of national development and

modernization have been fashioned to identify commonalities
and differences among nations.

Identification and

evaluation of such commonalities help provide a needed tool
for comparison of national political systems.

While many general frameworks for the comparative

analysis of political systems have been developed, it has
also been recognized that differences in cultures or other

distinctive features of individual political systems or
clusters or regional groupings of systems have to be taken
into consideration to fully understand any one national

political system.

As a result, there has been a counter-

pressure to the construction of general frameworks.

Thus,

area studies, the study of political culture, and

individual case studies have also retained their
importance in the field.

2

The whole concept of political development has

gained increasing importance because of the large number

Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic
Political Attitudes and Demo era cy__ln_FiZS.
Ciilture;
Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19^3
P57~and Verba. Politic al Culture and Poll t le al ^Develoi^Dein^
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19o5) are among
In
culture.
the most important general works on political
Latin
on
literature
terras of area studies, the abundant
America cited throughout this study attests to the
continuing Importance of that kind of focus.
Pj^e.

o p»

c it.;

)

3

of nations currently "emerging" or attempting to develop

themselves.

The Third World encompasses a large portion of

the world's population.

According to I965 figures, over

seventy per cent of the world's people lived on the

continents of South America, Asia, and

3
Africa,-'^

These

continents also tend to include the majority of the

so-called under-developed or developing nations of the

world
The importance of the process of political

development for the v/orld as a whole makes it imperative
that students of the process be clear about what it is.
The author finds a vagueness in the use of the terra

"political development" in much of the literature of

comparative politics.

Thus, part of the purpose of this

study is to help clarify the term and to evaluate the ways
in which it has been used, with the hope of indicating a

useful definition of the term.
Secondly, the current work is intended to provide

an analysis of the use of the various political development
frameworks in relation to the study of Latin America.
of
Latin America, of course, contains about ten per cent

ed.

Rand NcNally New Cosmopoli t an World Atlas
(Chicago: Hand McNally, 1966), p. 195*

,

1966

the world's population and has one of the highest birth

rates of the world.

As a result, its importance is

destined to increase.

For that reason alone, it is

important to understand the political systems of Latin
America.

In addition,

its special relationship to the

United States makes Latin America particularly important
for United States scholars to understand.
It should also be noted that the political

development frameworks usually employed in the analysis of
Third World nations originated in the works of Western

European and Anglo-American scholars and as such have been
somevihat culture-bound.

The major purpose of this work is

to determine whether the general framevrorks used for

examining the process of political development are
appropriate for studying Latin American political systems.
The major hypothesis is that the Latin American historical

and cultural experience is sufficiently divergent from the

Anglo-American and Western European experience to require
different assumptions in the construction of a

developmental framework*
analyze the
To test the hypothesis, this study will
identify
literature of political development in order to
upon which such
the frameworks and evaluate the assumptions
study is to
frameworks are based. The basic plan of the

development" and
indicate the usages of the term "political
for greater ease of
to classify the various frameworks

5

analysis.

The application of these frameworks to the study

of Latin America will then be analyzed.

The advantages and

disadvantages of each framework as an aid in studying Latin
America will be outlined.

If the hypothesis proves valid,

the concluding section will include an attempt to indicate

a framework more appropriate to the \inderstanding of the

Latin American nations.
In evalimting the applicability of these various

developmental frameworks to the study of Latin America,
three major "issue areas" will be examined:

the question

of urbanization and its socio-political consequences, the

question of the role and function of bureaucracy, and the
role of the middle sectors in society.

These particular

subject areas are selected because they are used as

indicators of political development in much of the
literature.

The political development frameworks

attribute particular functions and/or roles to
urbanization, bureaucracy, and the middle sectors in the

development process.

These roles and functions will be

examined and discussed in the body of the study.

A

fundamental purpose of this study is thus to evaluate the
role or systemic function attributed to each of these

groups or socio-political forces by each of the frameworks
of analysis.

After evaluating the various roles and

6

fimctions attributed to each group, the author
his

\iXll

present

interpretation of the roles played by each.

oimi

Although there certainly are many other groups or
issue areas which could be singled out for analysis, those

indicated here are ones on which the frameworks of

development place substantial importance, and they do help
to illustrate the difficulties and ambiguities in the

application of the general development models to Latin
America.

A final Justification for selection of these

particular indicators is that they represent three
different types of variables.

One (urbanization) is a

process which usually receives much attention in the
literature.

Secondly, the bureaucracy represents a part

of officialdom in being a part of the governmental

machinery itself.

Finally, the middle sectors of society

represent a less organized interest group or "class" in
the society.

Because of the variety represented by these

three issue areas and because of the importance attached
to them by the literature on political development, the

examination of them should provide some significant
insights into the usefulness of the frameworks being

analyzed.

7

The Concept of "Development"

There are numerous meanings of the term "political

development"; almost every scholar using the term gives it
a different meaning.

It will be helpful to outline the

various major usages before analyzing the frameworks used
for studying development.
One of the most common usages of the

terra

its interrelationship with economic development.

involves
If not

equated with economic development, political development
Is often considered a necessary condition for economic

development.

The developing nations themselves have

readily accepted this framework and have pushed for rapid
economic development in most cases without such attention
to the political and social consequences.

The variety of definitions is noted by Pye, op.
Black, or), cit. Alfred Dlamant, Po litical
cit.
Comparative
DevelQ-pment (Bloomington, Ind.
Robert
A. Packenham,
and
I963);
Group,
Administration
Development,"
Political
of
"Approaches to the study
World Politics . XVII (October, 196if), 108-120 among
others.
;

'

;

;

See Pye, op. cit.
pp. 33-3^ for a discussion of
associated with this
commonly
this usage. Others
position are: Barbara VJard, The Rich Nations and the Poor
Nations (New York: Norton, 19^2); Walt W, Rostow, The
Cambridge
Staples of Economic Grovjth (Cambridge:
University Press, I960); and to a lesser extent, A. P. K.
Organski, The Stages of Political Development (New York:
.

8

The concern with economic factors can be traced
to

Karl Marx, of course.

.In

the superficial view of Marxist

analyses, the economic factors are the key to all other

aspects of the society's operation,

mile

some social

scientists have denied the influence of Marx on their
ideas, many have used variations of his analysis.

have denied his influence.^

Not all

The viewpoint of many of the

authors in this tradition is that economic development
will bring these nations to maturity and as such they will
be "developed," politically as well as economically.

With

a larger gross national product or voider distribution of

Knopf, 1965); and Black, o p. cit. .
Those citing economic
conditions as prerequisites stem from Alexis de
Toqueville's Demo crac y in America ed. by Richard D.
Heffner (New York: The Nev: American Library, 1956).
Seymour Martin Lipset is probably the best known as a
spokesman for this position in his Political Man (Garden
Doubleday, I96O), and "Some Social Requisites of
City:
Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,"
The American Political Science Review, LIU (March, 1959 )i
69-105.
,

^Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in
Stanford University Press,
Industrial Society (Stanford:
The Social Origins of
Jr.,
Moore,
I959T, and Barrington
Beacon Press, I966),
(Bostonl
Dictatorship and Democracy
Others such
Marx.
of
are examples of the direct influence
as Rostow, op. cit. however, attem.pt to provide an
alternative approach to Marx, but they are still tied to
the economic factor.
,

9

material goods, other problems will pale into
insignificance.

This position is tantamount to saying that

economic development produces or determines political
development, although many scholars tend to look at the two
as more or less the same.*^
Barbara Ward's analysis explores another aspect of
the same question.

In her approach, political development

precedes and actually provides the conditions for economic
development.

8

Again the emphasis tends to be on the

material factor.

Political development becomes the

instrument for attaining economic prosperity.

The

political system is expected to provide a comfortable
environment for development of the economy.

V/hile this

approach is an interesting and Important one, it is of
limited use in this study because Ward and the others

taking the same position do not really get to the point of
The tendency seems to be

defining political development.

for them to adopt the standards of the United States and

Black,
Lipset, op. cit.
De Toqueville, op. cit.
of
examples
good
are
c
it.,
op.
Organski,
and
op. c lt.;
;

this'tradition.
Q

Ward, op. cit ..

;

10

Western Europe as models of politically developed nations

and expect other nations to follow this pattern, g

A part of the economic approach to political
development relates to the process of industrialization.
For the above-noted frameworks, rapid industrialization is

often seen as the path to economic development and

therefore as an Important factor in political development.
Walt Rostow and A. F. K. Organski belong to this group.

"'"^

Eldon Kenworthy analyzes the assumptions behind this

approach and the implications for Latin America.

11

More

will be said about this in later chapters as these various
Many scholars have looked at the

approaches are analyzed.

effects of industrialization on political development and

^Charles W. Anderson. "Political Factors in Latin
American Economic Development." Journal of Intern ational
Affairs , XX (1966), 2^2-2^3 considers this question.
^^Rostow, op. cit.

,

and Organski, op. cit.

11

.

"Argentina: The Politics of Late
Industrialization." Foreign Affairs XLV (April, 1967).
.

11

their considerations will be important as an attempt is

made by the author to provide a framework of his own."^^
Most of the discussion so far has centered on the

correlation of economic and political development.

Some of

the scholars noted above have emphasized the negative

relationships between the two concepts of development.
Though writing from quite different perspectives, Moore,

Dahrendorf , Huntington, and Vellz focus on the problems
economic development can provide for political development.
In later chapters, these authors villi be evaluated in

greater detail.

At this point, it should only be noted

that not all scholars dealing V7ith the economic factors of

political development accept a deterministic or unilinear

relationship between economic and political development.
The association of economic with political

development has been one of the most common features of the
literature on political development, particularly in the ^

In addition to those noted above, some other very
important works include Claudio Vellz (ed.), Obstacles to
Oxford University
Chann:e in L^tin America (Cambridge:
Press. 1965); "The Politics of Conformity In Latin America
Oxf ord University Press, 196?); and Huntington,
( London
Moore, op. clt. and Dahrendorf, op. cite
clt.
op.
:

;

;

12

early stages of concern with the subject. 13

As was noted

above, the developing nations have placed a great deal of

emphasis on the development of their economies.

Foreign

aid programs of the United States and others have often
been geared to Increasing the economic capacity of these

newer nations.

Thus, an understanding of the

interrelationship of the two concepts is important in

understanding the new nations themselves, even if it is
decided that the economic determinist framevjork is not the
best over~all approach to studying latin America.

Taking

their cue from the economic determinists, many Latin

American nations have accepted the idea that economic
development is a prerequisite to political development.
As such, the economic determinism approach will be helpful
in understanding certain aspects of the Latin American

nations' policies and expectations.

Another very com.mon approach to the concept of

-

political development is to equate it with participation in
politics.

This approach is very obviously based on Anglo-

American and Western European experiences.
to be considered developed,

•^^Almond

it must illustrate

and Coleman, op. cit.

and Black, op. cit.

.

For a nation

;

Rostow, op« cit.;

13

characteristics approaching political democracy as

practiced in the Western nations. "^^

Since most of the

literature in this field comes from Anglo-American and

Western European scholars, it is perhaps natural that their
own experiences vilth political democracy would weigh

heavily in their analyses of development.

The Western

democratic nations are seen as the most highly developed

and others must imitate them to join the "elite."
In equating development with political democracy,

these scholars evaluate several factors.

First are the

basic institutions of government, especially constitutions

and governmental organization.

Some suggest that having a

^
Many authors in comparative politics and
political development make this assumption either
implicitly or explicitly. Among them are: Lipset, gj^
de Toqueville, op. cit.; Apter, o p. cit« Almond and
cit.
and
Povjell, op. cit.; Almond and Coleman, op. cit.
in Latin
Change
nic
or
Econ
and
s
Charles W. Anderson, Piolitic
notes
9-13
America (Princeton: Van No strand, 19 W) f PP.
this difference for Latin America.
;

;

;

1^

democratic constitution and stability implies
political
development.
The obvious problem with this analysis
is
that the constitution may not indicate what is
actually

practiced, a factor particularly important in
studying

Latin American nations.

Democratic constitutions often

become the "front" for legitimizing undemocratic regimes.

Llpset»E analysis of "constitutional government," for
example, would have to involve a much deeper analysis of

actual practices in order to claim validly that democratic
governments are in fact more stable than non-democratic
ones.

Beyond looking at the nature of constitutions, some
believe that political development involves an increase in

political participation.

Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba

have, perhaps, provided the most comprehensive treatment
16
of this particular approach.
Their analysis professes

15

See Martin C. Needier, Political Developmen t JLn
Latin America;
Instability, Violence, and PJvolutlonary
Chan pre (New York: Random House, 19^0)' J. Lloyd Kecham,

"Latin American Constitutions: Nominal and Real,"
Journal of Politics XXI (May, 1959). 258-2?2, and Glen
Dealy, "Prolegomena on the Spanish American Political
Tradition," The Hispanic Am erican Historical Review,
XLVIII (February, 1968), 37-58 provide critiques of some
of the literature.
,

^Almond and Verba, op. cit. . Daniel Lerner, The
Passing of Traditional Society (Glencoe: The Free Press,
1958); Karl Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political

15
to go beyond democracy, but their "civic culture" is a form
of democracy emphasizing citizen participation in the

political process.

With democratic values as a basis of

analysis, it is clear that political participation has to
be a very important Ingredient of political systems.

The

question emerges as to whether it constitutes development.
Some suggest that participation accentuates impossible

demands on the system and actually leads to breakdovm
rather than development.

17

Again, it is obvious that the

values of the scholars themselves play a very important
part in their use of the term "political development."
This particular usage will have to be evaluated along with
the others to determine whether or not it is appropriate
in studying I^tln America.

Often related to the equation of democracy and

political development is the viewing of political

Development," American Political Science Review LV
(September, I9B1), 493-514; and William Kornhauser, The
Free Press, 1959)
jPolitlcs of Mass Society (New York:
provide other examples of this approach.
,

Among them, Huntington, op. clt. especially the
first chapter and Veliz in the introductions to his
edited volumes cited above.
,

development as stability of the nation-state.^^

As noted

above. Llpset is much concerned with stability
in his

analysis of development and democracy.

The goal of the

political system, according to this version of development,
is to maintain itself and resist challenges to its

legitimacy and stability.

Orderly change becomes the

watchword and thus any change is very gradual.

While

stability is all important, other features of the system
tend to be neglected.

Criticisms of the systems analysis

approach abound in recent literature with special emphasis
on the limitations Imposed by concern with system

stability.

One question to be pursued in this work is

whether stability by itself is worthy of being labelled
political development.

A very primitive society can be

very stable, but few scholars are willing to call such
societies developed

— development

obviously Involves more

than stability.

18

This view has origins In Max Weber *s work and has
been transferred to contemporary analyses by Talcott
Parsons, The Social System (Nev; York: Free Press, 1951);
David East on, A Syste ms Analysis of Political Life (New
Wiley & Sons, 1965); Alinond and Powell, opT clt.
York:
and Almond and Coleman, op. clt. . Among those viewing
Latin America from a stability oriented perspective is
Kalman Silvert, The Conflict Society (New York: Harper &
;

Row,

1968).

17

The consensus (and systems) approach
can accommodate

gradual change in the system.

Stability in the ••systems

approach" therefore means maintenance of the system
with
change coming within the system. Rapid change
and possible
destruction of the system are ruled out. The systems

approach does not necessarily represent stagnation,
as
many of its critics would suggest.

Nevertheless, because

the changes which do occur come through the system, there
is much opportunity for the biases of the system to filter

out and defuse pressures for the larger changes.

Another aspect of stability involves the
institutionalization of processes and organizations of
government.

David Apter and Samuel P. Huntington both

tend to view development in terms of institutionalization.

Apter sees the institutionalizing of roles as particularly
important .'^

Politics for him involves the

differentiating of roles by citizens, and political
parties become the major agent for role differentiation,^^

19

Apter, op. cit.
Chapters I, II, and VII are
particularly instructive in this regard.
.

ZO

Ib id.

,

see Chapter VI.

18

Thus, the institutionalizing of political
parties brings

about role differentiation, which is viewed
as the key to
development,

Huntington feels that the institutionalization
of
processes of government is the key factor.
The process
of political development for him should focus on
building

institutions rather than increasing democracy and
participation.

"Authority and the ability to govern" are

the essential elements in stability and development.^^

In

this case, change comes very gradually and a lid must be

kept on citizen aspirations to avoid destruction of the
system.

Concern with institutionalization of processes
leads to yet another approach to development.

Some

scholars equate legal and administrative development with

political development.

This approach is sometimes also

21
fiuntington, op. cit.
and Samuel P. Huntington,
"Political Development and Political Decay," World
Politics , XVII (April, I965). 386-430.
,

22

Huntington, Political Order in Changing
Societies , p. 8,
23

Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic
Organization (New York: Oxford University Press, 19^7);
and Joseph la Palombara (ed.). Bu reaucracy and Political
Development (Princeton; Princeton University PressT 19^3)

19

called the legal-formal approach.

Until fairly recently

much of the focus in comparative government
had been on
legal-formal aspects.
If the nation had the right

constitutional-legal system, usually meaning a

representative legislative body and adeqiiate legal
safeguards for citizens' rights, it would be considered
developed.

This tendency is particularly true of the

early Latin American texts.

Specialization of function

of agencies becomes a very important indicator of

development, especially for those concerned with

administrative factors.

The administrative approach often

concerns itself with the efficiency of operation of

are good examples of this approach.
In addition, Fred
Riggs* works, especially Admlnl .strati on i n Developing
Countries (Boston: Houghton MlTflin Co., 196^) treat this
relationship.
Carl J. Friedrlch, Constitutional Government and ~
Demo crac y (London:
Methuen, 1961), and Herman J. Finer,
Theor y and Practice o f Modern Government (Boston: Glnn,
19507 are classic examples of such analyses.
25

See for example:
William S. Stokes, Latin
American Politics (New York: Crowell, 1959); Harold
Davis (ed.). Government and Polit ics i n latin America
(New York:
The Ronald Press, 1958) and Hussel H.
Fitzgibbon (ed.). The Constitutions of the Americas
(Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 19^8).
;

20

government and how adequately the government
performs its
Job of providing services to the citizenry.
The term political development is often
used

interchangeably with political modernization,^^

This

equation of terms makes the criticism of an Anglo-

American-Western European bias in the development
literature particularly pertinent.

Modernization in

government Is usually measured against the standards of the

Anglo-American- Western Eiiropean experience.

Thus, v;hat is

modern can usually be translated into what is
characteristic of V/estern democratic traditions.

Perhaps

to bo most accurate, modernization should be reserved as a

term to be applied to the changes in society as a whole

and political development should be limited to
governmental factors. 27

While such a suggestion is easy to

make, there is little question that boundaries of systems

are difficult to establish.

It should be recognized,

however, that the political system is only a part of the

26

From the works discussed above, those of Apter,
Black, and Organski, among others, tend to equate the
terms in usage
27

Huntington, Political Order in Changing
Societies was one of the first to differentiate between
political modernization and political development. Also
see Huntington, "Political Development and Political
Decay."
,

21

larger .social system and as such the terms
"modernization"
and "political development" should be
differentiated.

Hopefully this study will be able to clarify these

terras.

Various definitions or usages of the concept
"political development" have been outlined in the
foregoing

section of this study.

The author does not suggest that

this sketch exhausts the usage of the term, but he

believes that most usages are accommodated by the foregoing
typology.

Obviously, many of these usages overlap and

contradict one another.

My hope is to be able to bring

more clarity to the concept and bridge some of the

inconsistencies in its usage

V7ith

particular reference to

Latin America,
In order to evaluate the concept in a system.atic

way, the individual approaches along the conflict-

consensus continuum of social change analysis will be
categorized.

The conflict-consensus continuum is employed

because conflict and consensus represent opposing ways of

viewing plural societies*

There are many alternative

classifications which could be used as the structure for

See Leo Kuper, "Plural Societies:
Perspectives
and
Pl uralism in
in
Kuper
G.
Smith,
and Problems,"
Leo
M.
Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, I969). pp. 7-26.

this study, but the conflict-consensus
dichotomy has been
employed in much of the literature in recent
years.
Both
implicitly and explicitly, the conflict and
consensus

models have been applied to Latin America.

For the reasons

stated above, the conflict-consensus continuum
provides a

convenient method for classifying approaches to the
study
of Latin American politics.

Basically, the conflict theorists view change in

plural societies as occurring because of irreconcilable

clashes among power groups.

Inevitably, one group wins out

and exerts its power over the system.

Eventually, new

opposition forms and a new clash results in a new

distribution of power. 29^

In the consensus approach, on

the other hand, conflicting interests compromise among

themselves and no one power group very often achieves its
goals.

Instead, it is willing to give in for the benefit

of keeping the system intact.

The ensuing series of

compromises characterizes the process of social change and
a basic consensus emerges on the ends and means of

political action.
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See Kuper, op. cit. , and Diam.ant, op. cit.
a discussion of the differences of the models.

Ibid..

,

for
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Latin America and the Literature
of Political Development

As has already been noted above,
the various
frai^eworks of political development
analysis have been

'

created chiefly by scholars with
experience in the AngloAmerican and Western European traditions.
This fact in
itself indicates a neglect of Latin
America in the
literature of political development.
In the major works
on development, very little attention
is ever given Latin
American nations. Even when the literature
takes note of
these nations, little in-depth analysis
is provided.
Rather, surface observations are made
on the basis of the
author's general concept of the Latin American

experience.

Most of the authors creating frameworks for

the study of development have not been trained
in Latin

American stiidiec.

They cannot be taken to task for not

being experts on this region, but it is a factor which

'

must be considered in looking at the relationship of Latin

America to the literature of political development.

See Almond and Coleman, op. cit. .
Huntington,
Political Order In Changing- Societies also devotes some
attention to Latin America,
,

2k

While the generalists have often Ignored
Latin

America, the Latin Americanists have also usually
been

divorced from the theories of political development.
Frequently they have ignored the theoretical works.

Part

of the reason for ignoring development theory is that
for

a long period, the Latin Americanists have been outside
the mainstreams of comparative political analysis.

The

North Americans studying the region have not been fully

associated with comparative politics developments while
the Latin Americans themselves have not had a social

science tradition comparable to that of the United States.

Recent years have brought changes, but there is still a

gap between the comparative political analysis tradition

and studies of Latin America.-^
What may be more important to this study is that the

various frameworks have. been applied to the study of Latin
America with rare questioning of the appropriateness of
the models to the Latin American experience. -^^

Many

See Juan Mar sal. Cambio social en America Latina
(Buenos Aires:
Solar/Hachete, 196?), pp. 225-226.
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This fact has been treated by Alfred Stepan,
"Political Development Theory: The Latin American
Experience,** The Journal of International Affairs XX
Albert 0. Hirschman.
(1966). 223--23^; Dealy, op. cit.
"How Policy is Made," Americas XV (August. I963), 39-^1;
,

;

.

^

scholars of I^tln America have
attempted to understand
Latin America In terms of the
previously summarized
frameworks.
Specific authors and their uses of the

frameworks will be given detailed treatment
in Chapter
VIII, and selected treatment in Chapters
III through VII.
The fact is, then, that there is a bias
in the

literature which causes neglect of the Latin
American

experience in the general developmental schemes
and.
secondly, there is a misapplication of the
frameworks to
the nations of Latin America.
Briefly noted below are

the

reasons for the bias and the problems which unquestioned

application of the models to the study of Latin America
imply.

Many students of Latin America have attempted to

evaluate the use of V/estern democratic frameworks of

analysis.

Alfred Stepan suggests that the underlying

assumptions of the fram.ev/orks bear the primary

responsibility for the neglect of Latin America in the
literature.

The models usually assume that as societies

Hoviard Wiarda,

"Elites in Crisis," an unpublished paper,
among many others.
.

n.d.

;

and Marsal. op. cit.
3^

Ibid..

beco.e more industrialized,
.ore urbanized, and better
educated, they will inevitably
show changes in the nature
of their political systems,
ordinarily accompanied by an
evolution toward the democratic
model. According to
Stepan. however, these "indicators
of development" Just do
not seem to follow the prescribed
patterns in Latin

America.

Scholars who apply such models
usually tend to
reach conclusions consistent with
the models because they
do not take notes of other factors.
Juan Marsal suggests
that such models, as used by John
J. Johnson, are selffulfilling because they ask questions
of the society in
such a way that the answers will be
consistent with the
model's assumptions.-^^
Glen Dealy and Charles W. Anderson point
up

another very important assumption of the
models— namely
that the models are based on the belief that
people will
act in a rational m^anner to gain particular
goals.
The

Latin American experience has often placed greater
value
on what the advocates of democratic models might
consider

Marsal. op. cit.

.

p. 108.

36
op* cit.
and Anderson, "Political
Factors in Latin American Development."
.

2?

"non-rational" factors, such as personallsmo

bureaucratic efficiency, for example.

.

rather than

Glen Dealy goes

into much detail in comparing the Latin American

experience with the belief of many scholars that
Latin

American nations have adopted the United States and
Western European democratic systems as models to strive
for.

In an incisive analysis he evaluates the

constitutions and practices of the nations of Latin

America and illustrates how the values of the Latin

Americans give different meanings to the terms and
concepts of the Western democratic experience.

He

concludes that these nations probably do not aspire to our
ideals or to the ideal of democracy as we think they do."^^

Related to Dealy 's analysis is Juan Marsal's

contention that much confusion has arisen in terminology
because the Latin American Intellectual tradition has not

produced an indigenous social science.

Rather, social

science frameworks have been adopted from North Americans

and Europeans.

Because the Spanish language has not had

37

Anderson, "Political Factors in Latin American
Development," pp. 246-247, and 251.
38

Ibid., pp. 54-58.

a social science vocabulary,
many of the terms of social
scientists have been appropriated
from the English.
Often, new and different meanings
are given the terms by
Latin Americans and North Americans
may think the Latin
American scholar means one thing when
he actually means
something else.

Another reason for the bias against Latin
America
in the development literature is that
the historical
experience of latin America has been quite
different from
that of North America. The North American
colonial

experience was primarily associated with the
Northern

European nations, whereas Latin America's heritage
is
Southern European or more specifically. Iberian.

As

traced by Richard Morse, Howard Wiarda, and others,
there
is a significant difference in these traditions.

Because the values and thought of the Iberian tradition

vary tremendously from the Protestant ethic of Northern

39

Marsal, op. cit.

.

pp. 225-226.

Richard M. Morse, •Some Characteristics of Latin
American History," Americ an Histo ri cal Review LXVII
(January, 1962), 317-33B, and "Toward a Theory of Spanish
American Government," Journ al of the History of Ideas XV
(195^). 71-93; and Wiarda, op. cit.
Dealy. op. cit.
is
also very instructive in this regard.
.

.

.

.

^

29

Europeans and North Americans, the
models appropriate to
the latter traditions just do
not conform to the Iberian
and I^tln American experiences.
Latin America
is

essentially authoritarian. Catholic,
feudal, and
conservative while the tradition of the

United States is

primarily democratic. Protestant, middle
class bourgeois,
and liberal.
A more detailed analysis of Latin

American historical experience will be
presented in the
next chapter.
The significance of the question of the

appropriateness of the frameworks of political development
analysis to the study of Latin America goes beyond
just
learning about Latin America. Policies of the United
States and others toward Latin America are based on our

knowledge of the area.

It is important to have an

accurate understanding of the area if our foreign policies
are to make sense.
This introductory chapter provides an overview of
the analysis to be presented in the study.

The remainder

of the study will provide detailed analysis of the

Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America
Harcourt. Brace, and World, 195Tn

(New York:
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various factors and Issues outlined above.

Chapter II will

present a very brief review of Latin America's
pattern of
political development. Chapter III will explain
the

consensus model in detail and evaluate its application
to
Latin America. Chapter IV will do the same with the
conflict model.

Chapters V. VI, and VII actually analyze

the major issue areas under consideration and their

treatment in the literature.

Chapter V deals with the

middle sectors, vzhile Chapter VI analyzes urbanization and
Chapter VII analyzes the phenomenon of bureaucracy.

Chapter VIII presents a brief review of the major points
of the arguments and the author's conclusions about the

issues considered in the study, along with some

suggestions on how one ought to approach the study of
Latin America,
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CHAPTER

II

THE PATTERN OP LATIN AMERICAN

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
Introduction
As was noted In the previous chapter, the

historical experience of the Latin American nations
has
been quite different from that of the United States,
Basically, the Latin American heritage is Southern

European and Iberian while the United States* tradition
is of a North European origin.

In terms of societal

differences this has meant that the Latin American

nations have inherited the essentially feudal and medieval
traditions of Spain and Portugal, whereas the United
States was colonized primarily by Northern European

nations which had already emerged from the feudal
experience into an early capitalistic oriented economic
system.

Concerning religion, the Latin American

tradition is Catholic with all of the Church's

institutional and conservative Spanish moral values, while

,
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the United States was colonized
by a variety of sects
most
of which were dominated by the
Protestant ethic, with its
greater emphasis on pluralism,
secularism, and material
success.
The religious experiences have
had much

influence on Intellectual and scientific
endeavor as well.
The Thomlstlc Catholic tradition based
its intellectual
traditions on logic and deductive reasoning
in search of

absolute truths, while the Protestant
tradition provided
greater opportunity for questioning and
scientific
inquiry.

1

The social and political spheres of Latin
America

and the United States have been subject to different
forces as well.

The feudal and medieval system was based

on rigid class lines which were transferred to
Latin

1^

Leopoldo Zea, The Latin Am erican Mind, translated"
by James H, Abbott and Lowell Dunham (Norman: University
of Oklahoma Press. I963) was one of the most influential
books on the philosophical traditions of Latin America.
Kls analysis has been severely criticized recently.
Among the critics is William D. Raat, "Leopoldo Zea and
Mexican Positivism: A Reappraisal." The Hi spanic
Amgrican ..Historica l Rev iew. XLVIII. NoTXTfSbrui^y
1968), 1-18^
Several of the readings in The Origi ns of
the_Jjj-U.n_Jlrrierican Revolutions. 18 08-1826
ed. by R. A.
Humphreys and John LyncfrTWevi York
Knopf, I966), present
excellent analyses of the differences in philosophical
traditions as well.
.

:

America through colonization. ^
of power

m

Land-holding was the source

the social and political spheres.

The Spanish

tradition accepted absolutism as a legitimate
kind of
rule. The United States colonial experience,

on the other

hand, brought the beginnings of pluralism
and the

emergence of a strong middle class.

In the political

sphere, pluralism began to emerge, and the
concept of

limited government came from the English and French
traditions.
Since the colonial experiences of new nations

affect their future developments, the study of colonial
traditions should provide a key to understanding later
development of the systems.

As a result, attention will

now be turned to an analysis of Latin America's colonial
experience; and then, its history will be traced

interpretlvely rather than exhaustively, through modern
times.

The Impact of the colonial experience as well as

pertinent differences between the Latin American and
United States • experiences will be noted.

2

H. Haring,

This analysis

The Spanish Empire in America
Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1947). especially
Chapter X notes this tradition. For discussion of the
liberal tradition of the United States, see Louis Hartz,
The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt,
Brace, and World, 19^^.
C.

(New York:
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will provide the basis for
further evaluation of the
western democratic oriented frameworks
for the study of
political development in relation to
Latin America.
One further note about the study
of latin America
should be made. Lewis Hanke, among
others, has frequently

cautioned that it is risky to treat
all of Latin America
alike. ^ The author of this study
realizes that there are
many conflicting forces and trends from
one nation of
Latin America to another. None can be
treated as exactly
alike. While it may be hazardous to
generalize about the
"latin American experience." there are enough

commonalities in the historical and cultural traditions
of
the Latin Americans to treat the region as a
whole.
Pertinent exceptions to the general trends will be noted
as these traditions are scrutinized.

This question is considered as part of an even
broader question in Lewis Hanke (ed.). Dp th e Ameri cas
~~
Have, A_ Commo n History ? (New York:
Knopf. IStWf^
especially the Introduction as well as in his Contemporary
I^^n Amgrl pgA Short Histor y (Princeton: Van Nostrand,
1968), pp,
and 2^2^^2E5l
In addition, see Luis
Mercler Vega. Roads to Power In Latin America (New York:
Praeger, I969), especially pp. I-.3.
;

35

Colonial Traditions
The sixteenth century was one of exceptional

colonial activity by the Spaniards and Portuguese, and
the
Americas provided a fertile ground for empire building.
Their colonial empires in the Americas took hold during
this century.

There were several aspects of the colonial

period which are important to the evaluation of latin

American political development.
The Indians .

The native Indian population of the

Americas presented an obstacle to colonization by the
Spaniards and Portuguese.

The variety of Indian

civilizations created a number of different types of
effects for the conquerors.

In some instances, the Indians

of Latin America had more advanced civilizations than their

counterparts in North America.

For example, the Incas,

Mayas, and Aztecs facilitated the conquest in the Valley
of Mexico, the Yucatan, and the V/estern Andean highlands.

These sedentary Indians were fairly easy to conquer because

See Charles Gibson, Spain in America (New York:
Harper and Row. I966), pp. 25-32, and Chapter ?. Also
Donald E. Worcester and Wendell G. Schaeffer, The Growth
and Culture of latin Arnerlca (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1956), Chapter II,

^

the Spaniards only had to
get rid of the leaders and
then
they could take control of the
civilization. This type of

subjugation was particularly easy
with the Aztec
Civilization which was highly centralized
in organization.
The Mayas were less easily subjugated
because there was no
one capital of the civilization
and they did not fall to
the conquerors as a unit.
Instead, various bands of
Mayas fought In an uncoordinated
manner— the whole

Civilization did not submit as the result
of loss of the
leadership,^
The Incas, although perhaps the most
advanced

Indian civilization, proved even more difficult
to
conquer. The Andean topography may have been a
partial

factor in their greater resistance to conquest
in that the
highlands permitted holdouts in various mountain
hideouts.
Hov/ever,

the situation was complicated by civil war

within the Inca civilization and various Spanish factions
vied for control of the Incan empire.

Gibson, op. cit.
6

Ibid.

.

p.

29.

.

p.

25.

The Spanish
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factions led to conflict a.ong
the conquerors and
permitted
the inoas to retain some
Independence late Into the
sixteenth century,'^
once the elite elements of
the Aztec. Mayan, and
mean Civilizations were eliminated,
the Spaniards had a
readily submissive population at
their disposal. ^ These
sedentary tribes were skilled in
agriculture, weaving,
and the mining of precious metals.
All of these skills
were valx^ble to the Spaniards and
they took advantage of
the Indians to provide for their
own enrichment.
In contrast to the sedentary
Indians, there were

many nomadic tribes.

The nomads inhabited Southern
South

America (the Puelche. Tehuelche. and
Araucanian Indians)
and Northern Mexico (the Apaches).^
These nomadic
Indians were more akin to the Indians in
what was to
become the United States. The nomads were
difficult to
conquer and they made it difficult for
settlements to
exist because of attacks on the settlements.

Ibid.

,

Conflicts

pp. 30-32.

Q

See Eric R. Wolf. Sons of Shakinp: Earth (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press. 1959), pp. 213-215.
9

Worcester and Schaeffer, op. clt.

.

p. 19.
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With the nomads continued throughout
colonization and still
exist in some Latin American nations.
Additionally, the
nomads did not represent a stable source of
labor for the

colonizers as the sedentary Indians did so that
there was
not so much attraction to the conquerors in
areas where

nomads roamed "'"^
The Indians represented a vast source of labor
to
the conquerors and use of this supply of manpower
took

many forms.

During the early period of colonization, the

encomienda system developed.

Through this system,

Spaniards were given control over land and Indian labor on
the land, although the land still remained in the hands of
the Crown.

This arrangement is different from the

hacienda system which emerged in some parts of the area,
Tl^e

hacienda system Included title to land; whereas the

en comienda system extended control only over the Indians

and whatever was produced on the

land.'^"'"

The person

Ibid,
See Eric R. Wolf. "Aspects of Group Relations in
a Complex Society:
Mexico," Contemporar y Cultures a nd
Societ ies of Latin Ameri ca, ed. by Dwight B, Heath and
Richard N, Adams (New York: Random House, I965), pp. 9092, and Wolf and Edv;ard C, Hansen, "Caudlllo Politics:
A Structural Analysis," Comparative Studies in Society and
His tory , IX (January, 19^7), PP. 168-179 for a discussion
of these differences.

granted the

encomle^

was supposed to protect
and provide
for the moral well-being
(n^eaning Christianization)
of his
subjects.
In return the Indian subject
provided labor for
the grantee.
In effect this system
a form of slavery,
even though moral and legal
obligations were imposed on
the landowner.
Ronald Glassman refers to the
encomienda
system as part of a «semifeudal state
system," carried
over from Spain's ovm developmental
experience.
this
system, there developed a very
personalistic relationship
between the master and his charges thus
differentiating
the system from a purely feudal
arrangement with greater
emphasis on traditional-legal factors.
This personalism

m

is an important factor in considering
the modernizing

process in Latin America.

Attempts at creating

bureaucratic organizations on the western model
have had

12

Ronald Glassman, Political History of Lat in
(New York:
Funk &""Wagnalls, I969), pp. 83-89;
William W. Pierson and Federlco Gil. Governments
of litin
America (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970)'.
p. 55; Stanley Stein and Barbara H. Stein. The Colonjal
H.erita.'^e of latin America (New York:
ColumbiTljnT57^?iTty
Press, 1970). p. 36; and Earing, op. cit. . Chapters III,
IV, and VI explain some of the details of the enco mienda
system.
America.

13

Glassman. op. cit.
pp. 87-90 spells out some of
the difference betv/een feudalism and his "semi-feudal"
.

framework.

to consider the personallstic
feature.

The assuinptions

behind the rational Weberian
model, for Instance, have
not
always been relevant to Latin
America.

Another aspect of the semi-feudal
arrangement was
that the scale of organization
of social relationships was
fairly small. The peasant developed
loyalty to his
landholder rather than to a larger
political unit such as
the Crown or its administrative
officers in the colonies.
This feature was also to be of great
importance for future

political development.

Much of the experience of Latin

American political affairs relates to the many
centers of
power which have competed for supremacy in
any one
country.

The

c audillo

system emerged partially as a

result of this experience.
The e ncomienda system seemed most suited to the

early period of colonization

v^hen the

Europeans were few

in number and the native population was large.

As the

relative size of the indigenous population decreased, a

new approach was needed and the encomienda system gave way
to repartimiento. 14

In this system the person in need of

This discussion of the use of Indian labor is
based on Gibson's analysis, op. clt. . pp. 157-I58.

labor applied to local authorities
and the local
authorities distributed Indians among the
Spanish
employers.

While the Indians were paid and
supposedly

treated humanely, this system was a form of
forced labor.
The system of repartlrolento developed
partly because of
Crovm pressure to abandon the e ncomlenda
system.

Like It

predecessor, repartlmiento failed because of abuses
by

employers and because of increasing pressures by the
Crown in the late sixteenth century.

During the seventeenth century, a system of free
contract labor developed but was short-lived.

The

insufficiency of Indian labor and abuses by employers led
to its demise.

Peonage took the place of the

aforementioned attempts at utilization of Indian labor.
Through peonage, the Spaniard made loans to the Indians

and required repayment in work.

As the debt was repaid,

new loan would be granted thus insuring obligation of the
Indian.

Debts could be inherited by the children.

This

system has endured even though attempts at limitation
have been made.
The hacienda and plantation systems represent a

variation on the use of Indian manpower.

In this system,

the Spaniards acquired land by buying, through land grant

or by taking It away from the native population.

The

hacienda would often incorporate entire Indian villages*

While the Indian was taken advantage
of In this system, the
Crovm did not react to It with
controls as It did with the
other forms of labor.^^ As a result,
the system became

entrenched In Latin America and works hand
in hand with
peonage.
The generalizations made above cannot
be applied to

Brazilian Indians.

In Brazil, the Indian civilizations

were generally very primitive and usually
nomadic.

As a

result, they either disappeared, were assimilated,
or

became isolated in uncolonized regions.

The coastal

areas of Brazil became devoid of Indians and even
in the
interior they were not very well suited to plantation
work.
In addition, the Jesuit influence in Brazil had the
impact
of reducing the use of Indians as slaves. '•'^

All of these

forces led to the introduction of the African slave in
Brazil,

15

Ibid.

,

p. 156.

16

See Worcester and Schaeffer, op. cit.
17

.

p. 2?.

Ihid . . pp. 27-28. Also see C. R. Boxer. The
Po rtuguese Seaborne Empire:
1415-1825 (London:
Hutchinson. I969), pp. 96-9?.
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The African slave gave Brazil
an ethnic minority
Which did not exist in such large
numbers in much of the
rest of latin America. The African
provided the muscle
for development of Brazil's colonial
economy.
Black
slavery was accepted by the Portuguese
Crown until

abolition in 1888.

While the Africans were imported

mainly for their labor, they also
introduced new ideas to
the Brazilian social system. Brazil
became a
mixture of

African, Indian, and European with the
result that

Brazilians represent a people very different
from most
18
Latin Americans.
In addition to providing labor and

introducing different cultural traditions, the
African
helped explore and develop Brazil as well as provide

manpower for protection against hostile Indians.

Besides

Brazil, many Caribbean nations were influenced by
large

African populations.

This ethnic-cultural strain enriched

the cultural tradition of latin America and led to some

racial problems at times.

The Africans in Latin America,

however, were assimilated to a greater extent than they

were in the United States and their culture became a part

18

See E. Bradford Burns, A History of Bi-azil (New
York:
Columbia University Press, 1970), pp. 39-43 for an
excellent discussion of the contribution of the Africans.

Of Brazilian and Caribbean
cultures; whereas in the
United
States, they remained essentially
a separate culture.
Generally, the ethnic-cultural
make-up of Latin

America is vastly different from
that of the United States.
In many cases in latin America,
the Indians outnumbered
Spaniards and were not eliminated or
assimilated.
Compared to the United States, the
Indians have had a much
greater Impact In Latin America.
many cases,

m

particularly where the nomads are Involved.
Indians still
exist in virtual Isolation of the rest
of
the nation.

a result,

As

integration of the nation is very difficult.

Instead, two separate cultures often exist
within the

national boundaries with little bridging of the
gap between
those cultures.
Administration.

In colonizing the New World, the

Spanish Crown retained almost absolute control over

acquired territories. 19

'

In order to exercise the supreme

19

Harlng, pp. clt.. pp. 1-22 analyzes the
background to the Spanish view of the King's sovereignty
over the colonies. The subject is also treated briefly by
Stein and Stein, op . clt. pp. 3-26, William Lytle
Schurz. lat in Amer ic a; A Descriptive Survey (New York:
Button, 19^3), pp. 31-33 deals specifically with the
aspects of discovery and exploration by the Spaniards.
.

authority, the Crov.^ set up
viceroyaltles In the New World.
First came the creation of New
Spain in 1535 containing
Mexico and Central America; the
Viceroyalty of Peru was
created in 15^2 encompassing all of
South America.

Eventually New Granada was separated
from the Viceroyalty
of Peru in I7I8 and still another. La
Plata, was carved

out in 1776.

20
It should be remembered that the
creation

of these units and the forthcoming
administrative unity was
for the purpose of extending more effective
control over

the regions by the colonial power.
The fact that Spain attempted to maintain
extensive

control over its colonies means that the colonies
did not
have opportunity for acquiring experience with
self-

government except at the local level.

By way of contrast,

the English colonies had some element of discretion in
the

Pierson and Gil. op> cit. pp. 39~-li9 outline the
administrative apparatus of the Spaniards.
.

21

IMd. . pp. 62-65. The authors provide an
excellent comparison of the Spanish and English colonies
in the Americas.
In noting the different experiences of
the tV7o colonial traditions, they note that the English
colonies were developed by settlements of colonists going
to the New World for their ov/n reasons while the Spanish
colonies were attempts at transplanting the colonial
power's culture in the new world.

;

operation of their own unit,
despite the fact that
authority .tlU resided In
the Crown. Hobert
Potash „..es
the suggestion that
It .ight be laok of
preparation of the
people for life
modern society rather
than

m

the

continued existence of outmoded
colonial institutions
Which is important in latin
American development.

22e.Mtles.

Another feature of the
colonial system
v.as the fact that
it involved an element
of city building
on the part of the Spaniards.
The cities were the centers
Of administration for the
Crown as well as beine
showcases
Of splendor and luxury in the
tradition copied from the
Moslems by Spain. ^3 They attracted
the landholders and

22

Robert A. Potash, "Colonial
Institutions and
Contemporary I^tin Arnerica: A Commentary
on Two Papers

flfe^'S^^^^
comments
i^^"^^^

^v^i^

(August
"Coloniel
Institutions and Contemporary Latin
^
and Economic Life." pp. 371-379. and Am.erloa: Political
Charles Gibso^
"Colonial Institutions and Contemporary
Latin AmericaSocial and Cult.n>al Life."
pp. 38L38/in the same ?oiume.
^
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•

^

on Woodrow Borah.

John Mander, The^Unrevp

If^lSrofL^^

Tj^e

for Latin America. United Nations Economic
and Social
council, Soc.ial Development of Latin America
in The Post61 deal with the issue and take a simi.lar position.

.ore wen.to.do.

The development or
cities in this way

has two very important
implications for this study.
First of all. the fact
that cities developed
as
centers of grandeur by the
aristocracy, who were the
landholders, meant that the
landed estates were often
left in the hands of managers.
The countryside eventually
experienced a legitimacy vacuum
of sorts.
This vacuum
may be partially responsible
for much of the social
disjointed^ess and political anarchy
which was to plague
latin America's rural areas in
the future.
The cities
became the centers of political
power although land was
the source of wealth, status,
and power.
Secondly, that cities developed
very early in
Latin America and as showplaces
of culture is important
in evaluating frameworks for the
study of political
development. Many of the frameworks are
based on

assumptions and result in conclusions to
the effect that
urbanization is brought about by industrialization.
In

Latin America, in contrast, cities long
predated

Industrialization and have existed without accompanying
Industrialization.

The fact of Latin American

urbanization experience will be important in considering
the validity of such frameworks.

Chapter VI, dealing

with urbanization and political development, will treat
this factor in depth.

She-Church.

Perhaps one of the
„ost durable of
colonial institutions
in I.tin America
is the RoM.n
catholic Church. The
relationship of church
and state
was traditionally one
of interdependence.
The Spanish
monarchy exercised a great
a.ount of control over
the
selection of the ecclesiastical
hierarchy during the
colonial period as a result
of the Royal Patronage
of the
Indies worked out by the
government and the Pope.^'^

m

effect, the Church operated
at the pleasure of and
for
the benefit of the Spanish
Monarch.
It provided further
assua^ances that control by
the Crown would be upheld
in
the colonies.

There were some limitations
to the governmental'
control over the Church in the
colonies, however. As
Pierson and Gil note, the Cro^vn
could not revoke an
ecclesiastical appointment once made.25
^^^^^
^^^^
some room for independence
on the part of ecclesiastical

authorities.

Further, the state's authority
did not

24

See Pierson and Gil, op. cit.>
pp. 50^^-^166-193;
PPand
Schurz,
.^^^•-•^^^
pp. cit.
formation on this relationship.
25

Pierson and Gil, op. cit. . pp.51-52.

.

for

extend to ecclesiastical matters.

It is obvious that

this arrangement provided some
limitations on the state.
The close relationship between
Church and state

provided an opportunity for the state
to further the
interests of the Church as well. The
state attempted to
keep heretical ideas out of the
colonies but for various
reasons, it was not always successful.
For one
thing,

the Indians did not accept Christianization
without

resistance.

Instead, they retained many of their
pagan

beliefs and the result often was a mixture
of pagan and
Catholic practices. In Brazil and other places
where

African slaves were introduced, many slaves retained
their Moslem or African religions and thus represented
a
source of heresy.

In most of Spanish America, however,

the efforts of the Spaniards to keep the faith intact

paid off handsomely in terms of loyalty of the Church to
state authority.

The ecclesiastical authorities often

became adjuncts of the state.
Not to be overlooked
the Spaniards.

v;as

the missionary zeal of

Usually people were not allowed in the

colonies imless they were Christians, and the colonists

attempted to spread the faith in some instances.

In

cases where the Indians were Christianized, the clergy

were usually closer to the indigenous population than

were the governmental
officials
uiixciais.

^
reason
for the

n>.«
One

Closeness of the Indians
to the clergy I3
the fact that
the Indians had been
stripped of their hu:,anlty
by the

conquerors but the Church
defended that hu„.nlty
and gave
n>eanln« to the Indian's
life.
A3 noted by Eric Wolf
religion provided the Indian
with a .eans of coping
with
his existence.
It gave him hope, not
in the
sense of

eternal salvation, but In
the meaning of everyday
Ufe.^^
In addition. hw.ane
considerations on the part
of clerics
often tempered the brutal
treatment of the Indians.
As a
result, where Indians had much
contact with the Spaniards
it was usmlly through the
Church and loyalty tended to
be to the Church rather than
government. Of
course, the

ecclesiastical authority occasionally
used this loyalty
against the government, but usually
it was translated
Into loyalty to the Crovm.^?
The close relationship of

26

Wolf.

Sons of Shaking Earth , pp. 170-I75.
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See Pierson and Gil. op. clt.

5o^n^

.

pp. 51.53.

agree with the
?dei"?AaF?hf^'
the clergy was any less likely than
others to
exploit and abuse the native population.
He relates
examples of physical abuse as a means of
ridding Indians
t^l''^
°f
destruftlon o?
"^^^
?nH?of temples.
^'''^"S!^
Indian
Frank Tannenbaum, Ten Keys to Latin
America (Mew York. Vintage Books. r9"6o).'p.
56 states:
it is important to repeat that the only
contact with
P''*
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Church and state went hand in
hand in transmitting
Spanish culture to the New World.
The Church's role in Latin
American political
affairs increased as time went on.
largely as a result of
its acquisition of land.
Much land was left to the
Church and it eventually became the
largest single
landholder in Latin America. With wealth
and power
dependent on land, the Church gained
unprecedented

influence.

Because of the system of mortmain, the
lands,
once acquired by the Church, were to remain
in its hands
perpetually. The Church's holdings continually
increased.

Perhaps the most important legacy of the Church
was its impact on thought.

The Church's teachings

emphasized reverence for authority and acceptance of the
faith vrithout question.

Anyone who questioned the

Church's teachings was considered a sinner.

The idea was

carried over to acceptance of authority in general

because of the close interrelationship of church and

Europeans not imkindly to the American
through the mission." Thus, agreement
although it is generally conceded that
received humane treatment, it was from

Indians was
does not exist
if the Indians
the Church.

state. 28

The lack of questioning created
a fairly

submissive population.

The teaching that poverty,
for

instance, was a natural condition
and a form of suffering
leading to Improvement in human
nature and as a partial
way to eventual salvation, caused
the peasants to accept

their lot as natujral.

Donald E. Worcester argues that

religious traditions created a fatalistic
and passive
population.
In addition he argues that incentive
and
creativity were dulled by the faith put in
miracles or
other acts of God.^^ Whether good or bad,

there can be

little doubt that the Church was a major force
in the

colonial setting and was to remain so for a long
time to
come.
The Interrelationship of church and state was not
so great in Portuguese as in Spanish colonies.

V/hile the

rights of patronage existed in Brazil, there was much
less rigidity in religious practices*

The Portuguese

were not so likely to exclude non~ Christians and were

28

Gibson, op. cit.
Chapter k deals with this
aspect, especially pp. 35-86,
.
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Donald E. Worcester, "The Spanish American
Past: Enemy of Change," Journal of Inter-American
Studies . XI (January, I969), 66-75.

more open to acceptance of
Indian and African practices;
thus, the Church had less
influence in state affairs. ^o'
Another difference in the Church
in Brazil was that the
Jesuits were dominant and because
they were more open to
new ideas and developments than
the secular clergy,
the

Church had a different effect in
Brazil.
In the other nations of Latin
America, the various

religious orders fought with one another
and usually the
Crown sided with the secular clergy
who tended to be more
conservative and loyal to the Ci^own.^^
The Jesuits were
not controlled by a secular hierarchy
in Brazil.
Many
Jesuits in Brazil became spokesmen for
humane treatment of
the Indians and slaves as well as for
curtailing
the

influence of the Crown.

Brazil still has some of the

most liberal clergy in all of Latin America
although not
necessarily Jesuit. As a result, there was a
greater

acceptance of diversity and. because of the African
input,
of racial mixtures so that discrimination did
not become

as strong in Brazil as it did in other parts of Latin
America,
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Pierson and Gil, op. cit. . pp. 72-73, and pp.
o
80-81; and Stein and Stein, op. clt. pp. 21-2^^.
.
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Gibson, op. clt.

.

pp. 7^-82.
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Bourbon Reforms and Independence
The Bourbon reforms in Spain
and Portugal were
carried to the American colonies
but often with effects

very different from what happened
in Europe.
intent of the Bourbons in instituting
reforms
Americas was to increase the amount
of wealth
collected by the Crovm.^^ There were
reforms

The primary
in the
to be
in the

economic, political, and social areas
of the system and
all were directed at increasing colonial
control.
The

political reforms In particular were calculated
to
consolidate Crovm authority and diminish the
Influence of
the Church in colonial affairs.
Many attempts
at

centralization of power were made with reorganization
of
colonial administration. The intendant system was
intended as a means of decreasing the Influence of
local

officials

\}ho

had been embarrassments to the Crown because

of their corruption and inefficiency.

32

See John J. Johnson, Simon Bolivar and Spanish
Americ an Inde p endence; 1783-1830 (Princeton! Van
Nostrand, 1968), pp. 16-36.
33

Ibid.

,

p.

18.

While the Intent of the reforms
seemed to be to
improve control by the mother country,
there were also
some results beneficial to the
people of Latin America.
Most Important, the reforms meant more
humane treatment
for the Indian and slave populations.
Although the lives
of Africans and Indians continued to
be dreary, at least
the worst abuses v;ere abolished.^^
The effect of the Bourbon reforms was
to Improve
the established order through enlightened
despotism.

It

did not have much Impact in reducing absolute
control over
the system.

However, the improvement of many elements
of

administration meant eventually that new power centers
for opposition to the Crovm would develop.

In addition to

new power centers, the various efforts by the Crown
to
increase the efficiency of its exploitation of the

colonies only increased opposition. -^^
In Brazil, the Bourbon reforms were tied to an

increasing interest by the Crown in its colony.

During

the late eighteenth century, Portugal began losing its

3^

Ibid.
p. 21; Charles C. Griffin, "The
Enlightenment and Latin American Independence," in
Humphreys and Lynch, op. cit. pp. 3G-51; and Gibson,
,

.

op. cit.

.
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p. 48.

pp. 165-172,

Johnson, op. cit.

,

p.

2k; and Griffin,

op, cit.

,

empire and Brazil beca.e
its major interest after
having
been of minor importance
as part of Portugal's
empire in
earlier days. The Crov:n
attempted to tighten its
control
over the colony by talcing away
much of its local autonomy
and transferring power from
the landed proprietors
to

agents of the Crown.^^

With the transfer of the
monarchy

to Rrazil in 1808, the conflicts
between the local

administration and Crovm policies grew
with the eventual
result of complete autonomy for
Brazil,
For nearly three hundred years,
the colonial rule
of Spam remained essentially intact.
The success of
Spain in retaining control over her
colonies is notable in
light of the eighteenth century developments
in North
America.
The reasons for Spain's success in
maintaining

control are not easy to pinpoint.

However, Cecil Jane

suggests that a great portion of the credit
for retention
of control must go to the lack of desire
on the part of
the colonists for independence.^''

He argues that the

See Caio Prado Junior, "The Economic
Interpretation of Brazilian Independence," in Humphreys
and Lynch, op. cit. , pp. 221-2^0 and Boxer, op. cit.,
*
pp. 198-200.
j
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Cecil Jane, Liberty and Despotism in Spanish
Americ a (New York:
Cooper Square Publishers, 1966). pp
W^50 and 57-64.

colonists were satisfied for
the most part with
Royal
authority and that the Church
was instrumental in

instilling a loyalty to constituted
authority. Another
factor may have been the
colonists* fear of domination
by
other European powers. At any
rate, there is
little

question rhat the colonists had
little desire for breaking
their ties with Spain until the
nineteenth century.
During the period from 1810 to
1825, however, most
Of the nations of Latin America
severed their political
ties with the colonial powers.
Leading to the wars of
independence, notes Lyle KcAlister.
there was a general
erosion of the institutions and structures
of the Spanish
colonial powers,
Both Spain and Portugal had attempted
to centralize their colonial administration
but. as was

noted above, their attempts produced forces
leading to
sentiment for independence. Most importantly,
resentment
began building up among the Creoles who were
virtually
excluded from positions of political power.

peninsulares retained almost all power.

Instead, the

Increasingly, the

Creoles made contact with the outside v/orld and gained

exposure to new ideas.

Comparing their own society to

38

Lyle N. KcAlister, "Social Structure and Social
Change in New Sfvain," The PUspanlc American Historical
Review , XI.III (August. 1963)7 370.
'
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those Of Europe and North America,
many Creoles became
impatient for change from authoritarian
rule and. as such,
became involved in Independence
movements. ^9 ^ven though^
the Cro.^ had become somewhat
distant in dealings with the
colonies, the peninsulares remained in
control.
One of

the effects of this arrangement was
to leave a power

vacuum when independence did come since
the Creoles and
native population had no training or experience
in

governing themselves.
Nany of the colonists regarded themselves as
being

exploited by the mother country and this, combined
with
the miserable lot of the peasant, created greater
interest

m

separation.

The general feeling of repression in all

spheres of life was responsible for much of the

Independence sentiment especially when combined with a

widening horizon on the part of the colonists.

Ideas from

the Enlightenment and a tendency toward greater

Intellectual and social freedom were emerging.
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Pierson and Gil, op. clt. p. 83 deals with this
element as well as the other ideas suggested in this
section. Also see Ben Burnett and Kenneth F. Johnson,
Political Forces in Latin America (Belmont, Calif.:
Wadsworth, 1968), pp. 3-6; and Schurz. op. cit. pp. ^3,

.

Probably nothing had a greater
impact than the
example set by the North American
colonies and the French
Revolution. With their independence
from Great
Britain,

the North American colonies
stimulated similar activities
in other colonial dependencies.
The ideas of liberty,
equality, etc., were being accepted by
the colonists of

latin America.

As will be seen, the ideals were not

always carried into practice in the Latin
American states
While support for Independence may have
increased

because of dissatisfaction with certain
features of
colonial rule, the wars of Independence were
not really

anti-Crom.

Instead, the independence movements were

often Justified on the basis of support for the real

monarchy as opposed to the rule of Napoleon after his
subjugation of Spain,

Loyalty to Spain was acceptable

but most Spanish people in the colonies could not give

loyalty to Napoleon's colonial empire and the seeds of

revolution were planted.

Additionally, the colonies were

often revolting against peninsular authority imder the
guise of loyalty to the Crown, charging the penlnsulares

^0
Johnson, Simon Bo lfvar and Smnlsh American
Independence;
I783-I83O p. 36,
.
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with violating the will of the
Crown.^^

Whatever the

source of revolt, the wars of
Independence changed very
little. Although often based on lofty
Ideals, the postindependence rulers tended to be as
authoritarian as were
the colonial powers.
In the words of John J, Johnson:
The difference vjas that by 1825
authoritarians born in America had replaced
those sent from Spain and Portugal; except
in Brazil, which remained an empire iintil
1889. authoritarianism was wielded in the
name of republicanism. ^2

The social, economic, and political order tended
to remain
the same, the only change being that different people
were

holding power.

Jane, op. clt.

42

.

Chapters V and VI.

John J. Johnson, Political Cha npre in Latin
Am erica: The Emergen ce of the Middle Se'ctors (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1958). p. 1?.
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Post-Independence 19th Century
I83O-I87O.

When Independence came to Latin

America, the colonists were often
ill-prepared for ruling
themselves. It will be remembered that the
Spaniards

practically excluded the Creoles and natives
from
governmental affairs.

As a result there developed a power

vacuum when the rule of Spain and those loyal to
the
empire

v:ere

removed in the Americas.

To fill this power

vacuum the military often appeared, but even the military
was not very well organized on a national level.

The era

of the QQud,UJ-0 emerged in which military heroes with
the

support of their own bands would fight for peace. ^-^
The landed estate system was not changed with

independence and thus the various large landholders often

competed for political power as well.

As a result of

these conflicts, the period following Independence
of confusion and frequent changes in leaders.

v^as

Brazil,

one
'

with the monarchy helping to insure peaceful change did

not experience the disruption of other Latin American
nations.

See Wolf and Hansen, op. cit.
for an excellent
discussion of this power vacuum and its implications. In
addition, see William H. Beezley, "Caudilllsmo
An
Interpretive Note," Journal of Inter-Amerlcan Studies
,

:

,

XI (July, 1969). 3^5-357.
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In addition to the forces noted
above, there was

another problem for the emerging independent
nations of
Latin America. The independence movements
were
often

influenced by and based on the ideals of the
French

Revolution and the democratic ideals of the
newly-formed
United States of America. Thus, when new
constitutions and
governments were established, they often copied
United
States and Western European models.

Whole sections of the

United States Constitution were often inserted verbatim
as
parts of the new Latin American constitutions.^^ These

constitutions were supposed to provide stability and order
for the society.

Along

V7lth the

new constitutions, many Latin

American nations developed a political party system.
Usually the political parties were divided along the lines
of Liberals (often reformers) and the Conservatives (often

defenders of the system as it existed).

Electoral reform

and participation by the people became the programs of
the Liberals in nations such as Urugviay and Mexico, for

example.

In Mexico, the one-party system developed with

44

Plerson and Gil, op. cit. Chapter 5 has a good
analysis of the early constitutions and their sources.
.

Gibson, op. cit.

,

pp» 214-216.
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reform being the major doctrine
of the party.
from the United States often
assume

Scholars

that Latin American

political parties play roles comparable
to those of
parties In the United States, but again,
cultural bias
overshadows objective analysis. As with
the constitutions
of I^tm America, the political parties
may represent
somethlns very different from what they
represent
In the

United States.
Unfortunately, the social and economic as well
as
religious Institutions of Latin America were not

conducive to the establishment or maintenance
of

pluralistic democracy.

The assujnptlons of democracy run

counter to the prevailing social, economic, and religious
order.
In addition, there Is some question as to whether
the Latin Americans understood the democratic ideals in

the same way Northern Europeans did.

Glen Dealy takes the

position that nineteenth century latin Americans actually

rejected eighteenth century political liberalism.

Glen Dealy, "Prolegomena on the Spanish American
Political Tradition," The Hismnlc American HistoricaJ.
Review XLVIII (February, I968), 37-5B. J. Lloyd Kecham,
"Latin American Constitutions: Nominal and Real,"
Journal of Poll tics XXI (May, 1959), 258-272 also reviews
this aspect although his attention focuses on twentieth
century constitutions.
,

.

6k

Dealy analyzes various provisions
and features of
nineteenth century latin American
constitutions to show
what real meaning was given the
adopted concepts and
ideals of democracy. His argument
is that
the

constitutions of Latin America were
actually aimed at
insuring control by political leaders
over the populace
rather than the other way around, as
assumed in
pluralistic democratic models.^"''
At any rate, the dichotomy between the
ideals as
North Americans understand them and the
conditions
in

which they were to be used left a great deal
of confusion.
As a result, the legitimacy vacuum left by
Spain's

removal meant that new sources of legitimacy
had to be
found. The period from I83O to I87O was one
in which

attempts to establish legitimacy occurred in most
Latin

American nations.

Various aristocratic families and men

on horseback contended for power, alternating in rule

through the caudillo system.

In effect, chaos and

anarchy reigned after independence.
Portuguese monarchy

vias

Partly because the

successful in its reform efforts.

^7

Dealy, op, cit, , p. 52; and Jane, op. cit.
Chapter VIII provide a similar analysis.

.

Brazil was an exception to
this generalization.
Some
nations of Spanish America,
such as Paraguay, did not
experience such disruption either.
While there were constant changes
in political
leadership in much of latin America
in the first forty or
fifty years of independent rule,
in reality, little had
been changed from colonial times.
Instead of
the Crovm.

the caudill o became the symbol
of power, but the colonial

institutions survived.

Moreover, change from one

caudillo to another had almost no impact
on social or
economic considerations. Changes came only
at the top.^^
187 0-19 ^0 ,

The chaos of the early nineteenth

century was bound to give way to some form
of order and
integration of the society eventually. The late

nineteenth and early twentieth century saw the
emergence
of greater order in Latin America.
This period

is often
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See McAlister. op. clt.

.

p. 370.
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Merle Kling. "Tov^ard a Theory of Power and
Instability in Latin American Society," Western Political
SHSlterl^, IX (March, 1956). 21-35 evaluates the Impict
of caudillo government on the larger system.

called the period of
national consolidation.
Vari<.ous
forces combined to integrate
the societies .ore fully
and
replace the caudUio system
with governments capable
of
controlling the whole society.
While the rest of Latin America
gained independence
duz-ing the mid-nineteenth
century. Brazil did not do
so
until 1889Brazil's independence also
differed in the
sense that it did not bring much
violent change. Instead,
a military regime deposed the
monarchy with little
noticeable effect for most of the
population. This
regime, however, attempted to
develop the nation
economically and was a stabilizing force
in this nation in
contrast to the independence periods
of most of the rest
of the Latin American nations. ^"^

During the mid-nineteenth century, the
Latin
American nations were caught up in the
desire for economic
development. They saw economic development
as the panacea
for all their ills. As a result, progress
in economic

50

Howard J. Wiarda. "Elites in Crisis. « unpublished
paper, n.d.. pp. 18-20 provides a brief description
of the
"consolidation" process.
Burns, op. cit.

.

pp. 198-204,

spheres became the goal of
Latin American governments.
To help this economic growth,
the countries of northern
Europe became markets for
agricultural goods
of the

Americas.

In addition, much immigration
from Europe to
Latin America occurred during this
period. Most

immigrants came in search of agricultural
opportunities.
Foreign investment and foreign markets
provided

tremendous economic growth for the region
and also led the
Latin Americans to become dependent on
agricultural
products. World War I only increased the
dependency of
Europeans on the Latin American agricultural
system.

The worldwide economic collapse of
1929 was to

change this situation, however, and prove
disastrous to
Latin American economic and political institutions.
Many

nineteenth century government leaders such as Porfirio
Diaz created economies dependent upon alien investors.

When the alien investors lost their money in the
1929
crash, the economies of Latin America suffered greatly.
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Johnson, Political ChanA-e in Latin America .
Chapter 3 provides one of the best analyses of I^atin
American development during this time. This section of
the study borrov^s heavily from Johnson's account.

In order to spin- economic growth,
the governments of

Latin America pushed various internal
improvements.
Notably, transportation and communication
systems were
established. Of course, this effort had
important

Implications for political integration, since
control is
easier to exert when geographical factors
can be

diminished as forces of division.
The unprecedented economic growth of this
period,

especially with its emphasis on agriculture, improved
the
position of the landed elites in Latin America. They
were
able to gain even greater power than before in controlling
society.

The influence of the oligarchies in Latin

America increased.
To provide a climate in which economic growth

could occur, certain political changes were made.

Partly

as a matter of convenience, the landholding elite

acquiesced to control by authoritarian rule and the
classic caudillo revolts diminished in frequency.

Dictatorships with mass support, as vmder Diaz, became a
way of providing stability so that economic development
could occur.

Attracting foreign investors was partially

dependent on stability in the political order and thus

compromises were made among landholders to support
dictators in the more general interest of developing the
economy.

Ironically, the very success
of the oligarchy
achieving its goals was to
produce forces which later
destroyed much of its power.
The emphasis on economic
development created new political
forces. John Johnson
sees this period of economic
development as responsible
for creating the middle sectors
of society, which he
considers the most important
force in the modernization
of
the area. ^5 The various
groups in the urban centers of

m

trade-.managers, bureaucrats, and
labor groups-were to
have a role in political development.
In addition, the
improvements in transportation and
communication provided
opportunities for the peasant sectors
to have contact with
other elements. Eventually, they were
also to demand some
share in the system.
Politically. Latin America experienced a
number of
strong dictatorships during this period,
but some nations
also went through the beginnings of radical
social and
political change as Mexico did in the Mexican
Revolution,
Being very personalistic in orientation, the
dictators

seldom prepared successors to themselves.

More

importantly, governmental institutions which could

Ibid.

,

pp.

continue to order the society
were not created. When
the
dictator went, there was nothing
to provide for an orderly
transition of governmental
authority. With the economic
collapse of 1929 and thereafter,
the political systems
became the objects of distrust
and frustration. As a
result, a new era of civil wars
and revolts ensued. A new
legitimacy vacuum developed and
brought about chaos as
great or greater than that of the
Immediate postindependence period.
With the new chaos, we begin to
^^ee

the emergence of various sectors
of society Involved

in political struggles.

The demand for a "piece of the

pie" came from many quarters.

These forces for change

produced more significant changes than
any experienced in
all the previous history of the area.

5^

analysis.

See Wlarda. op. clt.

.

pp. 20-21 for a brief
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Contemporary Latin Ameri ca
Many observers, looking at
Latin America prior to
1930. assume that it escaped the influence
of most of the
forces shaping the modem world.
However, as noted in the
previous section, forces which would
eventually catapult
many Latin American nations into
the processes
of

modernization were developing below the
surface.
attempt at economic development created

The

some changes which

provided a great deal more communication
among various
sectors of the society. As a result,
those sectors which
had previously been left out began to
recognize that an
alternative to their situation existed. Perhaps
increased

communication and transportation networks provided
the
greatest impetus to the so-called "revolution of
rising

expectations."

The dispossessed elements became

increasingly reluctant to accept their status as natural.
Instead, they began to demand a share in the fruits of

their labor.
The implications of the revolution of rising

expectations for the political system were immense.

The

political leaders and emerging middle sectors promised
that industrialization would be a cure-all for the

problems of the area.

Emphasis was put on developing
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factories and declining
dependence on foreign powers.
Unfortunately, the political
leaders were unable to l.eep
these promises.
Instead of curing problems,

industrialization created new ones
by putting all
available resources into
industrialization to the neglect
of other segments of society.
Secondly, increasing
industrialization often actually
brought greater influence
from outside because foreign
powers provided the major
resources for the industrialization
process.
Because
the political systems were
incapable of fulfilling the

rising expectations of the people,
more chaos and systemic
breakdovm ensued. Often, of course,
the political leaders
promised more than they could deliver
and the results
were increased impatience with the
political
system.

Thus, a new era of political instability
emerged.

Many changes in Latin American society
have
occurred in recent decades, although it
is easy to

exaggerate them.

Even though the post-1930 changes may

seem small from the perspective of highly
modernized
societies, the changes are significant in the
light of the
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"^^^^son. Political Change in Latin Amer ica,
no/n
pp. 1S6-189. and Mander. op. cit. . p. 2611

conditions existing in latin
America prior to I930. Prior
to 1930. very little change
was possible; whereas, post1930 experience indicates a greater
probability for such
change. Numerous traditional
institutions still exert
tremendous influence on the nations
of Latin America.
Despite a certain continuity to the
Institutions,
however, many significant changes
have come about.
While large haciendas still exist
in many parts of
Datin America, there has been a tendency
toward

modification of the system.

The product of economic

development and especially industrialization
has been a
challenge to the landowners by new groups,
especially
capitalists and labor elements.

Thus, land reform has

been a key proposal in most leftist political
circles.
The Alliance for Progress had. as part of its
goals, the

reform of landholding operations.^''

Internal development

Mander. op. clt. pp. 10^-106.
Claudlo Veliz.
The Poli t ics of Conforpilty in I^, tin America (London:
Oxford University Press. 196?). Introduction, looks at the
approaches to change and relation of the middle sectors to
the approaches.
.

victor Alba, Alliance Without A llies (New York:
Praeger. I965) provides an excellent critique of the goals
and performances of the Alliance for Progress.

of Brazil by Vargas and
succeeding governments has
created

new power centers in the Interior
to counterbalance
coastal interests. Along with these

changes, the Church

has become more socially conscious
in recent years.
pressures against the traditional elites
have had
significant influence. Even the military
with its

Such

increased middle class make-up is becoming
a little more
socially and politically progressive.
Perhaps the change
in make-up of the military is itself
partly responsible

for some of the changes noted here.

Brazil has been contrasted with Spanish America

several times in this brief analysis of Latin
American
history.

Perhaps it would be useful to summarize the

differences between Brazil and the rest of the region.
First of all, there was a vast difference in the

relationship of colonists to the indigenous population in
Brazil.

Since the Indian in Brazil

vias

not suitable for

labor as in most of Spanish America and since the Indian

population was comparatively small, the colonial power
imported a large number of African slaves.

The influx of

Africans gave Brazil a unique racial character among Latin

American nations.

The culture of the African slaves added

to the make-up of Brazilian culture.

Additionally,

slavery itself was a much more highly developed
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institution in Erazil than in any
other part of Latin
America,
Secondly, the economic history
of Brazil is very
different from that of much of
Spanish America. In much of
Latin America, the conquerors came
in search of precious
metals, many of which had been mined
by the Indians.
Once the mines were exhausted, the
colonial power focused
on agricultiu^e.
In Brazil, on the other hand, precious
metals were not important until much later.
Instead,

brazilwood, sugar, cotton, and tobacco were
important

conmodities in the economy of Brazil during the
colonial
period.
The agricultural exploitation in Brazil helped
to
create a system highly dependent on slavery from
the very

earliest days of development.

It was not until the

eighteenth century that gold and diamonds became important
to the Brazilian economy.

Brazil's economic development followed a reverse

pattern from most of the rest of Latin America.

More

importantly. Brazil also represents the epitome of the
"boom and bust'* type of economy. -^^

Brazil's development
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See Rollie E. Poppino. Brazi l;
The land and
People (New York: Oxford University Press. 1968). pp.
113-157 for an excellent analysis of Brazilian economic
development.

was cyclical with dependence
on one commodity at a time.
Usually, the economy has depended
on foreign markets as
well, making the nation economically
dependent. As one
natural resource was depleted or as
agricultural markets
fluctuated, the economy fluctuated
as well. The rubber
industry is perhaps the best example
of the boom and bust
character of Brazilian economy. Once
the major export of
Brazil, the rubber industry is now
almost non-existent
there. Now. of course. Brazil is most
dependent on the

coffee market although there is some
diversification in
its economy.
Brazil has developed a one-crop
or one-

commodity mentality— as the bottom fell out of
one market
a new resource was exploited.
The effect of this

approach has been disorganization and instability in
the
economic sphere as well as dependence on other nations*
economies.
In effect the contemporary scene in much of Latin

America is one in which traditional and modernizing
forces coexist side by side.

The traditional order has

not .been destroyed nor have modern institutions been
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Ibid.

.

p.

113, and pp. 153-15'!|.

^

installed.

Instead, some modernizing
institutions such a
new classes exist, but they have
to exist with

modifications of the old order.
The political systems of Latin
America still

reflect the authoritarian, personallstic.
and rigidly
hierarchical traditions, although those
traditions have
been modified.
In addition, there are forces for

modernization existing in the same systems.

The conflict

between the traditional and modernizing
forces create
difficult problems for Latin American attempts
at

developing social and political Institutions relevant
to
this modern era.
Just because there is turmoil in Latin America

does not mean that real changes are taking place.

Some

scholars note that while significant social and political
changes are occiArring in some nations, many of the

changes In government are still only changes at the top.
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Wlarda.

"Law and Political Development in Latin
America: Tov/ard a Framev/ork for Analysis." American
Journal of Comparative Lqw . XIX (Summer, 1971). ^34-463
explores the current scene. In addition, James Busey,
Latin America: Political Institutions and Processes
(New York
Random House, 196^) explains the same
characteristics.
:
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In fact,

it has been argued that
some recent "revolutions"

have really been attempts to
return to the past/^

^is

necessarily brief review of Latin
American
history Will provide a basis for a
fuller analysis

of the

applicability of the various frameworks
for the study of
political development to Latin America
in the following
six chapters. Each chapter will
provide greater

detail on

particular aspects of the several development
models and
on the peculiar nature of the Latin
American developmental
experience.
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.

leda S. Wiarda and Howard J. Wiarda, "Revolution
or Counterrevolution in Erazll, " r-Ta ssachusetts Review .
VIII (Winter, I967). 1^9-165 take this position
concerning Brazil; and Alba, op. cit> assumes the same in
discussing prospects for change in Latin America.
.
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CHAPTER III
THE CONSENSUS MODEL
The consensus model for the
study of social change
Is based on a tradition stemming
primarily from Max

Weber's works and carried into
contemporary scholarly
pursuit by Talcott Parsons.^ The
consensus model is also
referred to as "the equilibriiim
model" by many social
scientists, but as will be illustrated
in the next
chapter, equilibrium is not a concern
exclusive to the

1

Weber ThLe_ Thepry of Social and Econom ic
nv.nni..^?''
prfcanization
(New Yorkl
olford University
provides the most complete formulation of Pres~T947)
his ideas on
the subject, but other works to be noted
in this study
also provide important insights. Talcott
Parsons has
written extensively on the subject with his
Societies:
Evolutlonnry nnd C omparative Perspectives (EruPn^d
Prentice-Hall. 1966). and his collaboration with
Edward A. Shils. Toward a General Theory of Ac tion
(Cambridge
Harvard University Press. 1951) being among
tne most important.
In the comparative politics area.
Gabriel Almond has probably been the most ardent
spokesman for the Weberian model.
In turn. Almond's
influence on many of the political scientists to be
examined in this study is great.

—

:

consensus model. ^

Despite the suggestion that both
the

consensus and conflict models are merely
different paths
toward equilibrium, some social scientists
continue to
look at equilibrium and conflict as
identifying opposing
models.
In this study, consensus and equilibrium
will
not be considered the same.

Rather the consensus model is

taken to be one method of achieving equilibrium
in the
system.

Many equate the consensus model with democratic

pluralism, indicating that the backgrounds of the
people

most Identified with the consensus model are probably
very

influential in the results of their studies.^

According

2

Leo Kuper discusses the equilibrium feature of the
two models in "Plural Societies: Perspectives and
Problems," in Leo Kuper and M. G. Smith (eds.). Pluralism
in Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles:
Universltv"Tf
California Press. I969), pp. 7-26.
In addition", see
Edward Dow, Politics i n the Altiplano; The Dynamics of
Ch ange in Rural Peru"~TAustin
University of Texas Press,
1969), pp. 7-9.
:

3

In addition to Dew, ibid.
Alfred Diamant,
Political Development; Approaches to Theory and Strategy
TBloomington, Ind.
Comparative Administration Group.
1963). pp. 26-^3, discusses the approaches in this manner.
.

:

Kuper, op. cit. notes this tendency on the part
of some scholars.
David B. Truman, The Governmental
Process;
Political Interests and Public Opinio n (New
York
Knopf, I962); E. E. Schattschnelder, Party
Government (New York: Parrar and Rinehart, 1942) and
,

:

;

'
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to this view, consensus emerges
as a result of the peaceful
resolution of conflicts of independent
interests.

Consensus may be reached in a variety
of ways including
compromise of interest; acceptance of less
than maximum
satisfaction of interests in the interest
of society as a
whole; or as voluntary subordination to
group pressures or
decisions. Whatever the method of reaching
agreement, a
type of equilibrium tends to emerge as a natural

progression of events.
The general features of the consensus model are

usually couched in terms of the experiences of the Anglo-

American industrial development experiences.

According to

this model, the development process will be one in which
there is a tendency to move from an agrarian rural society
to an industrial urban society.

Instead of a particular-

istic and parochial social system there is movement

toward universallsm and centralization of societal

institutions and values.

In addition,

it is expected that

participation by the citizenry in all aspects of society
increases with the resultant equilibrium and gradiial

Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theo ry (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1956) provide some of the
best examples of the tendency to equate the consensus
model with democratic pluralism.

t

Change.^

It seems that these
general features of the

consensus model stem In large
part from the basic
assumptions made by its advocates.
It would be Instructive
to note and evaluate the
basic assumptions of the
consensus model of change and then
the conclusions
occasioned by those assumptions.

Elements of the Consensus Model
As£,Hrnptions of the model.

the consensus model, of course,

interests exist in society.

The basic assumption of
is that differing

There is little doubt that

differing interests do emerge in all
societies.
Regardless of what creates the differing
interests, it
seems safe to accept this assumption of the
conflict
model, as will be noted in the next chapter.

Once these

differing interests exist conflict emerges among
them for
satisfaction of their needs.

At this point the consensus

and conflict models diverge both in assumptions and
conclusions.

5

Howard J. Wiarda. "Elites in Crisis." unpublished
paper, n.d., outlines these basic features of consensus
oriented models.
In addition, see Kuper, op. cit.
Dew,
op. cit.; and Mohammed Guessous, "A General Critique of
Equilibrium Theory." in Readings on Social Change ed. by
Wilbert E. Moore and Robert M. Cook (Englewood Cliffs
Prentice-Hall, 196? ), pp. 23-35.
;

,
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In looking at the general
features of the consensus

model noted above, it will be remembered
that one aspect
was that there would be movement from
an agrarian to an
Industrialized economy, a process which
would help produce
a consensus situation. Numerous
assumptions lie behind
this feature. First of all. it is assumed
that

industrialization produces greater pluralism in the
society which in turn brings to fruition some
of the other
general features noted in the above discussion.^

Industrialization is supposed to bring about an

equalization of classes in the social system and with this
equalization would come greater cooperation among various
groups in the society.

Equalization of classes would

come about because there would be a greater and more

equitable distribution of wealth throughout the

V/alt Rostow, The Stages of Ec on ornic Growt h
(Cambridge:
Cambridge Univernity Pres5^. I96O provides
one of the earliest examples of the use of this
assumption. Following closely behind him were C. E.
Black, The Dy namics of Modernizati on (New York: Ilarper
and Row, 196b) and A. F. K. Orrranski. The Stages of
Political Do v elopmont (New York: Knopf, I965). For an
excellent review of the way some of these assumptions
relate to Latin America, see Alfred Stepan, "Poiltical
Development Theory: The Latin American Experience,"
Journal o f I nternational Affair s, XX (I966), 223-23'!|.
In addition, see the Introduction to John Kautsky*s
PoUtlcal Change in Under-developed Countries (Now York:
Wiley, 1962).
)

population.

With wider distribution
of the wealth,
greater portions of the
population would have an
interest
in the system and thus would
woric together for the
common
good.
This View ignores the possibility
that
the

industrialists could exploit the
rest of the population
and not distribute the wealth.
In addition to creating a wider
distribution of

wealth, industrialization is also
supposed to Increase
cross-cultural experiences. As the society
becomes more
urba.nized. larger portions of the
population Interact with
one another.
The rural residents suddenly have
much more
contact with the city residents and with
the whole urban
and more modern environment because the
rural inhabitants
are lured to the cities by jobs and
economic benefits

accruing from industrialization.

These cross-cultural

contacts tend to bring about a greater commonality
in the
Interests and values of the population."^ Such a

commonality of values, it is argued, helps to override
differences in interests which might otherwise cause

disintegration of the system.

r^niel Lerner's The Passing of Traditional
Society (Glencoe: The Rree Press, 1958) is one of the
best known works taking this position.
Those concerned
with economic development as a prerequisite to political
development often take this position as well.
,
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The limitations of this view
of urbanization center
in the fact that it ignores the
rising expectations which
might create havoc in the system
as the system proves

incapable of satisfying them.

Thus, greater contact and

communication among groups may ultimately
lead to
frustration and resentment, as the poor begin

to realize

that modern conveniences and goods exist
but that they may
never really hope to acquire them without
violence.^
The idea that urbanization and industrialization

create a middle class interested in political
and social

reform is also subject to question,^

As has been noted in

the previous chapter, urbanization in Latin
America was

not the result of industrialization.

Instead, the cities

were often built as centers of culture and luxury for the
elite.

In addition, as Claudio Veliz notes, the middle

g

Claudio Veliz in the Introductions to his edited
volumes. The Politics of Conformity in Latin America
(London:
Oxford University Press. I967), and Ob stacles
to Chanp:e in Latin America (London:
Oxford University
Press, 1965) notes this possibility.
•

9

John J. Johnson, Political Chang;e in Latin
Am erica: The Emergence of the Middle Sectors (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1958) presents this position.
The point is made by Ronald Classman, Political
History of Latin America (New York: Funk and Wagnalls,
1969)
pp. 2^6-24?; John Mander, The Unr evolutionary
Society:
The Power of Latin American Conservatism In a
,

classes in Latin America are not
necessarily associated
with pressures for reform. Instead,
he contends that the
middle sectors merely aspire to becoming
part of the upper
classes and feel no commonality with the
peasantry.
Such positions are in direct contradiction
to the

assumptions of the consensus model.
With the change from an agricultural to an

industrial society, the economic units change as
well.
While the agricultural system can operate on a

small scale,

the industrialization process creates greater

interdependence among various economic sectors.

Because

the industrial sectors usually depend on one another
for

raw materials, equipment, or capital, they are less likely
to maintain independence from other sectors of the

population.

Only if an industry has a complete monopoly

can it expect to be totally self-sufficient.

The argument

goes that increasing interdependence creates a greater

Changing V/orld (New York: Knopf, I969), p. 260; and
Economic Commission for Latin America, United Nations
Economic and Social Council. Social Development of Latin
America in the Post-War Periods
(Mardel Plata. Argentina.
~~
1963

) .

^Q^^z, op. cit. Richard N. Adams, "Political
Power and Social Structures," in Veliz (ed.). The
Politics of Conformity in Latin America pp. 15-^2 makes
a similar point.
,
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willingness to cooperate and stabilize
the system.

This

interaction is part of the tendency
toward the
universalizing of institutions of society.
People are
expected to consider broader issues
rather than
concentrate on their localized interest.
While there is a movement away from

particularistic aspects on the societal level,
there is a
seeming counter-tendency toward differentiation
and
specialization in the society as well.

This aspect of the

development process has been well analyzed by
Luclan
Pye.

13

Differentiation and specialization provide for

greater expertise in dealing with each segment or
aspect
of societal operations.

The greater specialization

produces obstacles to coordination as well, in that each
segment of society tends to become concerned with its
own

private Interests and does not always consider its

relationship to the other elements.

In this vray,

there

may be a tendency toward disintegration rather than

integration.

What differentiates this type of

This assumption is made by Black, op. clt.
64-7^, and Organskl, op. clt. . pp. 5-10 in their
discussions of the process.

,

Luclan Pye, Aspects of Political Development
(Boston:
Little, Brovm, I966), p. 45.

pp.

particularism from that of more
primitive societies is the
fact that the specialization
is coordinated at the top
in
order to reach agreed-upon goals.
For example, an
economic organization has highly
specialized units or
divisions which are coordinated for
the ultimate

production of a particular product.

In the primitive

societies particularism is characteristic
of the whole
fabric of society and coordination of
specialties is not
found.
The structural-functional theorists are
most

concerned with the roles of various sectors in
the system
and their orientation to its general goals.
The
charge

is often made that the only goal for structural-

functionalists is system stability.

S.

N. Eisenstadt,

however, takes the position that structures Just have
not

existed to meet the rising demands on the system in many

modernizing societies, resulting in system breakdown. "^^

Ik

Organski. op. cit. . p. 7. and Black, op. cit.
pp. 21-28 suggest this tendency,

.

15

See David Apter, The Politics of Modernization
(Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, I965) for a
good example of the structural-functional approach applied
to the development process especially pp. 1-42.

—

16

S. N. Eisenstadt, "Breakdowns of Modernizations,"
Eco nomic Development and Cultural Change XII (July,
1964), 345-36?.
.
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)

Another feature of the consensus model
is the
emphasis on social equality and increased
citizen

participation which is to emerge.
a deterministic character. ^7

These developments have

^he assumption of increasing

participation cannot be considered apart from the
other
assumptions outlined above. In order for participation

to

become probable, there has to be a certain equalization
in
the social system which, in turn, is brought about by
the

industrialization process.

If the first assumptions are

not accepted, participation is not likely to be realized.
Social equality and political participation are

particularly interlocked.

The argument is made that with

social equality there is a lessening of ideological

differences.

1

ft

As the gap between haves and have-nots

17

Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Ci vic
Culture;
Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five
Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, I963
present the most detailed case for this position. In
addition, Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba, Political Culture
and P olitical Development (Princeton: Princeton
University Press", I965) employ this assumption in their
analysis,
18
See Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (Garden
Doubleday, I96O), especially Chapter 13 for the
basic assumptions involved in this position. Also Daniel
Bell, The End of Ideology (Glencoe:
The Free Press,
i960), and Johnson, op. cit. , among others take this
position.

City:
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narrows and the levelling process
goes forward, people
tend to acquire similar values and
do not see one another
as antagonists. As a result, they
can work together to
resolve differences which are diminished
in size by the

decreasing social distance.
According to this view. Increased participation
in
society also contributes to a reduction of
ideological
differences.

As individuals participate in more and more

social groups, their Ideological loyalties tend
to

decrease in Intensity.

In other words, pluralism, which

is supposed to result from industrialization and

urbanization, reduces ideological conflict.

Sidney

Verba argues that the greater the number of organizations
a person belongs to, the less Intense his loyalties to

any one of those organizations become.

Cleavage in the

system is reduced by overlapping membership in groups.

William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass So ciety
(New York:
The Free Press. 1959), Pp. 79-81, and Sidney
Verba, "Organizational Membership and Democratic
Consensus." The Joui'nal of Politics XXVII (August, I965),
467-^+97 treat this feature of the consensus model.
Gino
G e r ma n 1
Polltica y Socledad en una Epoca de Transicion
(Buenos Aires: Editorial Paidos, I963 discusses
modernization in terms of social participation.
,

,

)

20
op. cit.

^®^^»

op* clt.

.

pp. 468-^70.

Also see Truman.

If one accepts the argument
that Industrialization brings

about greater participation In
groups. Verba- s argument
becomes a povjerful one.
The other side of the participation
process

Involves participation in the political
system Itself.
The idea that participation itself is an
indicator of

political development is Indicative of the
Impact Western
political systems have had on the concept of social
change.

Political participation by the citizenry is

obviously one of the most cherished ideals of democratic
beliefs.

As such, the suggestion that development means

participation approaches the equating of development and
democracy.

At any rate, the increase in participation is

tied very closely to all the other features of the

consensus model examined herein.

Social equality enhances

the possibility of increased political participation.

As

participation Increases there is more opportunity for the
expression of demands on the system; and as demands
increase, greater communication of ideas and interests

emerge.

With this, the cycle starts anew with cross-

cultural experiences, and so on.

The concept of

"partisan mutual adjustment" suggested by Charles E.

Lindblom is an excellent example of the way in which

differing interests impose claims on the system which are
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eventmlly^ altered in favor of
more generalized
interests. 2i

Every specific interest has
to be

compromised in favor of the interests
of all.
Conclusi ons of the .jnodel.

The consensus model

provides a deterministic character
to the process of
social change. Analysis of the
assumptions of the model
reveals a steady march toward
"progress." What this seems
to indicate is that once the initial
aspects of

development are set in motion, all
political systems will
move toward the Western European model.
Specifically, if

a developing nation could only
become industrialized or

economically developed, political development
would
2?
follow.^

Secondly, the process of change is seen to be a

slow and incremental one.

Each economic or social change

Charles E. Lindbloro, The Intelligence of
The Free Press, I965). Albert 0,
Hirschman's Journeys Toward Progress (New York: The 20th
Century Fund. I963) takes a similar stance.
DgmoGracy_ (New York:

22

Most of the authors connected with the consensus
model seem to accept this view. As an indication of its
pervasiveness, a program as noble in ideals as the
Alliance for Progress was based on this idea.
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sets in motion some new change which
In turn triggers

others.

However, no sudden or drastic changes
can be

incorporated into the model very effectively, 23

Another Implication of the assumptions is that
all
people have access to the system.
If participation
is to

be meaningful, all interests must have some
assurance of

being heard by the system.

Robert Dahl, for Instance,

concludes that all elements in the society have some

opportunity of having their demands considered by the
system.

If their demands cannot be aired,

the people's

Interests are stifled and compromise cannot result.

The

eventual outcome could be total destruction of the system
by frustrated elements.

23

Guessous, op. cit., p. 3^ makes this point,
suggesting that advocates of the model thus ignore many
"essential characteristics of social life."

Robert A. Dahl. Who Governs?
Power in an American City (New Havens
Press, 1961). pp. 223-301.

Democracy and
Yale University

9^

Variations on the Consensus Model
While the consensus model involves a series
of

common assumptions and conclusions, there are
differences
in individual models.

Perhaps the most widely known

version of the model is the systems analysis version.
Parsons, Easton, and Almond are most closely associated

with this approach to the study of politics.

Gabriel

Almond has been most active in applying the systems

approach to the study of comparative government.

Actually,

as Robert Packenhara notes, systems analysis covers several
of the approaches considered in Chapter

I

of this study.

Although they do not describe formal models, de Toqueville
and Lipset must also be considered advocates of the
consensus model, since they too are concerned with the
social correlates of democracy.

They analyze the roles

played by various social elements in the stability of

political systems, particularly democratic political
systems.

Robert A. Packenhara, "Approaches to the Study of
Political Development," World Politics XVII (October,
,

196^1),

115.

The analyses of Rostow, Black,
and Organski
indicate another aspect of the
social system approach to

studying political change.
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As with de Toquevllle and

Lipset. these authors do not prescribe
a systems framework
for their analyses, but such a framework
is implied.
The

authors are concerned with the interrelationship
of
economic, social, and political variables
in the operation
of the system.

David Truman in his concern with groups

employs a similar approach, except that his unit
of

analysis differs slightly.
More explicit in the use of the systems approach

are Karl Deutsch and David Apter.

Both use a structural-

functional framework in analyzing the relationship of
"communications," in one instance, and "role," in the
other, to the proper functioning of the system.

The systems analysis approach provides many

alternatives for the study of various aspects of the
political system.

What is common to all, however, is that

the factors which are studied are those which are

functional for the system.

Factors which can be

accommodated by the system are studied, while those which
are disruptive to the system are not considered or are

rejected because the system cannot accommodate them.
Many critics argue that systems analysis ignores certain

essential features of politics.

For example, systems

analysts assume that all

mjor

groups are able to

participate.

Without an in-depth analysis of
political
resources, however, it seems clear
that some groups do
find difficulty in articulating
interests or demands.
Some interests are thus articulated
only weakly; others
not at all.

Scholars interested in producing stability
may also
be clearly identified with the consensus
model. David
Apter and Samuel P. Huntington, for instance,
both search
for ways of institutionalizing structures and
processes as
a means of acquiring stability or equilibrium.

Even

though they are concerned about possibly disruptive
forces
in the system, their main concern is with finding
a way of

bringing about consensus and stability through
institutionalizing the processes of change.
Lucian Pye's use of political culture provides an
example of yet another consensus orientation to political
development, even though it may be more flexible in

application.

But in Pye's analysis too, with his six

crises of nation-building through which nations must pass'
before being considered developed, the basic assumptions
of the consensus model are again clearly evident.

The

aspects of distribution and participation singled out in
his analyses of these crises are indicative of the
consensus orientation.

:
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The consensus model, whatever
its variations, is a
very optimistic one which envisions
harmony and

pluralistic democracy as the ideals
inevitably reached in
modern societies. How this model has
been applied to the
study of latin America and whether it
is appropriate will
be taken up in the concluding sections
of
this chapter.

Application of the Consensus
Model to Latin America
Most United States students of Latin America
have

used a consensus orientation in studying the
process of

political development in Latin America,

since the United

States is a good example of what the consensus model
is

supposed to produce, it is not surprising that political

scientists trained in that tradition should apply it to
the study of other regions.

Adolf Berle, for instance, is a good example of a
United States scholar and government advisor who adopted
the consensus model orientation to the study of Latin
26
America.
Such studies often seem to be occasioned more

26

Adolf Berle, Latin America; Diplomacy and
Reality (New York: Harper and How, I962TT ThereTre
countless others of this nature oriented to the general
public based on prodding Latin American nations to imitate
the United States.
Milton S. Elsenhower, The Wine is
Bitter;
The United States and Latin America (Garden CI ty
Doubleday, I963 is another.
)
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by a concern for heading off
Communist advances in the
area than in gaining an understanding
of the Latin
Americans and their political systems.
Most often the,
analyses conclude with a call for United
States policle;
toward Latin /unerica which will foster
social and economic
reform which will in turn create political
changes

consistent with the consensus model's version
of political
development. At the policy level, the Alliance
for

Progress was a singular manifestation of the
consensus
model.

Among Latin Americanists. John

J.

Johnson. Gino

Gerraani, and Martin C. Needier are perhaps most
closely

associated with the consensus-equilibrium-pluralist
approach.-'
America;

Johnson's work. Political Change in Latin

The Emergence of the Middle Sectors , is one of

the clearest and most influential statements of the

consensus position.

In this work,

Johnson views the

middle sectors as the hope for political development and
stability in Latin America,

His view is that the middle

sectors of the urban areas will Increase pressures for

Johnson, op. cit. German:-., op. cit. and Martin d
Needier, Political DevGlopment in J^tln America;
Instability, V iol ence, and Evolutionary Change (New York:
Random House. l^Sjl
;

;
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governmental activity to solve the acute
social problems
of latin America.
The process will include gradual

change

and stability of the system,

Johnson's study

encompasses Uruguay, Chile. Argentina, ^3exico.
and Brazil,
which are among the most developed Latin
American nations

and which have the largest middle sectors.
studies are used to prove his hypothesis.

These case
Much of the

literature has challenged Johnson's views of the
middle
sectors' role in Latin America, and that material will
be

discussed in Chapter V.
victor Alba takes a view similar to Johnson's,
but his feeling is that the middle sectors and the

oligarchs have worked out a detente to prevent much of the

needed change at the moment.

While Alba is very

pessimistic about the oligarchy ever supporting real

28
See Johnson, op. cit.. Introduction and Chapter 9
in particular.
For a good critique of Johnson's
analysis, see Juan F. Marsal, Cambio social en America
latina (Buenos Aires: Solar/Hachete, 1967), pp. 2?-29,

and 108-110.
29

victor Alba, Alliance Without Allies (New York:
Praeger. I965). in V7hich Alba presents a caustic analysis
of hovj the United States and Latin Americans have both
failed to stimulate the needed changes. His later work.
The Latin Americans (New York: Praeger, I969) is a little
less caustic but makes the same point.
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Change, his emphasis is still
on social and economic
progress as the method of achieving
political progress.
He sees a need for modernization
of the social structure
of latin America but argues
that only the latin Americans
themselves can initiate it. When
the Latin Americans

modernize their own social structures,
political
development will also occur.
What

puts Alba in the

consensus camp, even though his background
is of the oldline socialist school, is the fact
that he envisions
change taking place within a fairly
stable system with
gradualism as the key. Economic and social
advance
are

basic to political development.

While certainly very

critical of the Alliance for Progress as it was
implemented. Alba is very much in agreement with
its

Initial objectives, all of which of course stem
from the

consensus model.

The relationship of the Alliance and the

consensus model will be explained in the last section
of

-~

this chapter.

Robert J. Alexander is yet another student of Latin

America who follows the consensus tradition.

His concern

is the means through which various sectors of society can

30

Alba. The Latin Americans.

contribute to a stable and progressive
system.

His

major thesis Is that democracy Is likely
to emerge In
Latin America for some of the same reasons
proposed by
Johnson.

He particularly emphasizes the probability
of

the development of democratic pluralism as
the result of

economic development.

Economic development, according to

Alexander, creates a diversity of Interests and,

particularly, a new Industrial wage-earning class which

exerts pressures on the system similar to those exerted by
the middle sectors In Johnson's analysis. "^^

Martin

C.

Needier also views Latin American

government from a consensus model orientation.

His work

Is almost entirely concerned with making the Latin

American nations over In the Image of the United States or
the Western European nations he considers politically

developed. 33

Again, the attainment of democracy and

31

Robert J. Alexander, Today's Latin Ame rica
(Garden City;
Doubleday, 1962), and Latin America n
Politics and Government (New York: Harper and Row, I965).
32

See Alexander, Latin American Politics

,

pp. I7I-

176,

33

Needier, Latin American Politics in Perspective
(New York: Van Nostrand, I962), pp. 178-182, although all
of Chapter 4 Is relevant. Also see his Political
Development in Latin America .
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stability is the goal.

This type of political development

comes about through social and economic change.

Needier

devotes much of his attention to economic development
in
his analysis of political development in Latin America.

A large number of social scientists concerned with
Latin America accept the positions implicit in the

consensus model, among them, Kalman Silvert, Albert 0,
Hirschman. and Gino Germani.

Most of these people see

economic and social progress as the key to political
development.

Social and economic changes are expected to

produce pluralism which provides for a system of

bargaining for special interests.

There are variations

on the intensity of optimism on the chances of progress

being made through application of the consensus model.
Some,

such as Silvert, while implicitly employing the

model, are very skeptical of the hope placed in the middle

sectors of society or in groups which are supposed to

emerge as the result of industrialization.

35

34

Hirschman, op. cit. takes the position that a
society in which there is a plurality of interests permits
trading off on issues and insures over-all stability.
,

35

Kalman Silvert. The Conflict Society; Reaction
and Revolution in latin America rev, ed. (New York:
American Universities Field Staff, 1966) is particularly
skeptical about the effects of Industrialization and the
,

This brief review of some of the literature
on

Latin American political development indicates how

pervasive the use of the consensus model has been in

analyzing the region.

Obviously the above review has

noted only some of the major works on the subject.

The

review was limited mostly to political scientists,

although some historians and sociologists as well as
economists were noted.

The major point emerging from the

review is that the Latin American nations have often been
studied as though they

vrere

on the way to becoming copies

of the United States or V/estern European democracies.

assmption has been that Latin America would follow

The

the

same steps as did the United States, that there is a

clear and unilinear path to development.

middle sectors. Taking a similar position are Karl M.
Schmitt and David B. Burks, Evolution or Chaos (New York:
Perhaps more optimistic is Frank
Praeger, I963 .
Tannenbaum, Ten Keys to Latin America (New York: Vintage
)

Books, 1962)'.
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Implications of the Consensus Model
for
the Understanding of Latin America

The consensus model is apt to ignore
many aspects
of Latin America which are important
to an understanding
of the area.

By expecting the latin American
nations to

follow the same pattern of development as the
Western
European nations and the United States, students
of I^tin
America have a tendency to overlook the differences
in

historical experiences of the area, to say nothing of
its
unique socio-cultural-political tradition.

As was noted

in the previous chapter, the colonial history of
Latin

America gave it a

m.uch

different political heritage from

that of the United States,

In effect, as John Kander

notes, the consensus approach discourages consideration of

differences in cultures.

"Worse,

it appears to rule out

the possibility that other cultures may be striving for

goals different from those American (i.e.. United States)

society proposes for itself.

""^^

This limitation is felt not only by United States

scholars but by those of Latin America as well.

To note

Mander's view again, the intelligentsia of Latin America

36

Mander, op. cit»

,

p. 106.

have uncritically accepted economic
development as the
criterion of maturity and as such have
"bought" the

consensus model approach with little or no
consideration
of Latin America's ovm cultural differences
from the

industrialised nations. ^"^

The Latin Americans have

accepted the fact (or adopted the myth) of their
own
"backwardness" or "underdevelopment."

The fact that Latin

Americans themselves have accepted the idea may be the
ultimate in a kind of United States cultural imperialism.
If one accepts the consensus model's analysis of

the relationship of industrialization and urbanization to

political development, much of Latin American society
would be ignored or misimderstood.

As was noted in the

first two chapters. Industrialization did not have the
same consequences for urbanization in Latin America as it

did in the United States.

Rather, cities were purposely

built by the Conquistodores long before there was any

industrialization.

In many instances industrialization

'

was Introduced as a panacea for many of the problems which

already existed in Latin America.

The consensus model

analysis is not very helpful in understanding these

Ibid..
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societies.

As Samuel P. Huntington notes, the

industrialization process, especially if rapid,
can cause
many problems for the political system
and destroy the
stability for which the consensus model
strives*^^ While

Huntington notes the disruptive effects of rapid
economic
development and social modernization, he still
accepts
the view that economic and social development
are necessary
to political development.-^^

Clearly related to economic development is the

emergence of the middle sectors.

The consensus model's

view of the middle sectors misinterprets the facts of the
Latin American situation.

As has often been noted, the

middle sectors of Latin America just have not put much
effort into social and political reform.

Instead they

have frequently aligned themselves with or been coopted
by the oligarchs, in the hope of improving their social

Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Chang ing
Societies
(New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1968), pF»
^9-50. Also see Eldon Kenworthy, "Argentina: The
Politics of Late Industrialization," Foreign Affairs
XLV (April, 1967). ^63-/i76«
.

39
Kenworthy, op. cit.

.
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status.

40

Since the consensus model does not
seem to fit

the situation, the particular role
played by the middle

sectors in Latin America is ignored.

These middle sectors

have become more oriented to the status
quo than to
41
progress.

Although it is not to be examined here, one might
question the applicability of the consensus model on
this
issue even to the United States.

Does the so-called

•silent majority" really fit the consensus model's

characterization of the middle sector as progressive and
democratic?

Do the middle sectors in the United States

really have all the solid virtues Johnson seems to think?
One doubts it.

With its emphasis on democracy and gradual change,
the consensus model creates problems for its advocates in

explaining what happens in Latin America.

Even in nations

which are relatively Industrialized, the political process

often remains very chaotic and prone to violence.

When

Mander, op. cit. , pp. 122-124. and 148; and
Veliz. op. cit.
"Introductions." These are two of the
most incisive in their analyses of this point, but
references in Chapter II and previously in this chapter
note many others taking similar positions.
,

cit.

.

See Economic Commission for Latin America, op.
pp. 111-115.
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democracy falls, many students of Latin
America, rather
than reject the model, reason that
the people were just
incapable of instituting democracy .^^
With such reasoning,

advocates of the consensus model keep their
model Intact
while ignoring damaging facts, relieving
them
of the

necessity of questioning the assumptions and/or
conclusions of the model which might be at odds
with the
facts.

The consensus model advocates thus reify
their

creation rather than accept the fact that it may
not fit
all nations and all contingencies.
While the model misinterprets or disregards some of
the facts of the Latin American experience, there
is no

reason to reject the model entirely.

In fact,

.it is

useful in providing some insights into the processes of
Latin American development.

The positive contributions of

the model for the study, of Latin America will be evalmted
in Chapter VIII of this study.

What seems more important

at this point is what implications the model has for

42

Glen Dealy. "Prolegomena on the Spanish American
Political Tradition." The. Hisp anic American Histori cal
Review XLVIII (February. 1968). 37-39 makes this" point
in his analysis of Latin America Ts "democratic"
experiments.
,

-
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policy-making on the part of the
Latin American
governments as well as for United
States policy toward
Latin America,
It seems that many latin
American governments have
accepted the understanding and
assumptions of the

development theory which emerge from
the consensus model.
The attempts at modernization of
an Eduardo Prei

Montalva.
for instance, have involved various
plans and strategies
to implement those progressive changes
which would put
the nation on the road to development
a la the consensus
model. Nation after nation has looked
at

industrialization and economic development as the
cure-all
for its social and political problems. The
tragedy of it
is that resources have often been squandered
on outmoded

and inefficient industrial plants with little
to show for
it.
Other areas of the society have suffered because
resources were drawn away from them to support
industrialization.

Only recently have these nations found

that they could not compete with other more efficient

industrial nations in the world market.
Similarly, United States policy toward Latin

America has often been based on our own developmental
experience.

We have simply carried over and applied our

own growth model to a society and culture which lacks our

traditions and to which it simply does not conform.
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Industrialization and economic and social
reform have be en
prime targets of most of our Latin
American programs. The

Alliance for Progress is the most notable
of these
programs. The idea behind this program
is the familiar
one that social and economic development
will produce good
liberal democracies in the area. A typical
American view
is that people who are well-off are happy
people and antiCommunist people. The New Deal assumptions have been
brought to bear unquestioningly on the problems of
Latin

American development.

The lack of success of the Alliance

for Progress attests to some of the problems with such a
set of assumptions.

Undoubtedly, the lack of success of

the Alliance cannot be attributed only to United States

misinterpretation of the Latin American experience.

Lack

of promised United States support^ pressiires by American

economic interests, failure of the Latin Americans to plan

needed reforms and resistance of the oligarchy to broad
social and political changes are just a few of the other

reasons for failure of the Alliance. ^-^

Some of these

factors are discussed more fully in succeeding and the

^3
See Alba, Alliance Without Allies .

concluding chapters.

It is clear that the United
States

policies often reflect the attitude
that all developing
nations will follow its model of
development whether they
want to or not. A large part of the
reason for this

attitude is that Americans understand
Latin America from
the perspective of the consensus model,
a model which is
uniquely /Lnglo-Araerican and not necessarily
attuned to the
special needs of Latin America.
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CHAPTER

IV

THE CONFLICT MODEL

Introduction

Although Karl Marx's analysis of social change
Is
used as the foundation for the conflict model,
advocates
of this model do not always employ his units of
analysis

— economic

classes.

Half Dahrendorf and Harrington

Moore, Jr», are among the more influential contemporary

scholars in the conflict tradition who have accepted

Marx's analysis complete with economic class analysis.^
Others use the general assumptions of the conflict model,
but they do not limit the conflict to class conflict.

Half Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in
Ind ustrial Society (Stanford:
Stanford University Press,
19o8); and Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of
Dicta tors-hip and Demooracy (Eoston:
Beacon Press, "1956)
are the major works on the model.
Stanley Hothraan,
"Barrlngton Moore and the Dialectics of Revolution; An
Essay Review," American Political Science Review LXIV
(March, 1970), 61-82 presents an excellent critique of
,

Moore's position.
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They see that there may be conflict
among various sectors
of society including ethnic, religious,
cultural, or

ideological differentiation instead of viewing
all
conflict as resulting from economic class
differences.^
Usually, however, those scholars employing the
conflict

model tend to isolate one particular root of conflict

ordinarily class, which is used to explain all forces
of
social change.

Contrary to the consensus model, social change in
the conflict analysis model does not come gradually and

orderly.

Instead change tends to be rapid and often

violent because there are no mechanisms for the compromise
of particular interests in conflict model analysis.

Violence may often occiat although change is not always of

M. G. Smith, "Social and Cultural Pluralism." in
Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences LXXXIII
(i960), 763-777 provides one of the best statements of the
conflict model in application to modern society. Further
note Is made of it in Leo Kuper and M. G. Smith, Pluralism
in Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles:
University of
California Press, I969). Lewis A. Coser has also
published several works devoted to the conflict model,
among vrhich the most Important are: Continuities in the
Study of Soc ial Conflict (New York: The Free Press,
1967); The Functions of Social Conflict (New York: The
Free Press, 193^ ) and Lewis A. Coser and Bernard
Rosenberg (eds.). Sociological T h eory: A Book of Readings
(Toronto:
The Macmlllan Co., 19*^9 ).
.

a violent nature.

Whether violent or non-violent, change

is brought about as a result of
social conflict.^
In its most general view of society,
the conflict

model has some characteristics in common Kith
the
consensus model.

Social diversity of groups or interests

is important to each model, although the
conflict model can

accommodate a more simplistic society.

The conflict model

may view society in terms of a bi-polar arrangement;

whereas the consensus model makes sense only if there is
a
large number of groups competing for power in the system.
The direction of change is usimlly thought to be

similar for the consensus and conflict models.

There

seems to be an inevitability of movement from the rural,

agricultural to a more complex urhan industrial society,^
In many respects,

the conflict model sees progress in

terms of movement toward what exists In the Industrialized

3

See Half Dahrendorf, "Out of Utopia:
Toward a
Reorientation of Sociological Analysis." in Lewis Coser
and Bernard Rosenberg, op. cit. « pp. 236-237.
See Howard J. Wiarda, "Elites in Crisis."
unpublished paper, n.d. Also Edward Dew. Politics in the
Altlplano; The Dynamics of Change In Rural Peru (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1969), pp. 8-10, and "Leo Kuper,
in "Plural Societies:
Perspectives and Problems," Kuper
and Smith, op. cit. pp. 10-13 for further elaboration.
,

^
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societies.

In some instances the
deterministic feature of
the conflict model is more
evident than in the

consensus

model,
The previous chapter indicated
that equilibrium is
also associated with the conflict model,
l^ile on the
surface it seems that conflict analysis

is antithetical to

equilibrium, some critics of social theory
view conflict
analysis as also envisioning movement toward
a state of

equilibrium.

According to this interpretation of

conflict analysis, conflict emerges within an
orderly
social system and the over-all focus is on achieving
a

particular type of society.

Marx's expectation of a final

Utopia of communism is an example of the equilibrium
which

might emerge.
Half mhrendorf rejects this interpretation of the

conflict model.

Utopias to him are consensus models and

have no validity in the conflict analyses.

He contends

that many analysts attempt to bridge the gap between

5

See Dahrendorf. op. cit. . in particular.
In
addition, James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin (eds.), I^tin
America: Reform or Revolution ?
(Greenwich, Conn.:
Fawcett, 1968). in their introduction indicate the extent
of the assumption of determinism in the conflict model.

^See Kuper. op. cit. . pp. 7-26. and Dew, op. cit. .
pp. 7-9 for a statement of this position.
Coser,
Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict , especially

"
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"reality" and some Utopian scheme.

Hence, conflict

theorists are being taken in by the consensus
approach.
His position is that there never will be a
society devoid
of conflict.
Thus, there is no room for the Utopian
scheme in conflict analysis.

When applied to the analyses of developing
societies, conflict analysis often emphasizes the

dependent status of the developing society upon the

industrialized nation and the issue of imperialism or neo-

colonialism becomes an essential feature of the analysis.
Of course, the imperialism is not always external in

source; rather, many analyses focus on internal colonialism
o

or internal exploitation of one group by another.

These

in the first chapter and Irving L. Horov;itz, "Consensus,
Conflict and Cooperation: A Sociological Inventory,"
Social Forces XLI (December 3, 1962), 177-188 also note
that conflict theory is not necessarily inconsistent with
,

equilibrium.
7

Dahrendorf, "Out of Utopia: Toward a Reorientation of Sociological Analysis," pp. 230-238.
Q

See Shlomo Avineri, Marx on Colonialism and
Modernization (Garden City: Doubleday, 1968), especially
In
his introduction for some general discussion.
addition, Marx's views on the issue are expressed on pp.
125-131, and p. ^39 of the work. Among Latin
Americanists, most of the authors in the Petras and
Zeitlin volume cited above express such sentiments but
especially Rodolfo Stavenhagen, "Seven Fallacies About
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issues will be discussed in greater
detail

m

later

sections of this chapter as well as
in later chapters.
The important point here is that
this particular aspect of
the conflict model often leads to
the creation of a
scapegoat for the problems of the society.
Extreme
nationalism often develops with some outside
force being
blamed for the problems of the country.
Anti-United
States sentiment in much of Latin America can
be traced to
such perceptions of societal problems.

Although the conflict and consensus models have
some common features^ there are also many differences

between the two approaches.

This chapter will spell out

the distinguishing features of the conflict model»
thus

contrasting the conflict paradigm with the previously
discussed consensus model.

Latin America," pp. I3-3I takes this position. For
general discussion of the question, see Wiarda, op. cit.
Kuper and Smith, op. cit. . p. 11; and Moore, op. cit.,
p. 431.

;

"

Elements of the Conflict Model

As§ug£tlonn of the mod^T_.

As Indicated above, the

conflict model assumes the existence
of a minimum of two
interests or classes in society with the
real possibility
of a plurality of interests.
In the conflict model, qs in
the consensus model, these differing
interests compete for
power in the system. In contrast to the
consensus model,
however, there is no natural mechanism for the
compromise
of diverging Interests.

In fact,

compromise is alien to

the conflict approach.^

The pluralism of the conflict society is one in

which a variety of interests exist, but they do not
combine or Interact to any appreciable degree. "^^

People

tend to belong to particular groups but there is not much

overlapping of membership In the conflict society.

Group

membership tends to occur along ideological or other

9

See Kuper. "Some Aspects of Violent and Nonviolent Political Change in Plural Societies," in Kuper
and Smith, op. clt .. pp. I53-I67, as well as Dahrendorf,
"Out of Utopia:
Toward a Reorientation of Sociological
Analysis.
10

See Kuper, "Plural Societies:
Perspectives and
Problems," p. 154; and Dew, op. clt. p. 8.
,
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lines so that diverging values are not
cross-fertilized in
such a system. The major instrument of
compromise
for

the consensus

model—a plurality

of loyalties which

diminish intensity of loyalties— is absent in the
conflict
view.
With lack of communication across group lines,
there is little hope for acceptance of less than
total

victory by any one interest.

The groups tend to become

very close-knit and closed to outside influence s."^"^

A

defensiveness about their values and positions emerges
only to compound the difficulties in communication across

group lines.
There is also a tendency for conflict theorists to

view society as polarized between two major interests. "^^
The two groups are usually denoted as the oppressed and the

oppressors, and the source of oppression can take many

Smith, op. clt. , provides an excellent analysis
of this point as does Dew, op. cit.
Of course, David
Truman ( ed , ) , The Governmental Process; Political
Interests and P ub lic Opinion (New York; Knopf, I962) and
Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago;
University of Chicago Press, 1956) offer analyses of this
point in presenting the requisites for consensus
.

politics.
Kuper, op. cit. , pp. 15^-l6l analyzes this
polarization and its Implications.
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forms. 13

It Is easier to analyze a society
if only two

opposing groups can be Isolated for analysis—
there are
those in power and those out of power.
If each of

these

two groups can be viewed as closely-knit, all
problems of

society can be analyzed in terms of the struggle
between
those in and those out of power.

The people in power are

not likely to give up their power without a struggle
and

conflict often takes the form of violence in such a
simplistic view of society.

The oppressed finally reach

the point of total frustration and resort to violence, ''"^

According to the bi-polar analysis of society,
everyone belongs to one camp or the other and there is no
middle ground between them.

Thus, communication and

compromise are next to impossible.

The determinants of

what constitutes the oppressed and the oppressors varies

Ibid. , p, 154.
Dahrendorf describes them as two
groups, one defending the status quo and one attempting
to disrupt the status quo in "Toward a Theory of Social
Conflict," in Warren G. Bennis, Kenneth D. Benne, and
Robert Chin (eds.), The Planning of Change (New York:
Holt, Rinehart, I96I), pp. ^45-451.

Kuper, op. cit. . pp. I54-I61. Also see C.
Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford
University Press, 19597T Of course, Vilfredo Pareto,
Mind and Society (New York: Karcourt, Brace, & Co.,
1935); Roberto Wichels, Political Parties (New York: The
Free Press, 19^9), and Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class ,
McGraw-Hill, 1939), are
tr. by Hannah Kahn (New York:
some of the classics on this issue.
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from one analysis to another, but economic
factors are most
commonly seen as the source of conflict in the
conflict

^15

model.

Most conflict analyses relate in one way or

another to economic power and economic class conflict
tends
to be the driving force in societal change. "^^

One group

is always struggling to get a greater share of the

economic resources held by the group in control.
In some societies, of course, the economic factor

may not be primary, and conflict analysis sometimes posits
other sources of conflict as dominant.

Religion, race, or

place of residence (i.e., urban versus rural) may be the

determinants of power in the

system."'-'^

Whatever the

The economic factor is very explicitly stated in
Marx's analysis, of course, and is carried over into the
analysis of such as Moore and Dahrendorf . The economic
goods may be stated in terms of industrial power, land, or
other forms of wealth. See Kuper, op. cit. pp. II-I3 for
a brief analysis.
.

''"^The source of this approach is Marx's own. views
as expressed in many writings. Perhaps his, "Value,
Price, and Profit," in Marx, Engels, and Lenin, The
Essential Left (New York: Barnes and Noble, 196TT"traces
the economic causes of change most clearly.
See Henry B.
Mayo, Introduction to Marxist Theory (New York: Oxford
University Press, i960), especially Chapter 3 for an
analysis of the point.

Smith, op. cit. , notes some of these alternative
sources of conflict as does Dew, op. cit. .
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source of conflict, there tends to be a
conception of
society in terms of caste or class broadly
defined.
If
the division in society is bi-polar. the
conflict is easy
to analyze; but if divisions are multiple,

the analysis

becomes increasingly difficult as the number of
groups
or Interests increases.

It is not difficult to see why

bi-polar analysis is so popular in the conflict tradition.
For the conflict model, industrialization is

usually seen as increasing the gaps between sectors of
the society rather than decreasing them, as the consensus

model contends.

Industrialization is conceived as a

means of increasing the concentration of power,

particularly economic power.

Instead of reducing

differences among groups, the industrialization process'
increases such differences.

As a result, ideological

differences become more intense rather than diminished;
society becomes polarized and conflict results.
The conflict model usually accepts the consensus

view that industrialization and urbanization go to/rether.
The validity of such a claim was analyzed in the previous

chapter.

The importance of the contention here, however,

is that whereas for the consensus model urbanization

Of course, this is a basic premise of Marx; and,
Dahrendorf makes a similar contention in Class and Class
Conflict in Industrial Society .
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promoted greater communication and participation,
the
conflict model sees urbanization as providing
still

another source of conflict.

Greater differences emerge

as the urban sector moves forward and enjoys some
of the

benefits of industrialization, while the rural sector
is
left behind and exploited by the urban sectors.

As

concentration of power is increased, the likelihood of
increasing participation by other sectors is decreased
because they become further subordinated.
Despite the tendency of conflict theorists to see
a bl-polar society, they also argue that their model

permits the opportimity for all sectors of society to
have their interests articulated in some vjay.^^

This

contention seems inconsistent with the earlier suggestion
that participation tends to be decreased as society

industrializes.

Such is not the case, however, since

articulation of interests occurs in a wider range of ways

19

An excellent analysis of this point is made by
Stanlslav Andre ski, P arasitism and Subversion; The Case
Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
of Latin America (London:
1966), pp. 1-3.

20

In all of his
See Dahrendorf particularly.
continuity of
the
note
of
makes
works cited above, he
in this
participating
conflict and the likelihood of all
way.

in the conflict model.

As noted before, violence and

revolution often result from societal conflicts, and
it is
along this avenue that interest articulation can
occur in

conflict analysis.
Conclusions of the model .

In reviewing the

assumptions made by the conflict model, several
conclusions seem almost inescapable.

First of all. if

conflict is to have any meaning as a force for social
change, as the advocates of the system envision it. all

sectors of the society have to have some possibility of

making an impression on the system.
involved in conflicts in the society.

All interests may be
What is difficult

however, is to talk about any order at all if conflict, is

completely unchannelled.

While conflict may be a useful

concept, carrying the model to the extreme would seem to

presuppose the existence of no social order at all.

21

21

Alfred Diamant, P olitical Developm ent;
Appro a ches to Theory and Strateg y (Bloomington. Ind.
Comparative Administration Group. I963
pp. 38-^1
discusses this and other features of the conflict model.
He actually argues that Dahrendorf s analysis can be
viewed as a group systems approach free of the constraints
Horowitz, op. clt. rejects the
of equilibrium issues.
argument that conflict analysis presupposes a lack of
social order.
:

) ,

'

,
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In other words.

It is very difficult to
envision a

society, even of conflict, without
some order (i.e..
consensus) to it.

Since a certain amount of order is
necessary to
even perceive the existence of a society,
the advocates
of the conflict model are led to the
conclusion that

restraint is in some way imposed on the system.

They

reject the idea that constraints emerge from
interaction
of groups, so they postulate enforced order.

Order or

constraint is imposed by the stronger or oppressing
power
over the weaker or oppressed.

In the case of

developing nations, this may be the enforced order of
outside colonial power over the dependent nations. ^-^
Hov;ever.

the requirement of the conflict theorists is

that interests be expressed in some way.

become a way of expressing interests.

Violence may

A problem arises

from attempts to claim that interests are expressed by
the subordinate element when it is being suppressed by
the more powerful.

Since the conflict theorists

criticize consensus theory for not providing opportunity

Dahrendorf, "Out of Utopia: Toward a
Reorientation of Sociological Analysis," pp. 237-238;
p. 8; and Kuper. op. cit.
^^^t op. cit.
pp. 11-13.
.

Kuper, op. cit.

.

,

p.

11.

for all groups to express demands,
the question raised
here becomes a crucial one. Obviously,
the conflict
theorists have some problems in
operationalizing their
theory on this point.

What Dahrendorf argues is that constraint
actually

provides the basis of conflict, and as constraint
increases, greater conflict emerges— presumably as
a

result of increasing frustration on the part of those

constrained by the force of those in power.

since one

group reacts to the force imposed on it by the other, an

increase In such force makes the reaction that much
greater.

As Edward Dew argues, the smaller the group in

control, the greater the dependence there is on force for

constraint.

^

Following the implications of Dahrendorf »s

position, this situation would lead to increasingly

Intense conflict.

At any rate, it is clear that in the

conflict paradigm there is no self-regulating mechanism
for the ordering of society as there is in the consensus

model.

2^

Dahrendorf, "Out of Utopia: Toward a
Reorientation of Sociological Analysis," p. 237.
25

Dew, op. clt.

.

p. 8.
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Ideological polarization is a further
Implicate.on
of the conflict model.
While the advocates of the
conflict model do not necessarily spell
out the

consequences, it is implied that ideological
positions
become very intense and ideological loyalties
increase.
If one accepts, as the model assumes, that groups
must

necessarily view one another as enemies, it would seem
that all issues would have to take a highly Ideological
tone.

Every problem of society can be easily reduced to

conflict among the major groups.

When such conflict

occurs, especially if the bi-polar position dominates,

solutions to problems often become rather simplistic

— the

solution to all problems lies in terms of destroying the
influence of the opposition group.

Marx's economic

analysis and suggestion for curing society's ills is Just
one example of such a simplistic approach.

Not all

conflict analysis is reducible to such simplistic
accounts, but the assumptions implicit in the model
create the possibility and tendency toward such a

conclusion.
It seems that what the conflict model posits

regarding industrialization and urbanization also leads
to increasing ideological divergence.

If it is accepted

that industrialization and urbanization produce wider

gaps between sectors in the society, it seems there would
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be increasing insulation of ideological
position because

there would be less communication across group
lines.
If groups are not exposed to discussion of
differing

views, their own ideological positions will not be

critically examined and will tend to become accepted
with
greater tenacity.

Perhaps the best way to summarize the conflict
model is to use Alfred Diamant*s comparison of the
conflict and structural-functional (consensus) models:

Structural-Fimctional

Conflict

26

Every society is a relatively
persisting configuration of
elements

Every society is always
changing: change is
ubiquitous

Every society is a wellintegrated configuration of
elements

Every society always
experiences conflict:
conflict is ubiquitous

Every element in society
contributes to its
functioning

Every element in society
contributes to its
change

Every society rests on the
consensus of its members

Every society rests on
the constraint of some
members by others

Reproduced from Diamant, op. cit« p. kO,
Diamant, of course, has paraphrased Dahrendorf in this
classification.
,

.
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The next task of this chapter will be to
analyze
the ways In which the conflict model has been
used in

studying latin America.

The following sections will note

the application of the model to Latin America and

evaluate the implications of the model for the study of

Latin America,

Application of the Conflict Model
to Latin America
In recent years there has been an increasing

tendency for some scholars of Latin America to reject the
consensus model and employ the conflict model in their
analyses.

Some,

such as Irving Horowitz, Stanislav

Andre ski, and Merle Kling, have provided very
sophisticated analyses.

27

Others, however, have produced

analyses v?hich seem more concerned with making an
Ideological point than in illuminating Latin American

Horowitz, et al. (eds.), Latin American
Radicalis m (New York: Vintage Books, I969); Andreski,
and Kling, "Toward a Theory of Power and
op. cit
Instability in Latin America," Western Political Quarterly,
;

IX (March, 1956). 21-35.
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development processes. 28

Regardless of the tone of the

analyses, there is a common assumption
that struggle
between groups, primarily economic
classes, is the key to
understanding latin American politics.
This struggle
often leads to the conclusion that an
impasse results,
leaving latin America with little hope of any
real social
.^^
change
Most scholars using the conflict model in
studying

Latin America tend to envision a form of economic

polarization of society, although there are many
variations.

The Petras and Zeitlin volume noted above

contains a number of essays representing differing

interpretations of economic polarization and its effect on

political development.

The authors of most of the essays

tend to accept the idea that industrialization does help

28

The author has in mind particularly Petras and
Zeitlin, op* cit. , which consists of a number of essays
primarily oriented to bi-polar class analysis. Perhaps
John Gerassi, The Great Fea r (New York: Macmillan,
1963) is another good example of such analyses.
29
See Torcuato S. Di Telia. "Stalemate or
Co-existence in Argentina." in Petras and Zeitlin, op»
cit. . pp. 249-263 for an example of this position.
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create a new sector in society, namely, the
middle
30
class.
The middle sectors are not the reform
oriented

group of the consensus model view.

According to the

conflict theorists, the middle sectors are often
much less

unified than consensus theorists tend to assume.
Itself deeply divided, the middle class cannot be

expected to provide a very strong force for change in any

particular direction.

More importantly, however, the

lack of unity has meant that there has been no development
of a strong middle class Ideology.

Because the middle

30

Glauclo Ary Dillon Scares, "The New
Industrialization and the Brazilian Political System," in
Petras and Zeitlin, op> cit. pp. 186-201, for Instance
accepts this view, though others in the volme reject the
position.
.

31

Ibid_.
Also see Milton I. Vanger, "Politics and
Class in Twentieth-Century Latin America," The H ispanic
A merican Histori cal R eview , XLIX (February, 19697, 60-93
as well as Charles Wagley, "The Dilenmia of the Latin
American Middle Classes," Proceedings of the Academy of
Political Science XXVII (May, 19 65)731 0-3 18. Several
of the pieces in the Petras and Zeitlin volume make
reference to this idea as well.
,

32

Vanger, op. clt. » makes this point very strongly
in his analysis.
John P. Gillin, "Some Signposts for
Policy," in Council on Foreign Relations, Social Ch ange
in latin America;
Its Implications for United States
Policy (New York; Harper Brothers, i960), pp. 1^-62 as
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sectors come from varied backgrounds
and do not see
themselves as a unified force, they do
not develop a

common ideological stance.

The usual argument regarding

their ideology is that the only concern of
the middle

sectors is to achieve the status of the higher
class.
This position and its advocates have already been
noted
in previous chapters.

Many of the conflict theorists argue that the

landed elites, the industrialists, and now the middle
sectors have actually made an alignment against the

working class and peasantry.

Specifically such theorists

reject the idea that the industrialists and landed
interests have been at odds with one another. -^-^

This

view provides an excellent example of the simplistic

well as his "The Middle Segments and Their Values," in
Latin American Politics, ed. by Robert D. Tonasek
(Garden City:
Doubleday, I966), pp. 23-^0 also make this
point.
Rodolfo Stavenhagen, op. cit. pp. 13-31; Oscar
Delgado, "Revolution, Reform, Conservatism," pp. 38I398; Frederick B. Pike, "Aspects of Class Relations in
Chile," PP4 202-219; and Gustavo Polit, "The
Industrialists of Argentina, " all in Petras and Zeitlin,
are just a few examples of those taking this
op. cit.
position. Victor Alba, Alliance Without All ies^ (New
York: Praeger, I965) is an essentially consensus
theorist also assuming a similar stance.
,

,
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bi-polar analysis as it is applied to Latin American
study.

While the bi-polarity of the society is sometimes

a fact, the solutions recommended often ignore the

realities of a more complex society.

According to this

position, the upper class and industrial sectors combine
to exploit the lower sectors.

The solution of societal

problems is usually keyed to getting rid of the upper
class or putting power in the hands of workers or

peasants.

John P. Gillin uses a similar approach, but

sees the society as composed of substrata within the two

larger sectors.

He sees two lovier classes

— the

workers

and peasants; two upper classes— the industrialists and
land ov7ners; and a middle class.

As such, the conflicts

emerging in Gillin* s analysis are more complex than in
the others noted here.

Some suggest that a form of "internal colonialism"

exists in Latin America.

In this analysis the rural

peasantry are exploited by the combined industrial and
3

«;

landed interests.-^-^

This alliance of the landed and

3^

Alba, Alliance Without Allies
Zeltlin, OP. cit.

35

,

and Petras and

Stavenhagen, op. cit, , pp. 19 and JO,
op. cit. , takes a similar stand.

Andreski,

13^

metropolitan industrial sectors provide the
greatest
obstacles to development. The rural peasantry

are kept in

a dependent position by these interests.

again bi-polar.

The analysis is

Eventually the peasantry will reach the

point of revolution.
In looking more closely at the impact of

industrialization in Latin America, the conflict
theorists also suggest that new problems are created by
the industrial process.

One of the most severe problems

is that of creating a new urban sector which cannot be

absorbed by the industrialized society.

More and more

people move to the cities in expectation of a better life

and greater employment opportunity.

In fact, however,

the system is incapable of absorbing the new sectors and
the gap between the workers and the middle sectors only

increases.

More importantly, the newly industrialized

society seems incapable of integrating the new urban

settlers into the political system, thus creating the

possibility of greater disruption in the

36

^

system.-^''

Scares, op. cit.

James Petras, "Revolution and Guerilla Movements
in Latin America:
Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala, and
Peru," in Petras and Zeitlin, op. cit. pp. 329-369. He
makes the same point in his study of Chile, Political
,

Part of the problem of Industrialization
is that
while the middle sectors may be growing,
they are not

growing nearly as rapidly as the lower
classes.

Because

the lower class is growing at a faster
rate than the

middle class, sheer numbers would indicate a
greater
influence on the system by the lov/er classes.

In

addition, because conflict theorists argue that
the

economic factor is the source of conflict, the middle
sectors would not be able to play the role assigned to
them by the consensus theorists.

They simply could not

muster the support to hold back the eventual revolt of
oo

the lower classes.

A very popular theme of conflict model analysts
is economic exploitation from the outside.

In I*Iarxian

analysis of course, imperialism is necessary to the whole
argument, for without foreign capital to get the

and S ocial Forces in Chilean Development (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1969), and in "The Latin
American Middle Class," New Politics IV (V/inter, I965),
7^-89.
Talton P. Ray, The Politics of the Barrios of
Venezuela (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, I969), p. 176, notes the problems of
Integrating migrants into the urban society.
.

38

Scares, op. cit. , and Stavenhagen, op. cit.
base their analyses on this point.

.
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development process going, most of the
underdeveloped
nations would still have "no history" in
a Marxist sense;
i.e.. no production, no classes, hence
no Marxian class
analysis. 39 In this type of analysis, foreign
economic

interests are seen as the evil forces, but also

historically necessary, in conflict with the exploited
natives.

One such analysis even contends that the

concept of Latin America developing a feudal character
as
a result of its colonial heritage Is a distortion
of the

facts.

Instead, this study suggests that Latin America,

even in colonial times, was the object of capitalist

exploitation.

Others have concentrated on the more current

experiences of Latin America,

Foreign Interests are seen

as taking all the profits out of Latin America and
leaving the Latin Americans nothing.

There is often

envisioned an alliance betvreen native oligarchies and the

39

See Avineri, op. cit.

.

Introduction.

See Stanley J. Stein, and Barbara H. Stein, The
Colonial Heritage of Ijatln America (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1970); and Luis Vltale. "Latin America:
Feudal or Capitalist?" in Petras and Zeltlln, op. cit. .
pp. 32-43.

:
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foreign interests.^^

While one cannot ignore the fact

that Latin America has been exploited
by foreign

interests, it is also too simplistic to
blame all its
problems on such exploitation. It is not
surprising that

many conflict theorists have viewed the United
States

as the imperialist power par excellence.

This analysis

suggests that greater concentration of wealth occurs
and,

under foreign control, is often used to force out any
chance of indigenous industrial development.

Recurrent in the conflict analysis literature on
Latin America is the idea that rank and caste are at the
base of much of the social structure.

Extreme divisions

are seen to exist among the various classes or groups.

41

Merle Kling, op. cit.
Teontonio Dos Santos,
"The Changing Structure of Foreign Investment in Latin
America," pp 94-98, and Maurice Halperin, "Growth and
Crisis in the Latin American Economy," pp. 44-75, both in
Petras and Zeitlin, op. cit. .
;

42
This position is not unique to the conflict
theorists.
See Charles Wagley, Th e Latin American
Tradition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968);
Richard i^.. Morse, "Some Characteristics of Latin
American History," American Historical Review LXVII
(January, 1962), 317-338; Frederick B. Pike, Chile and
the United States, 1880-1962 (Notre Eame, Ind.
University of Notre Dame Press, I963); and Alba, op. cit.,
for discussion of the United States role from several
perspectives.
,
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While on the surface such visions are
valid, they probably
are overemphasized. At any rate, the
conclusion emerges
that there is almost no chance for
compromise among

groups because the interests of important
groups are
usuiilly unalterably opposed to one another.

Since no

communication among groups occurs, they cannot work
out
solutions to conflicts in a very peaceful manner.

Implications of the Conflict Model for
the Understanding of Latin America
It is evident that the conflict model leads to a

very pessimistic view of the future for Latin America.
With the position that groups are unalterably opposed to
one another, the only thing to do is wait for the

explosion which will Inevitably come.

Of course, the

conflict theorists are ultimately optimistic that the

explosion will bring a new order consistent with their
ovm Ideals.

^

In such analysis, the only chance for

progress is to revolutionize society completely, but since
those in power are not going to give up their power,

there seems little choice but violent revolution.
The conflict analysis model also creates a tendency
to accept xenophobic nationalism on the part of Latin

Americans.

Much of the policy of those nations is based

on the idea that the United States, for Instance, has as
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its only intention the exploitation
of the Latin American

nations and thus anything the United
States does is
suspect. Such suspicion, of course,
means

that there is

a great deal of difficulty in the
attempts of the two
Americas to live and work together. Unfortunately,
many
Latin Americans have accepted this particular
premise of
the conflict theorists.^^

The danger in such an analysis

is that it might lead to everyone giving up on
trying to

change anything.
Most important, however, the conflict approach

often leads to very simplistic suggestions for resolution
of problems.

One group sees the millennium through

destruction of its opposition groups.

No social or

political problems are subject to such simple solutions.
Those who are successful in leading revolutions on such

bases often only deceive their followers and create

greater frustration in the long run.
Obviously, as with the consensus model, there are

certain features of the conflict model which help explain

^3

Gerassi, op. cit. , for instance, suggests that
this sort of misunderstanding on both sides is
responsible for much of the trouble between the United
States and Latin America.
Irving L. Horowitz, et al. ,
Latin American Radicalism , includes selections employing
similar themes.

some aspects of Latin American political
development.

However, as has been noted in this chapter,
there are

limitations to applicability of the model to
Latin
America.

Forthcoming chapters will analyze uses and

Implications of the two models relative to particular
issue areas In Latin America.

These last

tvjo

chapters have outlined the dominant

paradigms for study of political development— namely
consensus and conflict paradigms.

Of course,

.

the

there are

variations on the paradigms and attempts by some to
synthesize the contrasting approaches.

The following

chapters will Introduce some of the attempts at

synthesizing these approaches, as discussion of specific

application of the approaches proceeds.

CHAPTER

V

THE MIDDLE SECTORS AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
The Issue

Much has been written concerning the role
played by
the middle sectors in the process of political

development.

As was noted in Chapters III and IV, the

consensus and conflict models differ in the roles they
expect the middle groups to play.

This chapter will

provide more detailed analysis of the role the middle
sectors are supposed to play in each model and then

attempt to explain what role they actually assume in
Latin America.

The chapter is intended as a preliminary

examination using the argument over the middle sectors as
a case study for the consensus and conflict paradigms.
First, the term "middle sectors" is used rather

than the more familiar "middle class."

The reason for

this preference is that middle class usually suggests a

fairly precise delineation of economic classes in the
society, while middle sectors or middle elements can be

1^2

used to denote a wide range of groups making up
the center

position of the socio-economic scale.

The literature to

be analyzed in this chapter is not consistent in
the

usage of the terms.

Some authors use middle class and

some use middle sectors to identify similar groups in
the

society.

To be consistent, middle sectors will be used

in this study."'"

Defining the term "middle sectors" or "middle
class" has presented problems for social scientists.

The

terms have often been defined according to type of

occupation or amount of wealth of those included in the
groups.

Such definitions lead to a great deal of

imprecision and lack of scientific rigor.

Each scholar

1

John J. Johnson, Political Change in Latin
America; The Emergence of the Middle Sectors (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1958), of course, has
popularized the use of the term "middle sectors" in
relation to Latin America.
This discussion is based on G. D. H. Cole*s
"The Conception of the Middle Classes," in The British
Journal of Sociology , I (December, 1950), 275-290. Also
see Alfred Meusel, "Middle Classes," Encyclo pedia of the
Social Sciences , X (New York: Macmlllan, 1951 )» PP» ^0?Regarding Latin American middle sectors, Johnson,
15.
Vfctor Alba, "Latin America: The Middle Class
op. clt»
Revolution." New Politics , I (Winter, 1962), 66-73; and
James Petras, "The Latin American Middle Class," New
Politics , IV (V/lnter, 1965)t 7^-89 provide some of the
best analyses and discussion of the problem of defining
the groups which belong in the category.

-if

;

1^3

has his own concept of which groups make up the
middle
sectors of society.

As a result, there Is often an

arbitrary assignment of various groups to the category.
As noted by G. D. H. Cole, another method of identifying
the middle class is to ask a random sample of the
society
to identify the class to which they belong.^

Such a

method is likely to be even more imprecise than the first
method because statistics indicate that a huge majority
of people identify themselves as part of the middle

class.

When studying Latin America, the difficulty is

enhanced because the middle sectors have not developed a

very strong identity of their own.^

What may be part of

the middle sectors in one country or to one scholar may

not be in another instance.

The problem boils down to

Cole. op. clt«
discusses the two methods of
identifying the middle class.
.

k
5

Ibid.

,

p.

276.

See Rodolfo Stavenhagen,

"Seven Fallacies About
Latin America," in latin America; Reform or Revolution?
ed. by James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin (New York;
Pawcett. 1968). p. 26, and John P. Gillin. "Some
Signposts for Policy." in Council on Foreign Relations,
Its Implications
Social Change in Latin American Today;
for United States Policy (New York; Harper Brothers,
I960), pp. 23-28;

whether the middle sectors are defined in
economic or
social terms and which elements are
encompassed

In the

definition.
Because of the difficulty in giving a precise

definition to the term "middle sectors," we shall
have to
look carefully at the boundaries provided by each
scholar
In his own discussion of the middle sectors.

What is

most important to the present analysis is what role each

scholar assigns to the middle sectors in his analysis of

political development.

For our purposes, each particular

definition of the term is important as it affects the
role the middle sectors play in the development process.
For this reason, each author's definition will be stated

and examined and note will be made If his particular

definition implies a significant difference for the role
he assigns to the middle sectors.

Although giving a precise definition to the middle
sectors is difficult, there are some commonalities in use
of the terra.

The general characteristics of the middle

sectors are set forth by G. D. H. Cole as follows:
1) economically they are between the very

rich and the manual labor v;age-earners

;

2) many of them receive a substantial portion

of their Incomes in the form of interest

or profits;

•

1^5
3)

salaries provide the major source of
Income for many;

^) collective barKaining Is becoming more

prevalent as a means of dealing with
employers with this group;
5) there Is often an alignment with the

working classes regarding taxation and
government spending policies; and
6)

the intelligentsia Is a part of the

middle sectors although only a small
minority of It.^

Obviously the various scholars to be analyzed here provide

variations on these general characteristics, but these
features are found in most definitions of the middle
sectors.

They serve at least to provide us with a

working definition, even though all these characteristics
may not be directly related to our analysis.

One other

feature of the middle sectors usually noted in the

literature is that they are made up of a variety of

backgrounds and that they are very much consumption

Cole, op« cit«

,

p, 28?

1^6
oriented."^

These factors will have significance
in the

analysis of how the consensus and conflict
models view
the middle sectors.
The Effects of the Middle Sectors on

Political Development According to
the Consensus Model

The jgeneral l iterature.

As was noted earlier, the

consensus model views the middle sectors in a very

optimistic light.

According to the consensus model, the

middle sectors will be the major instrument for reform
and as such will lead developing nations to modernity.
Efeting back to the Weberian analyses of society,

it can be

seen that the middle sectors vjould be the prime agents in
the move tov/ard rationality-legality in the organization
of society, which consensus theorists often interpret as

modernity.^

Ibid. . pp. 278-281.
In addition, the Economic
Commission for Latin America, United Nations Economic and
Social Council, Social Development of Latin America in
the Post V/ar P eriod (Mar del Plata. Argentina. May, I963),
pp. III-II5 provides a discussion of this feature
relative to Latin America.
Q

Max Weber's analysis is presented most cogently
in The Theory of Social and Economic Organizatio n (New
York:
Oxford University Press, 19^7).
Interpretations

14?
In the Weberian analysis, the middle
sectors would

make the society more rational through
education and the
spread of their value system, which Includes
the

Protestant ethic of hard work and savings and
Investment
for the future.
In the experience of Great Britain, much
of Western Europe, and the United States, the
middle
sectors accepted or were conditioned to play such a role.
Some people suggest that these nations were the exceptions
to the rule rather than the standard against which others

should be Judged.

o

Regardless of whether the Western

European and United States experiences were exceptions to
the rule rather than the rule, the fact Is that most

students of political development have generally assumed
that the middle sectors will assume roles in the

developing nations similar to those in the already
developed nations.

of Weber's position are provided by H. H. Gerth and C.
Wright Mills (eds.). From Nax Weber; Essays in
Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946);
Reinhard Bendix, Max V/eber
A n Intellectual P ortrait
(Garden City:
Doubleday, 1962) and S. M. Miller, Max
Weber (New York: Crowell, I963).
:

;

9

See Richard N. Adams, The Second Sowing;
Power
and Secondary Development In L-^tln America San
Chandler, I967), p. 48; Petras. op. cit. ,
Francisco
and
Alfred Stepan, "Discussion: The Latin
74-85;
pp.
American Middle Class," New Politics IV (Spring, 1965)»
87-90.
(

:

,
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Among the early writers who suggest that
the
middle sectors of society have a leavening
effect on
politics was Alexis de Tocquevllle.^^ In his
analysis

of

United States society, de Tocquevllle argues that it
Is
democratic largely because of the extensive social
equality which exists.

political equality.

Social equality produces
De Tocquevllle 's ideas found

expression in the writings of many other scholars, among
them, Louis Hartz who suggests that the absence of a

feudal heritage is largely responsible for the particular

character of the United States* development.*''^

Perhaps

Seymour Martin Lipset is most closely identified with the
idea that the middle sectors provide for stability in the

Alexis de Tocquevllle, Democracy in America ed.
by Richard D. Heffner (New York:
The New American
Library, 1956). Of course, the idea can be traced back
to Aristotle's "golden mean" and his idea that societies
which had the most even distribution of vjealth would be
most stable.
,

11

Ibid.

12

,

,

pp. ^9-55.

Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America
Harcourt, Brace, & World, 1955 )•
(New York:

1^9

political system.^^

The idea of middle class
moderation

and stability is in turn often
translated into a sign of
political development by consensus
oriented scholars.
Lipset's ideas have clearly had great
influence on
the study of political development.
Many scholars

specifically concerned with the process of
development
have accepted the idea that the key to
development and
political stability is in creating a large middle
stratum
in the society.

The specific effects of this middle

stratum will be the subject of the rest of this
section
of the chapter.
One of the most pervasive ideas concerning the

'

middle sectors is that they will provide for political

development because they lessen the ideological cleavages

13

Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites
Economic Development and Political
Legitimacy," The American Political Science Review LIU
(March. 1959)» 69-105* and rolitio«.l Man (Garden Citv;
Doubleday, I960) exemplify this position. The
application of this type of analysis to the United States
is plentiful with David B. Truman, The Governmental
Procesr^!
Political Interc^sts and Public Opinion TNcw
York:
Knopf. 1962) providing one of the most significant
examples. E. E. Schattschneider, P arty Government (New
York:
Farrar and Rinehart, 19^2); and Robert A. Itohl,
A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1956) are also important works in this
tradition.
of Democracy:

.
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of society.

Also, the existence of a large middle
class

implies the relative lack of vast gaps between
rich and
poor.
The argument goes that a large middle sector

provides for the emergence of a wide range of
groups in
the society.
With the large number of groups, there
is

overlapping membership and with the overlapping

membership more exposure to differing ideas and interests.
The exposure of groups to differing ideas and interests
is supposed to broaden people's perspectives and

facilitate compromise among groups."'"^

This feature

extends beyond the emergence of middle groups as a potent
force in the society and. as was noted in Chapter III,

involves the larger issue of increased participation in
society by all groups.
Essentially, the argment of the consensus

theorists regarding the middle sectors is that the middle
sectors will provide a moderating tendency in the

political system.

They will push for democratic reform

and take a very humanitarian approach to governmental

Daniel Lerner, The Passing
See Lipset, op. cit.
The Free Press. 1958 );
of Traditional Society (Glencoe:
and Daniel Bell. The End of Ideology (Glencoe: The Free
Press, i960).
;
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policies.

They are the elements which will exert
pressure

on the political system to modernize and
democratize.-^^
The key to the middle sectors* role
Is the value

system ascribed to the group.

Most authors merely assume

that the middle sectors in all societies will
behave as
they have in the United States and Western Europe.

As

was noted above, however, the roles played by the
middle

sectors in these nations may have been aberrations of

what can normally be expected.

The United States and

Western European nations had a chance to modernize very

gradually because of the time period in which they
developed.
v;ith a

Nations developing currently must contend

variety of modernizing forces V7hich were

encountered one at a time by the United States and

Western Europe.

.Students of Latin America often expect

the developing nations to follow the pattern of the

United States and Western Europe without critical

examination of comparability of the development

15

Most of the generalists noted in Chapter III
fall into this category.
Some of the more notable
analyses using this approach are Robert L. Heilbroner,
The Great Ascent {New York; Harper and Row. I963);
V/alt W. Rostow, The Stages of E conomic Growth (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, i960); C. E. Black, The
Dynamics of Modernization (New York: Harper and Row,
1966); and A. F. K. Organski, The Stages of Political
Development (New York: Knopf, 19655T
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experience.

There may be considerable doubt as to

whether the middle sectors even in the United States
or
Western Europe actually behave in the fashion and
play
the role that the development theorists have assigned
to
them.

When one looks at the relationship between the

middle class and the lower class in our own modern
society, doubts arise.
The middle sectors are usually thought to be

willing to forestall current consumption or conveniences
for the sake of a better future.

Thus, the middle

sectors are supposed to emphasize savings and investment.
The implication is that capital is put aside for use in

developing the economy.

Because these groups are

concerned with a better future, they are hesitant to make

dramatic immediate demands or provide very great

disruption in the system.

Instead they work within the

system to bring about social change.

Somehow, in their

essentially capitalist outlook, the middle sectors are
also supposed to have a very moral outlook in the sense
of having a social conscience.

They strive for social

Justice and the development of the system toward the

.

153

ideals of modern democratic societies.

Consequently,

the middle sectors are expected
to align themselves with
the working elements to bring about
social and political

reform.
The literature on Latin America .

According to

James Petras, almost all Latin Americanists
have accepted
the •middle class thesis." as outlined in the
above
section. 1?

He believes that his analysis varies from
the

generalization.

VJhile it is true that

both the advocates

of the consensus and conflict models often see the
middle

sectors as providing much hope for modernization, there

are differences in degree and emphasis.

The task nov; is

to note the position of Latin Americanists who use the

consensus orientation, while the following sections of
the chapter will deal with conflict analyses.

John J. Johnson is the Latin Americanist in the
consensus tradition most closely identified with the

16

These ascribed characteristics are noted by
o p. cit .
Petras, op. cit. ,
presents an excellent critique of this characterization.
'^ole,

op. cit., and Alba,

Petras, op. cit.

,

p. 75*

w

c

middle sectors argument.

Joining him in his views

concerning the middle sectors are others such
as Victor
Alba, Richard Adams, and Robert J. Alexander "^^
.

There

are variations on the theme among these analysts,
but all
see a great deal of hope in the increasing strength
of

the middle sectors.

Johnson's study, which concerns Mexico, Brazil,
Argentina. Chile, and Urugiiay, lists the values that the

Latin American middle sectors are urban with urban value
systems; they favor \miversal education; they favor a

high degree of state intervention to solve social and

economic problems; and they favor broad-based political

parties oriented to social reform. 20

Johnson, op. cit,
statement on the issue.

Noting the

presents the most precise

,

19

Alba, op. cit. Alliance V/ithout Allies (New
York: Praeger, I965) and Th e La t i n~A.mer i a n's Tn e
York: Praeger, 1969)f Richard Adams, in Council on
Foreign Relations, op. cit . and Robert Alexander,
Today's Latin A merica (Garden City: Doubleday, I962).
Some of these authors have changed positions in more
recent works. Richard Adams, particularly in The Second
Sowing, seems to have given up much of his earlier hope
as has Alba in the last two works cited.
;

;

;

20

See particularly the
Johnson, op. cit,
Introduction and Chapters 2 and 3»
.
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unselfishness of the middle sectors. Johnson
argues that
they have often subordinated some of their
own desires
^"^
or Interests In order to help the i7orklng
classes.
Victor Alba has exrpressed almost the same
sentiments in his I962 New Politics article.

Although

Alba suggests that the middle sectors in Latin America
will follow the route set forth by Johnson, he also notes
that they may be tempted to accept efficiency over
Justice.

Indicating that he tends to equate

modernization with democracy. Alba expresses the fear
that totalitarianlDm may emerge if the middle sectors

value efficiency at all costs.

Nonetheless, he is

optimistic that the middle sectors will resist such
J

authoritarian tendencies.
An Indication that Alba is not completely

comfortable with Johnson's analysis emerges in his

discussion of the middle sectors as being composed of two
elements
class.

— the

2k

21

new middle class and the traditional middle

The new middle class has gained Influence as

Ibid.

22
Alba,

,

particularly Chapter
"Latin America;

9»

The Middle Class

Revolution."
^•^Ibld.. pp. 68-72.

^

^Ibid.

.

pp. 66-67.
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the oligarchies have diminished
in Latin America,

it is

made up of industrialists, merchants,
technicians, and
executives of larger companies. The
traditional middle
class is composed of skilled workers,
artisans who have
become skilled technicians, small merchants,
and

provincial industrialists.

While the division into two

elements would suggest a possibility of differing
views
on policies within the middle sectors. Alba shrugs

that

off by saying that the new middle class has gained

enough power to be able to manipulate the traditional

middle class.

Alba's later works indicate somewhat of a shift
from this position.

He argues,

in The Alliance Without

Allies particularly, that the middle class has not
followed the pattern it was supposed to follow.

He does

not make clear, however, whether he thinks they have

submitted to the temptation to accept efficiency at all
costs or whether they have perceived greater self interest
in aligning with the oligarchy.

While he is unclear on

this point, it is implied that the latter is the more

Ibid.
Some of the Latin Americanists to
p. 67.
be noted in connection with conflict analysis also accept
the idea of a divided middle sector but with quite
different consequences.
,
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likely explanation. 26

Even though his analysis in later

works indicates growing pessimism on the role of
the
middle sectors. Alba still feels they are on the

side of

the liberals in questions of social change. ^"^
One of the most interesting expectations of some
of the consensus analysts is that the middle sectors will

be essentially anti-military.

Even those

viho

stress the

middle class origins of many officers of today suggest

26

It will be remembered that his analysis of the
failure of the Alliance for Progress rests on the idea
that self-serving oligarchies have used the United States
and vice-versa. For some reason, the unselfishness and
social reform values of the middle class which he noted
earlier are not evident in this work.

27
28

Alba, The Latin Americans , p. 124.
,

"Latin America: The Middle Class
Revolution," p. 67. Johnson, op. cit« pp. 192-193,
however, notes that the middle sectors are the source of
many of the military officers and as such, it would be
expected that military policy would be dominated by
middle sector values. Edwin Lieuwin, Arms and Politics
in I^tin America (New York:
Praeger, i960) also
emphasizes the middle sector roots of the modern Latin
American military. Jose Nun's "The Middle Class
Military Coup," in Claudio Veliz (ed.). The P olitics of
Conformity in
tin America (London; Oxford University
Press, 1967), pp. ~^-ll8 provides an excellent review of
the relationship of the military and the middle class as
well as the way the military is perceived by various
models of study.
Alba,

,

1.58

that the middle sector values are antithetical
to the

traditional military position.

With a stress on the

middle sectors* values of Justice and political
equality.
the military may often be seen as an instrument
of the

oligarchy against such values.

If Johnson's contention

that the middle sectors have actually allied with the

working classes in promotion of common interests is
accepted, the military coups which have attempted to

prevent too leftward a leaning in public policy, as in
Brazil, for example, would have to be considered contrary
to middle sector values.

The problem might be in the

contention that the middle sectors and workers have

actually allied.

Even Johnson seems to temper this

contention in noting that the middle sectors have been
made to feel uncomfortable as the size and strength of
vjorking class elements have increased.

29

Since much of the middle sectors* increase in size

stems from increasing governmental activity and the

expanding bureaucracy, governmental policies are again

expected to reflect middle sector values,

The public

Johnson, op. cit. particularly Chapter 9. deals
with some of the problems of the alliance of middle and
worker elements.
,
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service employees are Included as a major
segment of the
middle sectors by all those writing on the
subject. As a
result. It would be expected that the values
of the

middle sectors would be transmitted in much of
the

governmental policy made by such bureaucrats.-^^
Whether the middle sectors perform the roles

consistent with modernization and democratization as
suggested by consensus model theorists Is seriously

questioned by many.

In the next section of the chapter,

some of these questions will be noted as the conflict

theories are analyzed.

In the final section of the

chapter, however, the positions of both models will be

critically analyzed in the light of the Latin American
experience

v/lth the

middle sectors.

Ibid.
Alba does not deal with the
pp. 193-19^.
issue very specifically, but his analyses imply acceptance
of this position.
,
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The Effects of the Middle Sectors on

Political Development According to
the Conflict Model

The general literature

.

The conflict model for the

study of political development finds difficulty in

assigning a precise role to the middle sectors.

The

difficulty arises from the conflict analysis tendency to
conceive of society on a bi-polar basis.

The Marxian view

of the middle groups offers a very imprecise mode of

analyzing middle sectors.

In Marx's view,

the middle

sectors vjould be extinguished by absorption into the

worker groups or into the capitalist class or bourgoise. 31
Because his basic assumption was that there would be two

major economic antagonists In society, there was little

room for a middle group in his analysis, and the
likelihood

v;as

that the capitalists would exploit the

For Marx's
See Cole, op. cit. , pp. 280-281.
writings on the issue see "The Manifesto of the Communist
Party," and other selections in Karl Marx, Friedrich
Engels, and V. I. Lenin, The Essen t ial Left (New York:
Barnes and Noble, I96I). "interpretation and texts are
found in Shlomo Avineri (ed.), Karl Marx on Colonialism
and Modernization (Garden City: Doubleday, I968), and
L. S. Feuer (ed.), Basic V/ritings on Politics and
Philosophy; Marx and Engels (Garden City: Doubleday,

1959).

•
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middle groups relegating them to the level of the working
elements.

32

In reality, according to Marxist theory, it

was the bourgeoisie that was antagonistic to the working
class. 33

Many conflict analysts have uncritically applied

Marx's arguments concerning the bourgeoisie to the middle
sectors in modern society.

As Cole notes, there really is

not a very close correspondence between the two concepts
and, for this reason, Marx's arguments may not be

applicable to the middle sectors.

-ill

Barrington Moore, for example, has used the Marxian

analysis in describing the way in which societies
develop. 35

32

As Moore sees it, the historical patterns of

Cole, op. cit.

33
Marx,
31-33.
pp.

,

pp. 280-281.

"The Manifesto," in Avineri, op, cit.

,

3^
Cole, op. cit.

,

p.

283

35

Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of
Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1956).
Half Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial
Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1959), and
Essays on the Theory of Society (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, I968) is another of the better known
conflict theorists applying Marx's ideas. For a good
critiaue of Moore's analysis, see Stanley Rothman,
"Barrington Moore and the Dialectics of Revolution:- An
Essay Review, " The American Political Science Review LXIV
Moore responds in "Reply to
(March, 1970), 61-82.
Rothman," pp. 83-85 of the same volume.
,
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development have involved the exploitation of one sector of
society by another.

The capitalist elements which embody

the middle sectors tend to be in the position of

exploiting the laboring classes.
same position.-^

E&hrendorf assumes the

Put very simply, the middle sectors

might as well not be considered separately because they

actually are tools of, if not actually the same as, the
upper economic level of oppressors.
One of the keys to the conceptions of the middle

sectors in conflict theory is the idea that capitalist

societies are based on greater and greater concentration of
wealth.

The capitalist never satisfies his taste for

greater wealth and exploits the worker to attain it.

As a

result of this view, the conflict theorists see power
being concentrated as well when industrialization

occurs.-^'''

Dahrendorf's discussion of societal order relying
on constraint of some elements of society by other
elements emphasizes the factor of economic power of the
"haves" over the "have-nots" in "Out of Utopia: Towards a
Reorientation of Sociological Analysis," in Sociolop;lcal
Theory; A Book of R eadings , 3rd ed., ed. by Lewis A.
Coser and Bernard Rosenberg (Toronto: The Macmillan Co.,
1969). pp. 222-240.
Dahrendorf , in Class and Class Conflict in
Industrial Society particularly notes this effect of
industrialization.
,
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Because the working class Is seen as
the exploited class
and because the neo-Marxlan analyses
are most concerned
with correcting the condition for the
working classes,
they tend to ignore the middle sectors or
automatically

assume that they belong with the exploiters.
The liter ature on Latin America .

Although the

temptation to Ignore the middle sectors might be great
for
those adopting Marxian analyses, the Latin Americanists

using the conflict model have not been able to ignore the
middle sectors very easily because of the great eraphasls

placed on middle sector analysis by many of the consensus
theorists.

Although the conflict theorists among Latin

Americanists have taken note of the middle sectors, there
Is a tendency to treat them as adjuncts of two larger

groups

— the

oligarchy and the workers. -^^

By suggesting

that the middle sectors become part of the oligarchy or

are shunted back among the working elements, the basic

conception of a dual society necessary to the conflict
model is kept intact.

Petras, op. cit. » and Juan Mar sal, Camblno social
Solar/Hachette 19^?!
(Buenos Aires;
are t\:o among many who take this position. The others will
be noted as the issue is discussed further.
en America Latlna

,

16k

The major emphasis of the
conflict theorists
regarding the middle sectors is
that they have not
developed a value system similar
to that of the middle
classes of Western Europe or the
United States. Instead.
the middle sectors are viewed as
adopting upper class
39
attitudes.
one of the reasons given for the
upper class

attitudes of the middle sectors is that
they have not
developed a self-identity and no middle
sector ideology is
seen to exist.
Analysis of the middle sectors of Latin America
indicates the reason for lack of a middle sector

ideology.

Richard Adams* study suggests that the middle sectors

actually do not exist as a very identifiable group in

39

Frederick B. Pike, Chile and the United States .
1880-1962 (Notre Dame, Ind.
University of Notre Dame
Press. 1963), pp. 284-28?; most of the selections in
Petras and Zeitlin, o p. cit. Gillin, p p. cit. and LuisMercier Vega. Roads to Power in Latin America_ '{New York:
Praeger, I969) are a few among many works which adopt this
position. Veliz, op. cit. presents an analysis of some
of the middle sector arguments.
:

;

;

.

All of those cited In the above note make this
point.
In addition, Charles Wagley. "The Brazilian
Revolution:
Social Changes Since 1930." in Council on
Foreign Relations, op. cit. pp. I77-23O, among others
makes the same point.
.
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Latin American society.

Instead, he argues that the
middle

sectors are spilt, with some being
associated with the
oligarchy and others associated with
the working classes.
He argues that Latin American society
is of a dual nature
with two major value systems which are
not related
to

economic classes.^^

Some of the middle sectors are more

comfortable among the traditional elite and
have worked
their way into it while some of the lower middle
sectors
have been most comfortable with the working
elements.
Even if the middle sectors can be identified as a
group,

it is difficult to view them as being conscious
of

feelings of unity.

As Charles V/agley suggests, everywhere

in Latin America there is a dichotomous society

a

division "between the dominating upper class and the
people."

He says that the local upper class might be

considered lower class or part of the middle sectors on the

national scale, but in terms of the environment in which it

41

Richard N. Adams, The Second Sowing p. 257.
Charles Wagley, "The Dilemma of the Latin American Middle
Classes," Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science
2? (May, 1964), 31O-3I8 also suggests this point of
view.
,

,

Charles Wagley, The Latin American Tradition;
Essays on the Unity and the Diversity of Latin American
Culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p.
Pike, op. cit* , takes the same position In discussing
55»
the "Two Chiles," pp. 292-293. and Chapter 11.
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operates. It Is upper class
because Its everyday
relationships are with the people
In the local co^unlty
Khlch It dominates. In Its
local community, it is the
elite, and the rest of the
community is the mass. In
terms of the urbanized sectors
the society is divided
between the "haves" and the "have-nots."
Wagley's
interpretation is a variation on the
conflict model which
accounts for the middle sectors by
perceiving them as
absorbed by one of the two major antagonistic
elements in
society,

Wagley's analysis, however, is not totally
in

accord with the conflict model.

The middle sectors have

not always been upper class in attitude, but they
have
tended to develop upper class attitudes as they have

succeeded in society.

The fear of being dropped back into

the working class is a major force in keeping the
middle

sectors in line with the oligarchy.

This theme is fairly

common among Latin Americanists dealing with the middle

•

sectors.

James Petras, in analyzing the "middle class

thesis" as applied to Latin America, provides perhaps the

^3

See Vega, op. cit. . pp. 60-65; Gillln, op. cit. .
pp. 21-28; VJagley, The Latin American Tradition , pp. 196197; and Nun, op. cit. . among many v;ho adopt this stance.
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best statement of the way conflict
theorists view the
middle sectors in the area."^^ His analysis
maintains that
the Latin American middle sector is
non-revolutionary;

cannot be counted on as a force for democracy and

modernization; is anti-lower class; imitates United
States

and Western European middle classes only in consumption
patterns and not in value systems; and is authoritarian in
outlook.

The middle sector is perceived as self-interest

oriented, with the result being that it attempts to squeeze
out the working class elements.

Concentration of

economic power is the key to understanding the situations.
It seems that the conflict view of the middle

sectors is evident in many analyses of Latin America, even
by those who do not necessarily accept the conflict model
in its entirety.

44

'

Whether they hold out hope for the

Petras, op. cit.

.

Also in Petras, Politics and Social
Forces in Chilean Development (Berkeley and Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1969), particularly
Chapter 4.
Ibid.

.

Ibid.

,

46

pp. 80-81.

47

Among non-conflict analysts, Howard J. Wiarda,
•Elites in Crisis," unpublished paper, n.d.; Alba,
especially in Alliance Without Allies and Veliz, op. cit.
provide analyses stressing the tendency of middle sectors
to adopt upper class values in much of Latin America.
;

,
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middle sectors as moderating
forces in the society or not.
many of the scholars finally
reach the conclusion that
they are not acting as the middle
sectors
in

industrialized societies of Europe and
the United States
have or are supposed to have acted.
The Effects of the Middle Sectors
on

Latin American Political Development
If anything is illustrated by the foregoing

analysis, it is that the middle sectors play a
variety of

roles in the political development process, some of
which
are contradictory.

Robert F, Smith has noted the problem

in indicating that the roles of the middle sectors
differ

from one nation of Latin America to another.

The

problem with many of the analyses noted above is that they
indiscriminately transfer the Western European concept of
the middle classes to the study of Latin America when the_

latin American experience calls for a different approach.
In addition, many authors generalize about the middle

sectors in Latin America on the basis of their roles in
one nation without questioning whether generalization is

Robert F. Smith. "Discussion: The Latin American
Middle Class." New Politics IV (Spring. I965), 83-8?.
,
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warranted.

stUl another

general probZe. is in
deflnln.

authors include different
groups In the middle
sector,
arguments. ^ depending on
which part of the .iddle

sectors
is emphasized, the role
ascribed to the middle
sectors

varies.
The consensus model seems
to miss the mark on the
role of the middle sectors by
Ignoring some of the facts
Of the situation. As James
Petras has noted, analysis of
some of the ^^iddle sectors
Indicates that the "new middle

sectors" often present positions
exactly the opposite of
what the consensus-oriented scholars
5°
say they do.

The

consensus theorists argue that the new
middle sectors
represent the hope for the future democracy
of Latin
America, while Petras indicates that
it is even
less

likely to support democratic practices
than is the

traditional middle class.

If such is the case, hope

49

Robert Alexander's reply to Petras in "Mr.
Alexander Replies," New Politics IV (Winter, I965). 85.
«9 makes a point of the variety of groups included in
definitions of the middle sectors.
,

50

Petras, "The Latin American Kiddle Class,"
pp.
77-81. and Politics and Social
Forces in Chilean
'~
Development pp". 139-153.
,

51

Ibid.

,

p.

78.

.
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would not be very bright for the
middle sectors*
assumption of a modernizing role.
Perhaps the consensus theorists
reach the
conclusions they do about the middle
sectors because they
are so concerned with stability.
For many consensus
theorists, it will be remembered, stability
is almost
equated with political development. For
this reason, any
force acting in the interests of stability
is considered a
modernizing force. There is little question
that the

middle sectors are often effective forces for
stability
for reasons opposite to the assumptions of the
consensus

theorists, however.

As many of the Latin Americanists

have pointed out, the middle sectors are agents of

stability because they mimic the values of the upper
sectors and fear losing their own status and privileges if
too many changes are brought about.

moderation become the

m.ain

Security and

interests of the middle sectors

because they have much to lose with drastic changes in
policy.

'

What has happened in many instances is that new

52

A fevi among the many noting this tendency are:
Veliz, op. elt.
Economic Commission for Latin America,
op . c 1 t
pp. 111-115; John Mander, The Unrovolutlonary
Society: The Power of Latin American Conservatis m In a
Changing World (New York: Knopf ,~1969 ) pp. 122-lFj-; and
Mar sal, op. clt.
;

,

,

.

1
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faces have worked their way into
positions of power, but
the new faces pursue and perpetuate
the same values in
policy as those they replace. The
middle sectors have
provided a measure of stability but it
is frequently the
stability of the traditional, elitist,
olifrarchic society.
Another reason that the middle sectors are

effective agents for stability in that government
work has
become one of the major paths to achievlnff middle
sector
status.
Because a large portion of the middle
sectors is

dependent on government Jobs, the middle sectors become
defenders of the status quo rather than risk job security
in the pursuit of other ideals.

In addition to the fact

of bureaucratic growth, the growing state ownership and

direct control of entrepreneurship also provides a

stabilizing influence by discouraging moves for social

action on the part of the middle sectors.

Again,

governmental control over the economic destinies of these.

op« cit. , pp. 60-65; Stcpan, op. clt.
88; and Stanlslav Andreskl, Fa ra s 1 1 r,m and Subver s 1 on
The Case of T/^tin Amor lea (London:
Wcidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1966), pp. 11-12 all note this factor.
.

p.

;
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Middle sectors .akes the„
support the upper
classes rather
than oppose them on reform.
In addition to internal
pressures influencing the
middle sectors in latin
America, many argue that
outside

forces also push them toward
defense of the status
quo,
Hichard Adams, for instance,
argues that the upper
sectors
have an effective weapon to
hold the middle sectors
in
line through their alliance
with United States interests,
indeed, he states that the upper
sectors have an effective
lobby in Washington. D. C.
because their values coincide
With the values of United States
economic interests
in

latin America. 55

^he United States economic
interests

lobby to protect their interests
in Latin America, meaning
that they do not want too much
social change which could
lead to nationalization as well as
other such "harmful"
policies. The upper sectors of Latin
American society—

and now increasingly their middle
sector allies-are often
tied to United States interests.

•

5^

PP.* c^t\, pp. 6^-65 draws this point out
^
and^ also
notes that the struggles for political control
assume immense significance when political control
also
means effective control over the institutions and
allocations of natural resources.

55
Adams, op. cit. , p. 271. Remember Adams argues
that parts of the middle sectors have actually been
coopted by the upper sectors in some instances and by the
working sectors in others.

•
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Without doubt, there have been many
pressures on the
middle sectors to orient them towards
stability
in the

system.

As Pike and Petras note, the position
of the
Chilean middle sectors on values has meant
that there is
almost no disruption in the political system
as middle

sectors assume control.

These facts create difficulties

for the consensus approach.

While the consensus approach

emphasizes lack of disruption in the system, there also
have to be questions as to whether stability is to be

achieved at all costs.

It seems that many of the consensus

oriented Latin Americanists have emphasized the stabilizing
influences of the middle sectors without examining exactly

why they have been agents for stability and what kind of
stability that implies.

Juan

I«Iarsal»s

analysis of John Johnson •s approach

suggests that the consensus orientation on this particular
issue may ignore some of the facts of the situation

precisely because the model being used is oriented to
selectivity in what is discovered. ^"^

The point is that the

Pike, op. cit. . p. 287 and Petras, Politics and
Social Forces in Chilean Development , pp. 139-1^0
t

Marsal. op. cit.

.

p.

108, and pp. 26-2?.

.

expectations of the users of the model
influence the facts they find.^^

n^ay

actually

^^^^^^^

^^^^^^^^^

found are influenced by the types
of questions asked.
It
would be very difficult to explain the
seemingly erroneous
explanations of the middle sectors by consensus
theorists
in any other vjay.
There certainly is no one approach to the
study of
the middle sectors in Latin America.
Each nation
in the

area illustrates a different experience depending
on its
level of economic and social development, size of the

middle sectors, and strategic position of the middle
sectors.

Thus.

Chile, with a large middle sector

population has had vastly different experiences from
Nicaragua, for instance.

On the other hand, the

experiences of Paraguay and Uruguay may be quite different
precisely because there is a difference in the character

and size of the middle sectors in the

tv;o

nations as well.,

as a difference in economic and social development.

58

This obviously is not a new idea. For an
excellent analysis of this tradition, see William E,
Connolly, P olitical Science and Ideology (New York:
Atherton, T9'67 )
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Moreover. „e ™ust recognize
the diverse elements
and interests which make
up the .iddle
sectors-businessmen, clergy, labor leaders,
students. governn,ent
Officials. Military leaders,
etc.
This very diversity
helps explain why social
origins analysis has been
such a
weak explanatory tool in
enabling us to better
understand
the behavior of the I^tin
American officer corps, for
example,
•Hightist" military regimes as
In Brazil,

"leftist" military regimes as in
Peru, and "centrist"
regimes as in El Salvador are all
led by middle class
military officers.
The cultural heritage of the
nation is yet another

significant factor in determining the
role of the middle
sectors in particular societies. Those
nations such as
Chile or Uruguay which have very close
cultural links to

Western Europe contain middle sectors closer
to the
Western European model. On the other hand,
the evidence ^
suggests that societies without close ties to
such a

cultural heritage are not likely to show such
characteristics.
Despite the fact that the middle sectors show many

variations, some generalizations seem supported by the
studies noted above.

It seems obvious that the middle

sectors are most concerned with assuring their own status
in society and at present that usually means supporting
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the elite elements rather
than

The reasons for their actions

aUgnlng with

my

the workers.

not be Ideologlcal-in

fact, the evidence suggests
there Is little ideological
unity among the middle
uxe sectors.
sectors
Ty.o+.««^
Instead,
pragmatism seems
the most important characteristic
of the actions
of the

middle sectors.

They take the positions
calculated to pay
off in Job security and social
and prestige positions.

Therefore, it would have to agree
with Richard N. Adams
that the usefulness of the middle
class concept has been
vastly exaggerated in the study of
Latin America.

Many also argue that the universities
and the
expansion of education provide the best
prospects for

conveying the values associated with European
middle

Jane Lee Yare, "The Middle Class in Latin
America." (Department of Political Science.
University
Massachusetts, unpublished paper. 1971) suggests the
middle sectors take a very pragmatic approach to their
roles.
60

o

Richard N. Adams, "Political Power and Social
Structures." in Veliz. op. cit. . pp. is^k2 at p. 16.
This is also a m.ajor hypothesis of his book: The Second
Sowi!l£«
Milton I. Vanger, "Politics and Class"Tn
Tr^rentieth- Century Latin America," The Hispanic America n
Historical Review XLVIV (February, 19597T~To^, at pT
91 makes the same point along with many other Latin
Americanists.
.
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sectors/^

However, the experience on
this score also
indicates that such might not be
the case in Latin
America.
Claudio Veliz, for instance,
notes that the
Latin American university students
illustrate a surprising
tendency to slide back into middle
class conservatism
once they leave the universities.
They seem to follow
the same sort of pragmatic caution as
other elements of
the middle sectors.

Unless some drastic changes occur, the
middle

sectors of latin America are not likely to
provide much

impetus for modernization and development.

The Alliance

for Progress and other similar programs seem destined
for

failure unless their orientations are changed.

As many of

its critics note, the Alliance for Progress has been

ineffective because it tends to take the cautious route of

working through the elite and middle sectors rather than
identifying with the more progressive elements of

61

Richard N. Adams, The Second Sowing; p. 258, is
one who feels universal education may help expand middle
class consciousness.
,

62

Veliz, op. Pit.

,

p. 7.

society. 63

^^^^^

tendency has been to place

too much faith In the middle
sectors as modernizing
forces.
The evidence indicates that such
faith is
misplaced. Recognition of this fact
should help lead to
more enlightening analysis of the issue.

63

Eduardo Frei Montalva, for instance, in "The
Alliance that Lost its Way," Foreign Affairs XLV (April,
1967), 437-^^8, at pp. 443-447. Also see Alba, Alliance
Without Allies.
,

179

CHAPTER

VI

URBANIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
The Issue

The population of the world continues to
grow and.

as it does» there is a tendency toward increasing

concentration of population in urban areas.

For example,

predictions are that by the year 2000, approximately
fifty-five per cent of the world's population will be
living in urban areas. ^

Because the urban population is

increasing, urbanization is an important aspect in the
study of any society and particularly in the emerging

nations.

For this study, a consideration of the

1

Homer Hoyt, World Urbanization; Expanding:
Population in a Shrinking: World Urban Land Institute
Technical Bulletin ffo. 43 (Washington, D. C.
Urban Land
Institute, 1962), Table 1?, p. 50.
For country by country
breakdovms of rural versus urban population for the period
1965-1969» see United Nations Department of Economic and
Social Affairs, Demographic Yearbook I969 (New York,
,

:

1970). pp. 144-.150,
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urbanization process is especially
important, as it affects
the process of political
development. Little argument
is
offered against the contention
that urbanisation provides
various kinds of pressures on the
political system.
Questions do arise, however, as to
precisely what sorts of
forces urbanization sets in motion
in the development
process.
The task of this chapter is to
analyze the
various Interpretations of the role
played by urbanization
in the development process of L8.tin
America.
Definition.

One of the problems in studying the

process of urbanization is that there is much
confusion as
to what constitutes "urban.
Authors vary greatly in the

definition of the term and often use totally different
criteria.

There are normally three basic types of data

taken into account in discussing urbanization, and
they

are not always compatible concepts.
1)

population size;

2

2)

These criteria are:

population density; and 3) life

De mographic Yearbook 196 9. pp. 21-22 discusses
the problems encountered in defining urban from one
country to another. The variety of definitions is found
on pp. 1^7-150,

'
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style Of the population.^

Ufe

.tyle can be Independent

Of size or density of
population, although these
criteria
tend to «o together. The
point Is that definitions
vary
and the student of urban!
uj. uanization
7n f nr> rr.^^^^.
must v,
be aware of the
i

variations*

Defining urbanization in terms
of population si:.e
Is a very popular method of
solving the problem of
ambiguity in definition. However,
the population size
which constitutes -urban" varies
from country to country
and among authors in the same country.^
if scholars were

3

Robert Daland. "Comparative Perspectives
of Urban
systems
in Robert T. miand (ed.). Comparative
Srban
Regearcht
The Admini stration and PoirfT^;:rTTirr~
l^^blications. I969), pp. 15!^ at
pp. 22-26; and Louis Wirth, "Urbanism As A Way of
Life
Agie^q£yi_Jo urnal of So cj^olo^v. XLIV (July, I938). 1-24*
at
discuss these differing definitions of the
term!
Also see Giorgio Mortara. Characteristics o f
the
ge mogr ap hlc Structure o f th e American Coun tri pT"
(Washington, D. C.
Pan American Union. r9"6^77 pp. 8-10.*
:

See the Demographic Yearbook 19
.
pp. 147-I50.
For an example of variations on studies 69
within one
nation, see William L. Flinn, Rural to Urban Migration;
A Colomb ian Case (Madison:
Land Tenure Center,
University of Wisconsin. July, I966). p. 18. There he
indicates that the official census defines urban as an
agglomeration of I.500 people or more, many studies
consider 10.000 as a minimiim population to be considered
urban, and still another study defines any tovm or city
which is the country ( munlcipio ) seat as urban.
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to rely on the individual
nations to define "urban."
it
would soon be apparent that
size standards vary greatly
in
Official censuses of nations,^
recent years, there has
been a tendency to use the official
United Nations

m

definition of urban which means a city
of 20.000
population or more/ Even if size were

to be totally

agreed upon as a definition, there
would still be problems
because of the inaccuracy of much of
the data reported by
many of the countries. In many instances,
comprehensive
censuses are not taken and estimates are
substituted."^
Thus, even if the size definition can be
agreed upon,

other problems emerge.
The use of the criterion of density of population

(defined as the ratio of people per square mile)
also

lends itself to some problems.

The question of accuracy

of data is relevant in this case as well.

^

Demographic Yearbook I969

.

Nor does the

pp. 1^7-150.

6

Ibid.
Also see Philip Vi. Hauser (ed.).
pp. 21-22.
Urbanization in Latin America (New York; International
Documents Service. I96I), p. 75,
,

Demographic Yearbook I969 pp. 1^7-150 notes many
instances of estimated and old data.
.
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criterion of density necessarily
take' into accouiu the
value systems or interrelationships
of people.
Authors
also differ as to what density
constitutes
"urban."

The

criticisms applicable to using
size as the deteri^ining
feature of urbanization are valid
here as well.

The third definition is perhaps
the most vague and
troublesome to use in studies, particularly
empirical
studies.
Urbanism as a life style is difficult
to define
in itself because urbanites differ
so greatly among

themselves.

As Robert

T.

Daland notes, this definition

attempts to characterize urbanism or -urbaneness"
as the
key to defining urban society.^ Usually this
definition
of urbanization relates to the values of
the population

along with their interests and social relationships.

Of

particular Interest to this study is that urbanism
in this
sense is usually associated with modernism. According
to

this view, to be urban is to be modern and many students
of development assume such a relationship even though not

always consciously.^

As the discussion of the role

Daland, op. cit«

.

pp. 22-23.

9
Ifeniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society;
Modernizing the Middle F^st (Glencoe: The Rree Press.
1958) particularly equates urban society with modern
society. Warren S. Thompson, ••Urbanization," The
Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences Vol. XV (New York:
.

•

attributed to urbanization In
the development process
continues, the assumption and
Its Implications will be
analyzed. Obviously, problenis
wUl be encountered In
using this definition since the
life styles

of squatter

villages or ghettoes differ from
those of the suburban
middle or upper class.
While definitions of "urban" vary
according to the
author considered, we cannot permit
such variation to
direct our attention amy from the more
important problem
of what relationship the process of
urbanization has to

political development.

As a result, we will discuss each

author in terms of his own definition.

If and when an

author's definition has specific implications
for the role
assigned by him to urganization. special note will

be made.

Macmillan, 193^), pp. 189-192; Lucian Pye, "The Political
Implications of Urbanization and the Development Process,"
Social Problems of Dovelopinent and Urb anization
(Geneva:
United States Papers prepared for the United
Nations Conference on the Apolication of Science and
Technology for the Benefit of the Less Developed Areas.
Vol. 7, 1963), p. 64; and Donald J. Mc Crone and Charles F,
Cnudde, "Tov/ard a Communications Theory of Democratic
Political Development: A Cfiusal Model," The American
Political Science Review . LXI (March. I967), 7I-79 all
make a similar assumption. For even more detailed
explanation of the assumptions see, Gabriel Almond and G.
Bingham Powell, Jr., Compara tive Politics; A Developir.ental
Approach (Boston: Little, Brown, 19^6) particularly pp.
93-94
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^^^^^^^^^LJ^-^HII^^

Before meaningful analysis

Of the effects of
urbanization can be attempted,
an
understanding of Its causes
and

characteristics is

necessary.

The causes usually noted
depend upon the

period of urbanization being
discussed as well as the
particular society under
consideration.

For example, the

Western European origin of the
city was related to the
medieval period and the particular
economic requirements
occasioned by the decline of
feudalism.
From this
emergence and the development of
capitalist society, many
students have considered the city a
product of the

industrialization process.

Originally a center of trade

and commerce, it is argued that the
city provides the best
means of gaining productive efficiency
in the

10

3M-.Ci^. translated and edited by
n
Don
Martlndale and Gertrud Neuwlrth (Glencoe
The Free
Press, 1953) presents perhaDS the m.ost
exhaustive
comparison of the reasons for the development of
cities
from ancient to modern times. Pages 10^-111
provide a
^^^^
essential discussion of the medieval
city
:

11 ^
Thompson, op. cit. notes this approach as do
Philip M. Hauser, "The Social, Economic and Technological
Problems of Rapid Urbanization," in Bert F. Hoselitz and
Wilbert E. Moore (eds.). Industrialization and Society
(Paris:
Mouton, I963). pp. 199-21? at p. 200; Ernest
Weissmann, "The Urban Crisis in the World," Urban Affairs
.
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manufactirrlng process.

The labor and market needs
of

industrial society are conducive
to urban living
arrangements.
As has been noted before in this
study, the
development of urbanization in the Latin
American countries
does not closely follow that of Western
Europe or the
United States.
Instead, cities were created as centers
for the elite of the Spanish and Portuguese
colonizers and
their development usually bore no relationship
to

industrialization.^^

Rather industrialization has been

Ouarterix. I (September. I965), 65-82; and Almond and
Powell. o£^__ci_U. pp. 93-9^.
Daniel Lorner. op. cit.
takes a little different approach in that he considers
the
urban society as productive of industrialization although
he is somewhat vague on the specific causal relationship
between the two processes. At any rate, he believes the
tvfo are very closely interrelated,
.

12

Among the many authors noting this feature of
Latin American urbanization are: Jorge Enriaue Hardoy,
"Dos mil anos de urbanizaclon en America Latina," In
Jorge Enrique Hardoy and Carlos Tobar (eds,), La
urba nizaclon en A merica latlna (Buenos Aires: Editorial
del Institute. I969), pp. 23-6^; Jaime Dorselaer and
Alfonso Gregory, La urbanlzaclCn en Am e rica Latlna tomo
II (Bogota:
Centre Internacional de Investigaciones
Sociales de FERES, 19^2 ), Part I. especially Chapter II;
Richard Morse, "Some Characteristics of Latin American
Urban History," The Hispanic A merican Historical Review
LXVII (January. 19o2). 31?~33"^; and Ronald Glassmiin,
Political History of Latin America (New York: Funk and
Wagnalls. I969). pp. 246^2^2^ Obviously this is a very
small number of the many works which could be cited, but
others v;lll be noted in relation to specific points being
analyzed in the rest of the chapter.
.

,

"

.

'

18?

proposed as one way of solving
so.e of the acute
problems
Of the already existing
urban areas. At any rate,
the
Cities were created as
cultural, administrative,
and
social centers for the
Spaniards and Portuguese and
until
more recent times, tended
to exploit the countryside
rather than serve as centers
of economic development.
The question of ruralto-urban migration has also
been a subject of concern to
students of the urbanization
process.
The process is particularly
important
in Latin

America where the rate of urban
population growth is among
the highest in the world.
The migration process is
produced by factors characterized as
"push and pull"
factors.
These push and pull factors relate
to the

13

Economic Commission for Latin America.
United
Council, S
Develo;ment
of
f^^^rfArn erica in t""^
liLtll?,
the Post-War P^-rio d IJl^FT^TTlIt^
Argent inai May, 1963); Fauc^pr ^nvT Social,
J'^'^'^'^*
^^'^ Qr^o1o^
Economic and
Jr^
TArhr^oi^-.-i
ti
Technological Problems
of Rapid Urbanization." pp. 202-203and Weissmann. op. ctt. . p. 6? among many
^ ''^'^
others! ^
MA^inr,.

p^""^

—

^l

*

1^
See International Union of Local Authorities,
Urbanization in Developing: Countries (The Hague
Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff. 196iJ),
p. 12; j\ Medina
Echavarrfa and Philip M. Hauser, 'Rapporteur 's Report."
in
Hauser (ed.), op....„olt^, pp. 38-39; E. J. Hobbswawm,
Peasants and Rural Migrants in Politics"in Claudio Ve3iz
The _Politlcs of Conformity in Latin America (London:
Oxford University Press, 19Tf), pp. 43-65; and Gino Germani.
Soclolof-ia de la modernlzacion
estudios teroicas y
aplicado^; a America Latina (Buenos Aire.g!
Paidos. 1969
pp. 124-132.
;

)

.

.
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differing conditions existing
between urban and rural
areas. Both forces seem to
be important to an
understanding of urbanization in
Latin America as
indicated in the ensuing discussion.
The "push" factors are usually
noted as the lack of

services and opportunities in the
rural areas.

Job

opportunities are scarce because
dependence on agriculture
is decreasing and greater efficiency
agricultural
technology decreases the need for labor.
Education in the
rural areas is either very poor or
non-existent.

m

The

"pull" factors are perhaps even more
important in that
they represent the attractions of the urban
centers to the
migrants. The urban centers attract migrants
by offering

them employment, services, or luxuries that
they think
they need."^^
The "pull" argument is that urban centers offer

better educational facilities. Job opportunities, luxuries
such as movies, and the promise of a better

llfe.'^'^

The

15^

£JLL:.»

^
International
Union of Local Authorities, op.
13-15;
Flinn,
op. clt.
VP*
pp. 10-13; and Germani,
.

op. clt.

International Union of Local Authorities, op.
clt.

1?

Germani, op. clt
Hobbswawm, op. cl t
Dorselaer and Gregory, op. cit. pp. ^5-48.
;

.

?

and
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development of better transportation
and communication
systems is the Immediate
instrument
of migration.

People

learn of the "wonders" of urban
life through the
communications network and by being
exposed to them in
military service and in other
contacts with modern life.^^

Communications also evolve from the
network of family
relationships, with those in the urban
centers providing
contacts for family members left in
the rural areas/^

Regardless of the causes of urbanization,
the fact
is that urbanization is occurring at
a very rapid
rate.

Of particular importance to this study
is the fact that
the urban populations of developing
societies are growing

at a much faster rate than in the developed
societies.

Flinn, op. clt.

.

p.

12.

19

T. Lynn Smith, la tin American Popula t ion Studie
s
(Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 19^6), p. 6'47

See Wilfred Woodhouse, "Urban Development:
Some
International Comparisons." in G. M. Lomas (ed.). Social
Aspects of Urban Development (New York: National Council
of Social Service. 1966), pp. 64-72; Gerald Breese.
Urbanization in Newly Devel o pinp: Countries (Englewood
Cliffs:
Prentice-Hall, 196~6) and International Union of
Local Authorities, op. cit. p. 12.
;

.
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The Important point Is that
the effects attributed to

urbanization in the process of political
development
become more significant as the rate
and
degree of

urbanization increase.

If developing societies become

urbanized at faster rates than do developed
societies, the
effects of urbanization, both good and bad.
should be

greater as well.

As a result, it is important to have a

clear understanding of the process and its
effects.
The Effect of Urbanization on Political

Development According to the
Consensus Model
The general literature .

The consensus theorists

tend to stress the modernizing features of urbanization.
In their analyses,

the Increased opportunities provided by

urban society and the political integration occasioned by
the unlversalization of value systems of the population

tend to be emphasized.

In other words,

the positive

features and benefits of urbanization are emphasized
while the negative, disruptive features are

de-emphasized.

21

Dankwart Rustow. A World of Nations (V.'ashington,
Brookings Institute, 196?), p. 245 notes the
negative and positive features.
D.

C.

:
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As with

^ny

other aspects of the
consensus model,
the treatment of urbanization
by this particular
model cin
be traced to
x^o Max
Wphp-r
tj^-k^^i
i.ax weber.
Weber's analysis of the
medieval
City particularly has been
accepted as the mode of
development of urban society.22
According to Weber's
analysis, the medieval city
produced a form of pluralism
in which those values now
associated with modernization
are
most likely to emerge. People
developed the cooperative
spirit for solving common problems
and worked together in
the interest of all concerned. ^3
effect, the city

^

becomes the center of the orderly and
rational approach to
solving society's problems.

Among more recent analysts of the impact
of
urbanization on modernization, none has been more
influential than Daniel Lerner who practically
equates
urban society with modern society.

His thesis is that

urbanization is the basic feature of society which sets
in

22

Weber, p p. cit.

.

23

pp. lOif-111.

Ibid^.
See Reinhard Bendix, Max Wober;
An
lectual
IlLtel
Portrait (Garden City: Doubleday, i960),
pp. 70-79 for a good interpretation of Weber's analysis.

Lerner, op. cit..
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motion various modernizing
processes.

Specifically,

urbanization tends to increase
literacy levels .^hich in
turn produce greater exposure
of the population to the
communications media. Participation
in economic and
political life is encouraged and
increased by media
exposure; thus, urbanization is the
stimulus of the

modernizing forces.
Obviously, this is a very brief and
oversimplified

summary of Lerner's thesis, but it seems
that the media
really provide the key to modernization because
they permit
people to absorb a wide range of values through
empathy

with a wider range of life styles.

Urbanization,

however, provides the conditions productive of the
media

and thus urbanization is the most important factor.

Many

people have attempted to test Lerner»s thesis and most
field studies using the specific hypotheses developed by
him have concluded that they are valid, ^''^

25
26

Ibid.

,

particularly pp. 45-65,

Ibid.

.

pp. 50-61.

2?

Tv7o of the most specific tests of the theory are
provided by Gilbert R. Wlnhara. "Political Development and
Lerner's Theory: Further Test of a Causal Model," The
American Political Science Review LXIV (September, 1970),
810-818; and McCrone and CYiudde, op. cit. Both confirm
the essence of Lerner's theory.
,
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Lerner freely ad.its that
his .odel i. based on
the
western European industrial
tradition, but he ar.ues
that
it is not ethnocentric
because the process is a
historical
fact Which is verifiable.28
His Justification really
does
not confront the question
of ethnocentricity .
The fact
that his model can be
verified in terms of the
experience
Of developed societies does
not necessarily mean
that

societies of differing cultures
will develop in the same
way.
It should be noted that
his analysis is of the
Middle East and thus questions
of applicability to Latin
America may be raised. He does
not limit his conclusions
to the Middle East, however.
His analysis has been
adopted by many students of development
regardless of
their particular geographical interests.
Gabriel Almond is among those generalists
who have
accepted Lerner 's thesis as it applies
to urbanization and
the development process.

Almond notes that urbanization-

28

Lerner. op. cit.
29

.

p. 46.

See Almond and Powell, op. cit.

pp. 93-95 in
Almond
and
James
S.
Coleman (eds.).
mt^^l.^^}^^*
lj2e__Pqll tics of the Developing Area s (Princeton:
Princeton University Press. I960) particularly
pp. 536537 of Coleman's "Conclusion."
^'^^^

.
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can have a...nteeratl.o
efrocts. but he and his
coauthors
tend to e.phaslee the
Idea that the cities
are the cent ers
Of .odernlty and that
they also provide the
Instrument s
for modernization of the
countryside. 3°
their
arBUment, the i-ities
cities tend
tenrt to
^„ v,„
be the centers of
national
life, but they provide help
for modernisation

m

of the

countryside because the urbanltes
maintain family ties
With the rural areas.
In addition, a greater
flow of
information, of political
participation, etc.. emerges
In
the urban setting.
All of these developments are
Integral parts of
increasing pluralism of society.
Increasing urbanization
creates different types of needs
on the part of the
population. As needs and differences
of elements of
society become apparent, group identity
emerges. As
people recognize solidarity with others,
demands

'

can be

made on the system and then compromises
posited by the
plurallsts begin to emerge. 31 Political
participation and

modernity (stable democracy) are produced by
these forces.

30
31

Almond and Coleman, op. clt.

Almond and Powell, op, clt.

.

pp. 9k, 97,
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Many students of
urbanisation echo these
Ideas.
Luolan Pye and Louis
ouxs wirth
Wlri-h h^n,
^
both tend
to equate modernity
and urbanization or at
least see urbanization
as the
springboard to modernlzatlon.32
For the., all that
1,s
inodern la associated
with the growth of
cities,
hr.s
"crises" Of distribution
and penetration.
4.

m

Pye sees the

cities as Playing key roles
as they do to a lesser
extent
in the other
^3
ner crises.
<;p«j
cri
t*^ ^
In regard to group
organization
and political participation.
A. P. K. Organskl is
yet
another who adopts the Lerner
and Almond theses.^'^
His
idea Is that urbanization
pulls the working class
together physically for the first
ti.e providing them with
greater opportunity of becoming
organized.
With large
numbers of the workers together
in one place,
they can

become effective forces in the
political system. Warren
Thompson echoes these thoughts In
noting that Increased
economic opportunity in the cities
provides for greater

32

Pye, op. clt.. and Wlrth. op. clt.

p. 1.

Develon..nt (Boston:

Llttle/^^:;,^TflfT!

'

A. F. K. Organski,

Development (New York:

.

The Stapres of P oljtip.ni
Knopf. 1965 ). pp. 1^2-1^3.""*
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rreedo. because of increased
alternatlves.35 inereasing
eoono.lc opportunity also
opens new social doors
and, as
has been noted in Chapter
Hi. social equality
is

productive of political
participation and equality
in the
consensus approach. Numerous
others adopt the foregoing
position on the process of
urbanization.^^
The most significant feature
of the consensus
approach is that urban areas
are viewed as the agents
of

modernization and consensus-building.

Very little

emphasis is placed on the gulf
which exists between the
city and the countryside except
to indicate how cities
are forces for decreasing that
gulf.
Many Latin

Americanists have adopted the consensus
approach to
urbanization and attention will not be
turned

to them.

The_literature on La tin Arnerica

.

As with the

argument concerning the middle sectors.
John

Thompson, op. cit.

.

J.

Johnson is

p. 192.

36

Significant works include Karl W. Deutsch.
HQ
.
M^^^'ff
Social
Mobilization
and Political Development " The
Arn^rlcan Politi cal Science Review LV (
September. T96I),
^93-51^; David Apter, The Politics of Moderni zati nn
(Chicago:
The University of Cnicago Press, 19^TrBind
Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changin
g
Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, I908).
-,

.
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one of the latin A.-nerlcanists
most closely identified with
the consensus model view of
urbanization. 3? His argument
on the middle sectors is that
industrialization helps to
create the middle sectors.
Industrialization also brings
about iirbanization and it is in the
urban centers that the
middle sectors are found. The urban
centers provide the
forces for modernization, development,
and new hope for

democracy and stability.

Many Latin Americanists, without

evaluating all the evidence, accept this
argument with the
result that the urbanization process is seen
as
the

creator of modernization in Latin America.
In addition to Johnson's V7orks. the literature

often stresses the fact that the middle sectors are
most

closely associated with urban areas.

Urban development is

seen as the place in which middle sectors develop,
with

all the implications usually associated with the middle

37

Johnson (ed.). Con tinuity and Changre in Latin
America (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), and
Politi cal Chan^7e in Latin America; The Emerp:ence of the
Middle Sectors (Stanford:
Stanford University Press,
1958) present a consensus argument on urbanization.
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sectors argu^ent.^^

Even Glno Ger.anl notes
the tendency

or urbanization to
produce growth of the
middle sectors.^?
Again, the fact of growing
middle sectors In urban

centers cannot be denied;
however, the role played
by
those sectors In the developn,ent
process Is questionable.
Since the Issue of the role
of the middle sectors
was
analyzed In the previous chapter,
it will not be discussed
further here.
Michael Micklln adopts the
urbanization thesis of
Tnodernlzation by analyzing the
demographic characteristics
of Latin America.
In his analysis, demographic

modernization (low or decreasing infant
mortality, low or
decreasing population growth) is directly
affected by the
urbanization process. As a secondary factor,
economic

modernization is similarly positively associated
with

38

Franolne P. Rablnovitz. "Urban Development and
T.
Political
Development in Latin America," in Daland, op.
9±L*.* PP» 88-123 at p. 96.
Also see Michael Micklln"
Demographic, Economic, and Social Change in Latin
America: An Examination of Causes and Consequences,
"The
Joij^ngJL-O^ Dgveloplnp- Areas, IV (January, 1970), l^^^loZ"
at p. 183»
'

*

39

pp.

Germanl. op. clt. . pp. 199-225, particularly
199-202 concerning Latin America.

40
Micklln, op. clt.

.

pp. 183-185.

demographic modernization
In I^tln A.erlca.^^

These Idea

consensus theorists for
modernization of latin America.
The arguments concerning
demographic modernization
as defined by Mcklln. and
urbanization are based on
studies Of developed systems.
The facts Indicate that
birth rates in developed nations
are lower in urban areas
than in rural areas.^^ ^^^^^^^
mdicate. however,
that

the birth rates of latin
American urban populations have
shovm no significant decllnes.^^
This is not to say that

these trends will not eventually
occur.

What is

emphasized, however, is that the
tendency of some scholars

41
Ibid.

42
^^"^

pp. 276-278!

^"ited Nations Dempirraphlc Yearbook

IQ^.Q

,

43

J^l^ Also see United Nations Population
Branch. Bureau of Social Affairs.
"Demographic
Urbanization in Latin America." in Hauser (ed.),Aspects of
Carmen A. Miro. "The Population of 20th Century op. cl t
La tin
America." in American Assembly. Population Dll enma
of
Latin America (Washington. D. C.
Potomac Books. 1966):
and 0. Andrew Collver, Birth Rates in Latin A merica;
New
Estimates of Histori cal Trends and Fluctuation.':: ^R^r-k^l^y.
Institute of International Studies. University ~of
California. I965). Collver 's discussion is particularly
good.
He cites Venezuela. Chile, and Mexico to support
his argument.

•
'
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to apply pre-concelved
notions to analyses of differing

societies provides distorted
results.
If the scholars
were to take into consideration
the Catholic heritage of
I^tin Anierlcans. the concept of
i.achis.q. and suggestions
of some Latin American nationalists
that population
control is a scheme for keeping
Latin America weak, they
might be more willing to recognize
that the facts are
different for Latin America. Perhaps
the hope of
modernizing tendencies provides too great
an attraction to
such scholars for them to be objective.
Eventually,
birth rates may start dropping and other
modernizing

tendencies may develop, but that is not sufficient
for
solving the problems of the present. To do that,
an

understanding of the present is essential.
Perhaps more widespread than the idea that

urbanization will produce declining birth rates is the
belief that it will provide modern values for most of the
population.

An indication of the popularity of this view

is the fact that many authors state the view without

offering any further explanation.
self-evident.

They assume this to be

The idea takes the form of an argument that

urban centers are the effective nations of Latin American
systems and that all modernizing forces are found in the
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cities.

44

The .odern values and
Institutions are found in
the Cities and. beyond that,
the leaders and organizers
for modernizing society are
also found in the urban areas.
These leaders also stimulate
the countryside through
contact Kith families left in
the rural areas.
Thus, the
urban centers are viewed as
producers of a type of

political leadership for modernization.^^
Closely associated with this aspect
of urbanization
in I^tin America is that urbanism or
"citif ication" of the
rural elements comes about through contact
with the urban
centers. Andrew Hunter Whiteford states
this argument
quite nicely:

44

See Jacques Lambert, I^tin America;
Snojal
Structure and Political Instl tmTTnn.c:, t.-r. Ky pqI"—-^
te1
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 1967). pp. 184-199: Kalman Sllvert, "Leaders,
Followers and Modernization," in Roy C. Macridis and
Bernard E. Brovm (eds.). Comparative Politics: Not es and
Readin£S, rev. ed. (Horaewood, 111.: Dor c ey Pre s
s "l 90^77,
pp. 649-658 at p. 649; and Joseph Maier and Richard W.
Weatherhead (eds.). Politic s of Chan,?e in Latin America
(New York:
Praeger, 1964). pp. 8-9; and f^anclne fl
Rabinovitz, op. cit. p. 99,
,

,

45

Lambert, op. cit. pp. 145-148; and Margot
Romano Yalour de Tobar, "El proceso de socializacion
urbana," in Hardoy, op. cit. pp. 234-256.
,

.
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Througn contact with the city
a vague
conception of "progress" is
instilled
in
the minds of village folk.
.
.The
process of "ci tif icatipn" or
urbanization
^^anization
seems to be universal. ^6
.

A quote from George

I.

Blanksten Indicates a similar

position with emphasis on the urban
people and also an
aspect of the Western bias to the argument:
Urbanization. . .contributes to the
development of common sets of political
attitudes and experiences on the part
of the people who live in the growing
cities of Latin America. Although in
some instances urbanization aggravates
political conflict between large
municipal centers and rural areas as
in Cuba. Uruguay, and Argent ina--the
over-all effect of the movement to the
cities is integrative, and Westernizing,
so far as the urban folk are concerned. ^7

—

The major consideration is that the familial contacts of
the urban migrants are maintained and the urban migrant

provides a channel of communication to the countryside
in his contacts with family left there.

Andrew Hunter

V.Tiiteford,

T;^o

•

There seems to

Cities of Latin

America (Garden City: Doubleday, 1964), p. 2. Pages 1-4
provide the general assumptions he uses in his two case
studies.
4?

Blanksten, "The Politics of Latin America," in
Coleman, op. clt. , pp. 455-531t at p. 475,

Almond and
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be substantial evidence
that such Is the case and
that
breakdo™ of family tles-to be
discussed in the next

section-Is not a necessary effect
of Latin American
h,Q

m

urbanization.

such a situation, the urban

population has the potential to be
an effective force for
raodernization.

Another feature of urbanization often
noted by
consensus theorists among Latin American

scholars is the

potential political role of the urban
migrants.
not stress the potential violent threat

They do

of the favelas or

^^^^o^. but the constructive, development-oriented
political pressures which they might bring to
bear on the
kg
system.
Andrews and Phillips argue that the people in

Rabinovitz. pp. clt. p. 95; Richard Morse,
"Latin American Cities: Aspects of Function and
Structure," Comparative Studies in Society and History.
IV (July. 1962)7^^73-^93. at p. 485 f" Joan Nelso'nT^^^
Urban Poor: Disruption or Political Integration in Third
World Cities," World Politics . XXII (April, I970), 393414. at pp. 396-399; and Oscar Lewis, "Urbanization
Without Breakdown: A Case Study." Scientific Monthly
LXXV (July, 1952), 31-41. Lewis argues that family ties
actually strengthen in cities as one means of protection
against the strangeness of urban life (p. 36).
.

.

49

This is a continuation of Organski's argument,
See Rabinovitz, op. cit.
p. 96; and Frank M.
Andrews and George W. Phillips. "The Squatters of Lima:
Who They Are and What They Want," The Journal of
Developing Areas IV (January, I97O), 211-224.
o p»

cit.

.

.
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the barrios of Peru are
Just the ones »ho are
»ost
necessary for change In
soclo-econo.lc policies. They
are
the ones most llkelv to
h^s>^£>f»^+.
tn benefit and
^
represent those who
Show a certain amount of
initiative by the very fact
that
they ^.igrated to the urban
centers in search of a new
life
in the first place.^^
Rablnovitz carries the argument
further, notin, that political
opportunities may attempt
to direct attention to the
needs of the shanty towns as

suffrage is broadened.

Such a move would encourajre

greater participation by the poor
migrants as they see
chances for specific changes
beneficial
to them.

The consensus theorists have an
attractive argument
if it is valid.

If their view were to be accepted,

we

could look forward to gradual modernization
in the
plui-alist tradition.

Many, however, reject the consensus

argument on the question of urbanization as
on other
issues.

Attention will now be t'orned to some of the major

differing points of view.

50

Ikld^. pp. 212-213.

Nelson, op. clt,

,

p.

k06

and 411. however, stresses that the poor see their needs
as very individualized and argues that this keeps them
from taking unified action.
51

Rablnovitz. op. clt.

.

p.

96.
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The Effect of Urbanization
on Political

Development According to the
Conflict Model

The^eneral

litera ture.

It is difficult to discuss

the role of urbanization in the
conflict model among

generalists because the generalists have
not directed thei r
attention to the process in any appreciable
degree.

Thi s

lack of attention supports the thesis
that the model has
Western biases— it will be remembered that
the model is
developed from association by Marx with an
industrialized
and urbanized society. While most general
conflict

theorists do not pay specific attention to the
process of
urbanization, the process has an implicit role in
their
model.

This discussion is based on the assumptions

implicit in the model and the logical implications of
the

model itself.
The conflict model, as

v/as

noted before, is usually

based on the idea of class conflict.

When we analyze

Latin Americanists, it will be found that they broaden
this approach to Include conflict among many types of
groups.

For the generalists, however, the tendency is to
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base analyses on economic
class oonij.ict.
conflict

Economic class
.

differences, of course, were
most associated with
the
industrialization process for
.arx.
that process, the
capitalists began exploiting
the working .asses.

m

Since the

society Marx was

:.ost

familiar with was the urbanized

industrial society of Western
Europe, particularly Great
Britain, his analysis tended
to accept urbanization
as an
inseparable part of industrialization.
The analysis is
relevant to this chapter in that
it happened
to be in the

urban areas that class conflicts
were most manifest.
Urbanization may not be the cause of
conflict, but

conflicts might tend to increase in
number and intensity
in urbanized societies partly as a
result of greater
concentration of people. In addition, as
larger and
larger concentrations of the poor masses
emerge, they may
become increasingly impatient with their lot
in life
as

they are exposed to the amenities of modern
life while

also recognizing that they are unattainable in
the system

52

^' ^* Feuer (ed.), Basic Writings on Poli tics
Ph ilo sophy;
Marx and Engels { GiH:i?rCityl Doubleday.
1959;; Karl Marx. Friedrlch En-els. and V. I. Lenin. The
Essential Left (New York: Barnes and Noble, I96I); and~an
excellent interpretation by Shlomo Avlnerl, in the
Introduction to his edited volume, Karl Marx on
Colonial ism and Modernization (Garden City: Doubleday,
1968).

^d
^
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as It exists.^3

^^^.^^^ly, the urban' centers
provide the
greatest opportunity for
exposure to .odern life
styles.
The emphasis of the
"conflict^ generalists
•

Is

Placed on the de-personallzatlon
and alienation which
exist
in the urban society.
Again, they are not
necessarily
concerned with urbanization
Itself, but with modern
society as a whole, which
encompasses the urban settlng.^^
In the urba.n society, people
become much more Independent
from one another and more Isolated
from familial

relationships. ^5

This has been a common assumption
of

sociologists of the industrialized
society.

A form of

alienation from the society emerges
and societal bonds

1959) for
class structure.

Essays on The Theory of Soc iety
Stanford University Press. I968). Also Lomas.

/o^
(Stanford:

op. cit.

.

p.

33.

55

See William J. Goode. ••Industrialization and
Family Change,
in Hoselitz and Moore, op. cit.
pp. 237255 for a good analysis of general theory on family
relationships In Industrial society.
••

.
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disintegrate, leading to social
disorganization.

,ui

be noted below. latin
Americanists have very readily
accepted this analysis but much
evidence also exists to
indicate that the idea may have
been greatly exaggerated.

Another more commonly accepted
assumption about
urbanization concerns the role of the
urban migrants
themselves. According to many
analyses, the urban migrant
Is supposed to be a disruptive
force in the society and

also provide a large source of recruits
for radical
movements.
Because developing nations

have such large

56

Eric Josephson and Mary Josephson (eds.).
Kan
Alienation in Modern Sooio.t.v (New York:
Delf"
1^;62; presents an excellent collection
of essays on the
issue.
See also Glaucio Soavp.r^ «nH R^^Ko-^+• t

Alone;

57

Nelson. on_^i_u, pp, 396-399 who argues that
the theory has some validity, but it has become accepted
to the extent that conflicting evidence is not even
recognized anymore.
58

See Hauser. "The Social. Economic and
Technological Problems of Hapld Urbanization." pp. 210211; Scares and Harablln. op. clt.
and Joan Nelson.
j^-gTf^ri ts. Urban Poverty, and In .stabili t y in Developing
Na t i on
Ca m br 1 dg-e
liarvard Univcrcity Center for
International Affairs, I969) devotes Chapter I to analysis
of the theory of disruption by the migrants and Chapter II
to analysis of radlcallzatlon theory, rejecting both.
Also see S. N. Eisenstadt, Modernization: Protc;:t and
Change (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. I966). pp. 20;

r.

22.

(

;

migrant populations, the role
played by the .l^rants
becomes very Important. The
poverty of the recent
arrivals, the Impersonality
of the mass society of
the
cities, and the Increasing
class consciousness of the
workers all contribute to the
posslblUty-^or even
lnevitability--of accelerated conflict
and class warfare.
Unfortunately, however, the evidence
often contradicts
these most commonly held assumptions
about the
role of

urbanization.

Studies of Mexican urbanization, for

instance. sup:gest that there is little
evidence to support
the idea that urbanization is a
radicalizing force. -^^

Joan Nelson's consideration of urbanization
on a world
scale leads her to reject this commonly held
sociological

assumption as well.^^
Yet another feature of the conflict model position
on urbanization is emphasis on the differences
between

rural and urban areas.

Instead of economic class

59

Wayne A. Cornelius. Jr.. "Urbanization as an
Agent in Latin American Political Instability: The Case
of Mexico," Anorican Political Science novlow LXIII
(September. 19^97713X3-857, and Lewis, op.~t. .
Concerning I/itin America generally. see'Margot Romano
Yalour de Tob;\r. op. clt., and Lambert, op. cit.. pp. 1^5148 and 184-^199.
.

Nelson. "The Urban Poor:
Disruption or Political
Integration in Third World Cities."
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differences between groups within
the urban areas, conflict
may be seen between the urban
centers and the

countryside/^

Whereas the consensus model
emphasizes the

modernizing Influences which the urban
centers provide for
the countryside, the conflict
model emphasizes
the

differences between the two and how the
expectations of the
rural inhabitants may lead to disruption
in the system as
they are exploited to an ever greater degree
by the urban
areas.
Differences in culture and economy are noted,
with

the emphasis on the idea that a system of
••internal

colonialism" exists in which the rural elements are

exploited by their urban brethren.

Harrington Moore. Jr.. Social O ri gins of
Dictatorship an d Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, I956)
indicates a belief that the peasantry is often exploited by
the more modernized urban dvieller particularly during the
period of colonization. Also see Bert Koselitz,
'•Generative and Parasitic Cities," Economic DevG 3op?rpnt and
Cultural Chanpre. Ill (1955), 278- 29^^~and Brian J.' sirry;
"Some Relations of Urbanization and Basic Patterns of
Economic Development," in Forrest R. Pitts (ed.), Urba.n
Systems and Economic Development (Eugene: University of
Oregon School of Business Administration, I962), pp. I-I5,
at pp» 12-14.
.

.
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See Rodolfo Stavenhagen. "Seven Fallacies About
Latin America," in James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin (eds.),
I^'atln America;
Reform or Revolution? (New York: Fawcett,
19r8l, pp. 13-31.

.
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In addition,

the deterioration of the
physical

environment brought on by urbanization
in often noted by
the conflict oriented scholars/^
A. mi^^ration continues
and urban i:;^Qt ion increases at an
ever faster pace, the

environment keeps deteriorating.

The deterioration of the

environment only increases the squalor of
the poor and as
a result, the likelihood of violent
disruption
p;rows.

As

with the other features of the model regarding
urbanization, it seems that the ideas have been too
hastily

accepted.

As Oscar Lewis and others have noted, the new

environment, despite the squalor, is often much better
than the migrant knew in the rural area from which ho came^
A new culture emerges with the migrants developing close

ties to new people in their shanty towns and finding new

types of patr6n relationships with employers or others.
The conclusions of the conflict model have been

attractive to many Latin Americanists.

The tendency to

63

Hauser. "The Social, Economic and Technological
Problems of Jiapld Urbanization," p. 20?, and Weissmann.
o p, cit.
The International Union of Local
p, 6?,
Authorities, op. cjt. p, 15 discusses this effect,
.

.

Lewis, op. clt
Rustow, op. cit. p. 2^5 argues
that chaotic riots and such may be the short-run result
of the process but not necessarily a long-run effect.
;

,

212

consider I^tln America as
constantly in ferment or as
revolutionary has Increased the
tendency to accept the
analysis put forth by conflict
theorists regarding the
effects Of urbanization and its
accompanying class-based
changes. Exactly how such analyses
have been applied and
with Khat implications is the concern
of the rest
of this

chapter.

Tl2e_l_iterature on

r.at1

n America .

While a number of

Latin Americanists have been associated
with the consensus
view on urbanization, it seems that even more
of them

accept a conflict analysis.

In contrast to the

generalists who are often implicit in their approach
to
urbanization, many Latin Americanists are quite explicit
in noting the conflict-producing tendencies of the

urbanization process.

V/ayne A.

Cornelius provides a

convenient summary of the prevalent ideas concerning Latin

American urbanization and its consequences,^^

He sees

three basic themes in urbanization theory as it has been

applied to Latin America:

Cornelius, op, cit.
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1) Urbanization breeds economic
frustration
among

the migrant population,
which
aspires high but fails to
participate
In
the material rewards of
urban society.

2) Migrants experience major
difficulties

in adjusting socially and
to the urban environment. psychologically'

3) Urbanization,

increased awareness of
government and politics, and mobilization
opposition forces go hand in

hLr^S^^

While he summarizes the general beliefs
about Latin

American urbanization, however, he concludes
that the
evidence in Mexico does not support them.^"^

In fact, many

recent studies have questioned these generally
accepted
assiiraptlons.^^

Much has also been written regarding the suggestion
that urbanization breeds economic frustration among
the

migrant population.

There are many people who just cannot

be absorbed by the economic systems which attract them
to

66

Ibid.

,

p, 833.

Ibid.

,

p. 855.

6?
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Morse, "latin American Cities: Aspects of
Function and Structure,'* p. ^85; Nelson, "The Urban Poor:
Disruption or Political Integration in Third World Cities,"
pp. kO^'-^'ll•, and Rablnovltz, op. cit.
for consideration
of the evidence.
.

the urban areas.^^

Many authors tend to discuss
the Issue

as a problem of over-urbanlzation-in
the sense that larger
portions of the populations live
in urban areas than are
justified by the level of economic
development .^^ The
Idea is that as people swarm
to the urban centers in
search
Of a better life and find no
doors to economic success open,
they turn to violence as a last
resort.
The evidence

certainly indicates that masses of
the migrants are unable
to find work.*^^ However, a member
of studies also indicate

69

See Anibal Quijano Obreg6n, "Tendencies
in
Peruvian Development and in the Class Structure."
in James
Petras and Maurice Zeitlin (eds.). op. cit
.. Dp
289-328
at pp. 308-309 and 312-315; Talton ir-W.^Th
e Politics o f
themrivios of Vejiezuela (Berkeley and Los AFgTIiTr~
University of California Press. I969).
p, I76; and
HobbswaiTOi, op. eit.
for a discussion of the issue.
.
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See Hauser, "The Social, Economic and
Technological Problems of Rapid Urbanization." p. 203, and~
N. V. Sovani. "The Analysis of 'Over-Urbanization,'"
Economic__Develppmqnt and Cultural Change. XII (January,
1964), 113-122.
Sovani notes that this concept of overlirbanization takes the Western urban societies as the
norms indicating cultural bias. p. II7.
71

Obregon, op. cit.

.

pp, 313-31/^-,
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that they have not generally
turned to violence and are
in
fact politically quite
passive,^^ Yet it is difficult
to
believe that violence can be
avoided,
this sense, the
economic frustration of the
people .ay be a very important
consequence of the urbanization
process. However, if
policies were developed to relieve
the economic
frustration of the people, the
assumptions of the conflict
model concerning inevitability of
revolution and chaos
would require si;?nificant modification.

m

Closely related to the economic
frustration argument
is the idea that improved and
increased channels
of

communications provide a ready means for the
exploitation
of these masses of people by radical
elements. "^^ As the
people become more aware of what is potentially
available,
they are likely to aspire to it. Not being
able
to

achieve what they aspire to. the masses are likely
to
revolt.

Communications media are viev/ed as the immediate

causes in this argument, but the real cause is
still

economic frustration.

Nelson, "The Urban Poor:
Disruption or Political
Integration in Third World Cities,
pp. 396-399.
73

See Jose Luis Romero. "La ciudad latinoamericana
y los raovlmientos pollticos," in Hardoy and Tobar. op.
Git. , pp. 297-310, at pp. 298-302, and 308.

216

The predicted breakdown
in social organization
or
the alienation of the
individual fro. the system has
been
accepted as fact by n^any Latin
Americanists.
In this
argument, the traditional family
setting is viewed as a
positive social integrating force.
As the individual
moves to the urban area he loses
contact with much of his
family and he is too busy and the
urban society is too
impersonal for him to develop new
social ties. At times of
crisis, he is incapable of finding
people to help. As a
result, social disorganization and
disruptive behavior are
found. "^^ As with many other aspects
of the model, however,

the latin American experience indicates
that the degree of

social isolation stemming from urbanization
is slight at
present.
Field studies indicate that urbanization
does

7^

See Dorselaer and Gregory, op. cit.
"
and Germanl. op, cit. pp. 149-I51,

.

pp.

67-74.

.

75
See Goode, op. cit.
of the process,

.

for a complete examination

76

Rabinovitz. op, cit. , p. 95; Lewis, op. cit. .
pp. 36-38; and Cornelius, op. cit.
The question
p. 855.
is also discussed by Germani. op. cit.
pp. 149-I51.
.

.
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not weaken family ties and
.ay actually strengthen
them.
In addition, in latin America,
there seems to be a
substitute in the patron system
which exists even in urban
areas. The
may be the boss or a friend
in the city
or the trade union or the
government agency.

£a^

Perhaps the most important feature
of the
urbanization process is the tremendous
demands it brings
upon the system. Urbanization, itself,
creates different
types of problems and only Increases
the types and quantity
of demands with which the system must
cope.'^'^
This feature
of urbanization is related to the rising
expectations and

economic frustrations noted above.

It goes even further,

however, in that the question of urban services
is brought
in.

The conflict approach tends to emphasize physical

deterioration of the environment as well as social
deterioration,''^

The new demands created by physical

deterioration Just help to overload the system.

The system

is expected to break down eventually and then explode.

77

See Luis Ratinoff, "The New Urban Groups:
The
Middle Classes," in Seymour Martin Lipset and Aldo Solari,
Elites in Latin Ar.erlca (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1967). pp. 61-93, at pp. 62-64.
See Hauser, "The Social, Economic and
Technological Problems in Rapid Urbanization," p. 20?, and
Weissraann, op. cit.

.

p.

67.
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Yet another thei.e of the
conflict literature on
latm A.^erica is the .^ulf between
the urban centers and the
rural areas.
this view, the urban areas
are seen as

m

centers of modernity and the rural
areas as backward, A
common theme is that the urban
centers, representing the
elite elements, only exploit the
countryside.
The

expectation is that as the gap continues
to grow, an
explosion will occur. The suggestion
that the urban
sectors might actually be leaders in the
process of

modernization through the promulgation of modern
values and
ideas is rejected by the conflict approach.
The gaps

between the two societies are unbridgeable.

Richard Adams

notes that this is an oversimplification of the
social
system of Latin America.

He contends that there is as much

79

See Irving Louis Horowitz, "Electoral Politics.
Urbanization, and Social Development in Latin America," in
Glenn Beyer. The Urban Explosion in Latin America (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 19^7), pp. 215-253. and Floreal
H, Forni, "Aspectos sociales de la urbanizacion,
in
Hardoy and Tobar, op. cit. pp. 205-234,
.

•

80

Horowitz, op. cit. pp. 216-220, and George
Jackson Eder, "Urban Concentration. Agriculture, and
Agrarian Reform," in The Annals; Latin America Tomorrow
(Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political and
Social Sciences, Vol. 36O, July, I965), pp. 27-47,
.
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difference between society in
"private" cities and smaller
Cities as there is between
rural and urban centers.^l
The sulf between the rural
and urban sectors often
leads to discussion of primate
versus secondary urban
centers of I^tin America. The
primate cities are the ones
which usually constitute the
effective national life of
the country.
The primate centers were
usually the seats of
government for the Spaniards and
Portuguese colonizers. ^2

These primate cities exploited the
other cities and
polarization between urban centers developed.
Even
outside the primate cities, the urban
centers were
primixrily oriented toward using the
available resources of
the surrounding countryside and never
replenishing them.

They were exploitative in nature and many argue
that the
same relationship exists now. ^3

^oday the concept is

described by some as a system of internal colonialism
in
which the elite elements of the urban centers prey like

81

Richard N. Adams, Th e Second Sowing; P ower and
Second ary iDeYelovment in Latin America (San Francisco:
Chandler. 196?
Chapters 3, 9. and 10 particularly.
82

The Economic Commission for Latin America, op.
pp. 18-23 provides one of the best discussions on
the subject.
clt_^,

Ibid.

.

p.

18.
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parasites on the countryside.

This factor Is often

considered to be the greatest
obstacle to development In
^
Latin America.
There is a wide variety in
the conflict analyses of
latin American urbanization.
However, the emphasis is
placed on conflicts created by the
urbanization process.
Conflicts are seen to emerge within
the urban areas, among
different urban areas, and between
the urban areas and the
coimtryslde.
Tremendous problems of assimilating
migrants
into the system usually attract a
good part of
the

attention of the conflict analysts.

There is little doubt

that many of the tendencies suggested
by conflict analysts

actually exist.

The evidence suggests that the case
is

often over-stated.

The concluding section will analyze

the role urbanization has played in Latin
American

political development.

8^4

See Romero, op. clt.

.

pp. 299-301; Morse,

"Latin

American Cities: Aspects of Function and Structui'e, "
pp.
^7^-^79; J* M. Houston, "Foundations of Colonial Towns in
Hispanic America," in R. P. Eeckinsale and J. M. Houston
(eds.). Urbanization and Its Problems (Oxford:
Basil
Blackwell, 1968), pp. 352-390; and Ronald Classman, op.
clt.

.

pp. 246-24?.

85

See Stavenhagen, op. clt.
p. 30, and Stanlslav
Andre ski Parasitism and Subversion; The Case of latin
America (London: Weldenfeld and iMicolson, 1966), pp. 1-2.
Many of the authors in the Petras and Zeitlin volume take
this position.
.

,
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The Effect of Urbanization
on Latin

American Political Development
One of the most Important
con.slderatlons about the
urbanization process in Latin America
is that
its

historical roots are quite different
from that of the
Western or industrialized nations,
Latin American cities
were developed with the explicit
purpose of providing a
center of focus for the colonizers of
the
area.

They

served as commercial and cultural centers
for the European
settlements.
In effect they were transplants of
European
cities to the New World.
Thus, in contrast
to the

Western European and United States experiences,

industrialization did not produce urban centers.
Instead, Latin American cities were often points of

86
Morse, "Latin American Cities: Aspects of
Function and Structure," pp. k7k^>iQ0; John Kander. The
Unrov olutlonary Society; The Voviev of Latin AmerlcafT
A ChnnfrintK World (New York:
Knopf, I969),
260-261;
Glajisman, op. clt. , pp. 246-262; Romero, op.
pp.
crt,_, pp. 299-301; and The Economic Commission for Latin
America, op. elt. , pp. I7-I9, among m.any others provide
evidence on this point.
Con.^igJ'y^^ti-'-^m

87

See Milton I. Van.ocer, "Politics and Class In
Twentieth- Century Latin America, The Hispanic Amerjcnn
HI fit or leal Royjow XLIX (February, I969), 8O-93, at p. 83,
and Morse, "Some Characteristics of Latin American
History," p. 329.
.
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departure for exploitation
of the rural countryside.
As a
result, the assumptions
based on social change
brought
about by the industrial
process are not always relevant,
unfortunately, scholars in both
the conflict and consensus
traditions often ignore this
fact.
Because
industrialization was not the
producer of urbanization in
I.. tin America,
it must be recognized that
the modernizing
tendencies produced by the
industrialization process are
not existent in many latin American
urban centers.
As a

result, there are not necessarily
strongly united labor
groups able to articulate the wishes
of the people as
opposed to the capitalist elite. The
working class does
not necessarily recognize a difference
in its Interest from
that of the employer.
Instead, the employer may also be
the patr6n and as such the worker may
actually see a

coincidence of interests and thus not be
interested in
radical activities.
The argument that urbanization creates various

modernizing tendencies is even more confusing than the

argument noted above for the Latin American scene.

There

is no doubt that expanding com.munications and

transportation grids have an accelerating effect on the

urbanization process.

Urbanization also broadens the

communication of ideas and values, however.

Such an

expansion in the communications process helps modernize

.
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the population in the sense that
more and more people

become aware of modern values and
the wonders of modern
technology.
To that extent, modernization
certainly
occurs, but the problems are Intensified
because increased
communication of modern ideas encourages even
greater
migration to the urban centers where the
wonders of modern
society are available. Besides further
compounding
the

problems of urban life, migration also drains the
countryside of youth and efficient labor.
Directly related to the question of modernization
is the fact that many of the urban migrants cannot be

employed.

The economy Just cannot absorb the many migrants

into the system. ^

These elements provide a potential

threat to the system because their needs cannot be met.
Some arg-ue, however, that they are not potential

troublemakers because their conditions in the squatter

88

See Eder, op. clt.

.

and Nlro, op. c3t.

89

.

Scares. "The New Industrialization and the
Brazilian Political System," in Petras and Zeitlin, op.
cit
pp. 186-<!01, and Ray, op. clt.
pp. I6I-I76 provide
two of many studies of this problem.
.

,
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settleirents are acti^ally
l^prover^ents over their ri^al
exiotonce.90 ^hus, the suggestion
that

radlcall.atlon of

the squatter settlements Is
to occur does not seem
borne
out by the experience of latin
America. There may be a
difference In reaction from one
generation to the next.
The first generation of urban
migrants may be content with
What they find in their new homes,
still being peasants and

Impressed with the advantages they have
over their previous
rural existence.
Succeeding generations, however,
may

become more radicalized.

As the children grow up In the

urban environment, they do not have the old rural

environment with which to compare their own experiences.
Thus,

they may not think in terms of how much better
off

they are, but of how much they still lack.

The result may

eventually be radlcallzatlon.

Another supposedly modernizing tendency of

urbanization concerns the birth rate.

According to the

literature, birth rates are supposed to go down in urbancenters.

90

Both conflict and consensus theorists have

Sec Alfred Stepan. "Political Development Theory:
The Latin American Experience," Journal of International
AffnJrs XX (1966). 223-23^. at p. 230. See the preceding
section of this chapter for more detailed discussion of
the evidence.
,
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accepted this idea,

.et the evidence In
latin America

indicates that there are
no significant differences
in
birthrates between r«ral areas
and urban centers. 91
However, it cannot be ass^ed
that such changes ^l^ht
not
occur in the futiire.
All of the above indicates that
the long accepted
assumptions about urbanization are
not easily applied to
Latin America. Many questions have
to be raised about each
assumption. The only conclusion which
can be reached is
that latin American urbanization
varies from the generally
accepted pattern. Commonly accepted
beliefs about
urbanization have to be modified if the
process in Latin
America is to be understood. Differences
in the history
and culture of Latin Am.erica have to be
considered in any
analysis of the area. There also may be
considerable

differences between specific countries.

As has been noted,

some of the assumptions and conclusions of the
models

provide useful insights, but neither can be applied
to

'

Latin America in toto.

91

See Zulma Recchini de Lattes, "Aspectos
demograficos de proceso de urbanizacion on America
Latina»" in Hardoy and Tobar, op. cit .. pp. 273-29^)-. at pp.
283-289; and Demo^-raphic Yearbook 19^ pp. 276-278.
.
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CHAPTER VII
BUREAUCRACY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
The Issue

Of the three issues used as case
studies in this
work, none is more important to
development than the

bureaucracy.

The bureaucracy is strategic to the
process

of political development precisely
because the bureaucracy
is responsible for fashionin^r and
implementing the varied

policies which produce and accompany the development
process.

The direction and scope of development policy

(all government policy, for that matter) is
directly

controlled by the government workers.
choose to play

— obstructive

Thus,

the role they

or facilitative— will have

tremendous implications for the success of such programs.
For that reason, it is important to understand the

bureaucracy and the role it plays in the development
process.
The study of comparative politics has, until recent

times, treated public administration and the study of

•
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bureaucracy as somewhat of a
stepchild. Many of the
traditional works often included
analysis of administrative
institutions, but systematic study
of bureaucracy as a
Viable institution in comparative
analysis was slighted.^
Much of the work in comparative
administration is done by
the Comparative Administration
Group (CAG) in the form of
monographs. While comparative public
administration as a
whole has been slighted to some extent,
the same is also
true of the relationship between
bureaucracy and political

development.

Recalling that the process of political

development has gained detailed attention only
lately, it
is little wonder that the study of bureaucracy
as a factor
in political development is still in its infancy.

Even

though the study of bureaucracy and political
development

1

Carl Priedrich, Constitutional Government and
Ginn. 1950), and Herman Finer, Theory
and Practice of Kodern Governr.ent (London: Metheun, 1951)
are two of the traditionalists who direct attention to
public administration agencies as institutions to be
compared in study of government. One of the first major
works to deal with the subject exclusively is William J.
Siffin (ed.), Tovrard the Comparative Study of Public
A dministration (Bloomington
Indiana University, 195? )
It has been followed by Ferrel Heady »s Public
A dministration
A Comparative Perspective (Englewood
Cliff si Prentice-Hall, I966). To'lhis date v/orks on
comparative public administration are somewhat scarce.
The next footnote indicates a greater amount of attention
paid to the subject in developing societies, however.
2§HIocrac;^ (Boston:

;

;

c
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Is rather new as a bUDject
subleoi- nr
of c.,^*-,,
systematic study,

received

it has

.ore attention of late
than the .ore general
area of comparative public
administration,^ Even though
attention was focused on the
subject relatively recently,
there are indications that
students of political
development are becoming aware of the
pivotal status of
bureaucracy in the development process,
zauch

Deflnitlori.

Defining the term bureaucracy does
not

present the problems we found in dealing
with the other
two Issues studied here.
In this study, bureaucracy refers
to public bureaucracy as opposed to
bureaucracies in
private enterprise.

Bureaucracy, thus, will be used to

2

As V7lth the study of public administration
generally, the study of bureaucracy and political
development has roots in Weberlan studies to be noted
later.
Some of the earlier works on this specific top^
were done by Fred Rlggs.
See his "Agraria and Industria—
Toward a Typology of Comparative Administration," in
Siffln, op. cit.
pp. 23-116; and Mm i n 1st ra t i on lii
Developing Countries; The Theory of Prismatic So ciety
(Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1964} among many other of his
works.
The great Interest in the topic is evidenced by the
following works among many others: Joseph La Palombara
(ed.), Bureaucracy and Poli tical Development (Princeton:
Princeton University Press. 1963); Pialph Eralbantl. et al.
Political and Administrative Develop ment (Durham, N. C.
Dui^e University Press. I969): and Dwlght Waldo (ed.).
Temporal Dimensions of Developnent Administration (Durham,
N. C.
Duke University Press, 1970)/ Martin Henry
Greenberg, Bureaucracy and Develoopent; A Mexican Case
Study (Lexington, Mass.: Heath, I97O) is a recent stud"y
Involving a Latin American nation.
,

.
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refer to people in public or
government employ,
to time, different segments
of the bureaucracy
noted as pertinent to particular
discussions.
there may be some instances in
which

Rrom time

will be
For example,

the national, as

opposed to regional public employees
are pertinent,
still
other distinctions may be made between
upper levels and
lower levels of the bureaucracy,
dealing with
different authors, it will be noted that
some direct their
attention to all public employees^ whereas
others may be

m

concerned with only a particular sector of the
bureaucracy.
This is the point at which definitional
problems arise in
the use of the term.-^

As might be expected, most analyses of bureaucracy
and political development deal with the upper echelon
of

bureaucracy since that echelon is more concerned with

policy-making activities than the lower level.

It is to be

expected that the cabinet ministries or agency heads would
have more impact on the direction of policy change than
V7ould the office clerk.

When implementation of policy is

La Falorabara,

"An Overview of Bureaucracy and
Political Development," in La Palombara, op. cit. pp. 333 presents an excellent discussion of problems of and
varieties in definition, especially pp. 6-8,
.
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in question. hoKever.

r^y be more important.

the lower levels of
the bureaucracy
Thus, the questions under

investigation help to determine
which part of the
bureaucracy receives the
greatest attention of the
analyst.
One aspect of the definition
of bureaucracy is the
differentiation of the formal structure
and informal

factors in the operation of the
system.

^

The formal

organization is that spelled out by the
law or by the
organization chart. It is common knowledge

that more

-

informal lines of communication and
association often
develop and some scholars place more emphasis
on this

aspect of bureaucracy than on the formal
organization.
This study focuses prim.arily on the formal
aspects although
the informal arrangements which affect
formal operations

Ibid.

.

pp. 6-8.

5

See Jonathan A. Slesinger, A Model for t he
Comparativ e Stu dy of Public Bureauc racifis (Ann ATbor
Bureau of Government, Institute of Public Administration,
1957), pp. ^-6.
Robert V. Presthus, The Organ Ir ational
Society; An Analysis and. A. Theory (New York: Handom
House, 1962) and Peter M. Blau, The. D ynamics of
Bure aucracy (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1955)
deal with some of the informal aspects and functions of
bureaucracies.
In addition see Eugene Lltv/ak, "Models of
Bureaucracy V/hlch Permit Conflict," American Journal of
Sociology LXVII (September, I96I), 17?-18^ at p. 1??.
•

r
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and expectations are included.
Pc-n^^^^n
-Lr-cj.uQea-.especlally
Latin American bureaucracies.

considering

;,rhen

Closely related to the
problem of definition is the
lament of many scholars that
we have not had precise
enough formulation of a framework
for comparative study of
public bureaucracies.6 The usual
argument is that while
studies of bureaucracies in many
different systems are
conducted, there is often little
commonality between
studies facilitating comparison.
Jonathan Slesinger
suggests a framework which will be
employed here in
analyzing studies of bureaucracy. His
fairly simple,
.

straightforward model uses the following questions:
1)

Bureaucratic Orpranizatlon
Description

:

The

Nlod el
"

^

a) V/hat kinds of ends, personal and
societal, are served by the
existence of bureaucratic

organizations?
b) What form or shape do bureaucracies

typically take?

Chapter 1;
IM^iL* PP» 3-^; Heady, op. clt.
Herbert Emmerich, "Administrative Roadblocks* to
Co-ordinated Development," in Egbert De Vrles and Jos6
Medina Echavarrla (eds.). Social Aspects of Economic
Development in Latin America (Paris; UNESCO, I963), pp.
3^5-360, at pp. 3^5-346; and Slesinger, op. clt. pp. 1-3
among many others.
.

.
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a) Who occupy the
positions in

bureaucracies, and what is their
relationship to the total
society?
b) How do bureaucracies
ODerate. i.e "
what are the internal
mechanisms
Of control and decision-making?

c) What is the relationship
of particular
bureaucracies to their institutional

settings, i.e., what is the
relationship and balance between
control by the bureaucracy over
its
setting and control of the bureaucracy
^
by society??

All of the questions have implications
for the role of
bureaucracy and thus the model provides a
good starting

point for the analysis of bureaucracy.

This study will

go beyond use of this general model and
Investigate the

relationship of bureaucracy to the specific aspect
of
political development.

While Slesinger's framework is the

basis for analysis in this study, the question will be

considered in the general discussion instead of going
through each question in a systematic

v^ay

for each author

studied, thus avoiding too stilted an analysis.

7

Slesinger, op. cit.

.

p.

3,
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Another factor vmich
should be noted here Is
that
.o.t scholars dealing with
the subject of bureaucracy
note
that the sl.e of bureaucracies
Is growing rapidly.
As
governments are forced to deal
with .ore and »ore types
of
problems, new agencies must
be created and/or
additions of
personnel must be mdQe
made ZQ
to existing
PYic-n>no. agencies.
This growth
trend in bureaucracy seems to
be more evident in
developing societies than in the
already developed ones.^
What growth in bureaucracy
implies for political

development will be noted as the
various approaches are
discussed. The important point here
is that the increasing
size of bureaucracy only increases
the potential
impact it

might have on development, whatever
the role it plays.
Governments, particularly in developing

societies, are

increasingly under pressure to provide
new services for
their people, and bureaucracy grows with
the increase in
services.

8
""^^^^^
^^^^
^i^^s* "Bureaucrats
-o
T"^^
and Political
Development: A Paradoxical View," in La
Palombara, op> cit., pp. 120-16?, and Joseph La
Palombara,
'Bureaucracy and Political Development: Notes,
Queries,
and Dilemmas," pp. 3^-6l, at p. 3^ in the same
volume.
Also S. N. Elsenstadt. "Problems of Emerging Bureaucracies
in Developing Areas and New States," in Harvey G.
Kebschull (ed.). Politics in Transitional Society (New
York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, ly6d), pp. 239~24"6; and
Emmerich, op. cit. pp. 3^5-346.
,
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The Effect of Bureaucracy
on Political

Development According to the
Consensus Model

^h^£^-eral^^

Pe^^aps more so than in any

other aspect of the consensus
model. Hax Weber is the
primary so'orce for the assumptions
and conclusions
regarding bureaucracy and the
political process. Weber,
of course, is the founder of
the classical study of
bureaucracy and public administration.
His studies have
provided the basis for study of bureaucracy
in Western
society. 9 While Weber himself realized
that his ideal type
of bureaucracy would not exist in any
society, implicit in
his theory was the belief that this was
the norm to be
'

9

See Max Weber. The Theory of Social and K cnnnn^io.
Organization, tr. by A. M. E^^rson and Talcott
Parsons.
(New York:
Oxford University Press. 19^7). particularly
pp. ;)2^!-3^5 among others of Weber's works.
Reinhard
Bendix. Max.J/feber: An Intellectual Portrait
(Garden City:
Doubleday. 1930). pp. 1^23-^57, and S. M. i<liller (ed.).
|teix_Keber (New York:
Crowell. I963), pp. 59-82 provides
excellent selections and interpretations from his work.
Of course, H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (translators),
From Max Weber; Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford
University Press, 19^6} is perhaps the best volume of
selections of Weber's writings.

.
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The rational.legal model
he suggested became

the model associated with
modernity, and now many
theorists suggest that if that
model is not approached, a
nation cannot be considered
modern.
The elements of the

Weberian ideal type bureaucracy
include:

hierarchical system;

2)

1) a

responsibility for actions reposing

in the bureaucracy; 3) rationality;

Zf)

achievement

orientation; 5) specialization and
differentiation in
functions; 6) discipline; and ?) prof
essionalization.^^
Quite often, the development literature
accepts these as
the norms to be attained.

10
See La Palombara. "An Overview of Bureaucracy
and
Political Development." and "Bureaucracy and Political
Development: Notes. Queries, and Dilemmas," both in La
Palombara. op. cit,
for a discussion of this interpretation.
Gerth and Mills, op. clt. particularly in the
Introduction, provide an excellent discussion of ideal
types in Weber's works.
.

.

La Palombara,

"An Overview of Bureaucracy and
Political Development," p. 10 discusses this point and also
some of the implications of such a position. Also see
Michael V/alzer. "The Only Revolution: Notes on The Theory
of Modernization." Dissent XL (Autumn. 1964), ^32-440.
.

12

These are La Palombara 's condensation of the
characteristics of bureaucracy from "An Overview of
Bureaucracy and Political Development," p. 10. The list
varies from author to author, but this list contains the
Fiajor elements.
For Weber's discussion see Bendix, op.
cit
and Miller, op. clt.
.
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One of the most comnon
themes of political

development consensus theorists
Is that the bureaucracy
becomes more and more functionally
specialized as systems
become more developed. In effect,
modernization and
specialization are oiLen
o
oftpn Pmia+-or^
equated. ^3 Some

suggest that such

specialization keeps the bureaucracy
from attaining too
much power because specialization has
the effect of
circumscribing the goals of individual
bureaucrats.
Since
their goals are limited in scope, they
have to compete
with others with similarly limited scopes
of activity.
The competition is supposed to provide an
element of

control over the bureaucracy.

Of course, others argue

that concern with limited goals serves to inhibit

co-ordination of needed policies and thus is detrimental
to
development. This argument will be considered later
in
the

chapter.
There is little doubt that bureaucracies become

more specialized as societies become more complex and

13

For example, see Bert F. Hoselitz, "Levels of
Economic Performance and Bureaucratic Structures," in La
Palombara, op. cit. . pp. 168-198.
1^

David Apter. The Politics of Modernization
University of Chicago Press. I965),
particularly pp. 218-220.
(Chicago:
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governments provide more
services.

The effect of

specialization, however, may
be questionable.
Specialization, as Weber
weoer noted,
note^A
r.-^«^„
produces greater expertise
particular areas of activity.
Greater specialization
may also blind the bureaucrat
to the overfall objectives
of
the system.
There is at least a potential
obstructive

m

role here.

The evidence seems to indicate,
however, that

most developing nations suffer from
domination by too many
generalists in bureaucracy and from
too few specialists.^^
Fred Riggs is perhaps the most widely
known student
of bureaucracy and its relationship
to the development
process. Riggs views society in terms
of two

"Agrarian" and «Industrlan»

;

poles—

later, this typology was

changed to "fused" and "diffracted. "^^

Both typologies

outline differences between a "developed"
and "undeveloped"

15
R. S. Milne. "Comparisons and Models in
Public'
Administration." Political Studies X (February, I962),
^""^^
discussion of this point.
^ ^^^^
mZ}
This will be discussed more fully in considerinc: the
conflict model.
.

16

Fred Riggs. "Agraria and Indus trla— Toward a
Typology of Comparative Administration." in Slffln. op.
The new typology is put forth in
PAt».,t pp. 23-116.
Administration in Developing Countries; The Theory of
Prismatic Society .
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society.

The Agrarian society
(undeveloped) has the
following characteristics:
1) Predominance of ascriDtive

particularistic, diffuse patterns.
mobiiitj!''^'^

groups and limited spatial

3) Relatively simple and stable

"occupational" differentiation.

4) A deferential stratification system of
diffuse impact.

and Industrian society the following
characteristics:
1) Predominance of universalistic,

and achievement norms.
2) High degree of social mobility

— not

specific *
(in general

necessarily vertical sense).

3) Well-developed occupational system.

Insulated from other social structures.

^)

"Egalitarian" class system based on
generalized patterns of occupational
achievement.

5) Prevalence of "associations," i.e.,

functionally specific, non-ascriptive
structures*!?

17

Riggs, "Agraria and Industria
of Comparative Administration," p. 29.

— Toward

a Typology
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This characterization has
nas munh
much iv,
In «common with Talcott
Parsons* concept of a modern
social system.^^
While the Agrarian and
Industrlan patterns only
suggest some of the particular
aspects of bureaucracy,

the

fused and diffracted models
provide explicit discussion
of
the bureaucratic system.
The essence of the argument
Is
that
the fused system, the
bureaucratic structure is
highly generalized with one or a
few structures conducting
a large number of activities.
In the diffracted model,
however, structures become differentiated
and specialized,
thus, approaching the Weberian model.
\Vhlle Riggs
disclaims any normative position, his analysis,
in fact,

m

indicates that he expects societies to move
from the fused
to the diffracted types.

Thus, a unilinear development

process seems implicit in his analysis.

Of course, he

notes that no societies fit one or the other extreme
and
thus he uses the prismatic model for analyzing
developing

18

Talcott Parsons, Toward a General Theory of
Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), and
Societi es;
Evolutionary and Com.parative Perspectives
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentlce-Kall, 1966).
His disclaimers are found particularly in the
Introduction and first chapter of Administration in
Developing Countries; The Theory of Prismatic Society

countries.

This moael recoRnl^es that
elements of both
extremes exist and are "fused" in
any one society and must
be studied with that In mind.
The particular prismatic
society under study Is affected by
its own culture and
history.
While Riggs claims to be developing
a model free of
the biases of the Weberlan model, in
fact his model Is no
less value-laden.

The society to be achieved is the

Industrian or diffracted.

These are In effect the

societies Weber considered to be the goal of
modernl?:atlon.
In this respect. Rlggs and Weber actually complement
one

another.

Rlggs only articulates a model for studying those

societies on the path to the ideal type; whereas Weber, for
the most part, dealt with the ideal type itself.

Another common characteristic of the consensus model
theorists is the idea that bureaucracies are the neutral
servants of the political leaders in pov/er.

This view, of

course, follows from V/eber's idea of professionalism and

neutrality or impartiality in office.

This particular

aspect has been discredited, especially in developing
societies, but some continue to argue that the bureaucracy

does and will play a neutral role in the political system
or at least that this role is the proper and appropriate
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20
bureaucratic goal.^O

^ ^^^^^^^

^^^^^^

^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^

^^^^
the bureaucrats might become
overconcerned with legaliom.
procedures, and efficiency, and
not sufficiently concernld
With the objectives of their
policy.
At any rate, the

argument from this perspective is
that the bureaucrats can
serve the cause of development
best by being neutrally
subservient to the political leadership.
If society is

moving unilinearly toward development
in a deterministic
fashion, as some consensus theorists
have
suggested, a

neutral role by bureaucrats would be adequate.
Some theorists of the consensus persuasion,
seeing

that bureaucracy is not a neutral force in
developing

societies, argue that it is or must be a leader
in the

modernization and development process.

Quite often the

20
A. F. K. Organski, The Stares of PolitJcal
DevelopmejTt (New York:
Knopf, 1965), pp. 44-46 imolies
this position while noting that problems emerge because the
bureaucracy in new nations is usually untrained and cannot
function as it should. Harold F, Alderfer, Public
Adminis t ration in Newer Nation s (New York: Praeger, 196?)
seems somewhat naive in his contention that bureaucracies'
refrain from political roles in these nations. Robert A.
Packenham, "Approaches to the Study of Political
Development," V/o rld Politics , XVII (October, 1964), 108120, at pp. 113-115 discusses this idea.

Packenham, op. clt»
p. 439.

,

p. II5, and Walzer,

op.

clt.

,

educational and cultural
backgrounds of bureaucrats
are
emphasized in the analysis of
consensus theorists. The
urban background of the
bureaucrat and the fact that
he
tends to be fro. the Mddle
sectors is used as evidence
of
his tendency to foster
modernization of the
^2
system.

This

approach, of course, must rely
on the assumptions of the
consensus model concerning the
middle and urban sectors,
which have been discussed in early
chapters.
If the

consensus theorists* arguments about
those values are
valid, then the bureaucrats might
be leaders for

modernization.

As has been noted in the previous
two

chapters, there are many questions about
the argument.

Consensus theorists have also emphasized the
strategic location of the bureaucracy.

If bureaucrats are

agents for modernization, the positions they
hold in
society provide a good location for spreading
modern
values.

Almond and Powell note that the bureaucracy is

Karl W. Deutsch. "Social Mobilization and
Political Development." The American Political Scien ce
Revijew. LV (September. 1961), ^93-51^. at pt).
495-5017
notes some of these tendencies. Gabriel Almond and G.
Bingham Powell, Jr.. Com parative Politics; A
DeZg.lo£inen t_a 1 Appr os cYTTBo s t on
Little. Brown. I966).
pp. 96-97, and S, N. Eisenstadt. op. clt.
pp. 243-246.
;

.

an.

2^3

effective force In improving
the flow of cc.unlcatlons
in
the systeiB.
As was noted In the
previous
chapter.

cootnunloations flow Is Important
iioj-orcant tr,
to the „consensus analysis
Of the political developirent
process.
But it is not

altogether certain that bureaucracies
in developing
nations actually perform this
function.
Another modernizing feature of
the bureaucracy is
its tendency to provide a certain
modicum of stability to
the system.

Those authors emphasizing
institution-

building as an aspect of political
development stress this
feature of bureaucracies
The bureaucracy
is one

institution which tends to survive even when
political
leadership changes. If stability of institutions

is the

objective to be pursued by the system, the
buj-eaucracy 's

persistence would be a welcome sign.

As will be discussed

later, however, some argue that the reasons
for and

23

Almond and Powell, op. cit.

.

pp. 96-97.

24

See Samuel P. Huntington, "Political DeveloDment
and Political Decay," World Politics XVII (April, I965),
386«430; Apter. op. cit. . pp. 218-221; and Ricgs.
"Bureaucrats and Political Development," in La Palombara.
op. Pit., pp. 120-167.
Riggs particularly notes that
bureaucracies often become over-institutionalized and that
emphasis should also be placed on building other political
institutions.
.

2kk

l.pXlcatlone of bureaucratic
stability .ight actually
be
detrimental to development.
Obviously, the various
consensus authors recognize
that there are differences
in bureaucracies in
developing
societies. Even those theorists
accepting a .ore or less
deterministic approach indicate
that historical and
cultural factors affect the type
of bureaucracy which
is
likely to emerge in any one
nation.^S Bureaucracies
differ
according to the colonial history
of the nation and

according to the "stage-, of
development.
S. N. Eisenstadt
notes that nations with a history
including strong
colonial rule find themselves dominated
by the remaining
administrators of the mother country left
in the newly
independent nation.
If the colonial bureaucrats have
not
stayed behind, there is often a vacuum
existing in the
structure and chaos is likely to ensue.

The consensus

theorists, however, often feel the colonial
powers do a
service to the dependent nations by training
bureaucrats

25

See Seymour Martin Lipset. "Bureaucracy and
Social Change," in Robert K. Merton. ct al.. Reader in
Bureaucracy (Glencoe: The Free Press'. 1962).
221-232,
at pp. 227-231; La. Palorabara. "An Overview of pp.
Bureaucracy*
and Political Development." pp. 19-20; and Riggs,
Administration in Developing Countries; The Theory o f
Prismatic Society .
'

Eisenstadt, op. clt.

.

pp. 2^0-243.

2^5

in the Classical
tradition.
is not „Hat is nee.e.

m

Perhap. a neutral
bureaucracy

.an. .evelopln«
nations.

Western
nations too often atte.pt
to bull, up the
administrative
framework and leave the
social, economic, and
other

political institutions
undeveloped.

This .ay lead to

bureaucratic domination and
be a hindrance to
development,^''
The foregoing discussion
Indicates that the

consensus theorists stress the
integrative role of
bureaucracy in developing
societies.
By providing for
increased specialization of
function, greater amounts of
work can be done,
addition, the neutrality and
professionalism of public servants
means that government
functions can be carried out efficiently
and fairly.
Moreover, the consensus theorists
argue that bureaucracies
are integrative forces because they
are staffed by middle
class urbanites embracing modern
democratic

m

values.

Institutionalization of bureaucracies also
fosters
stability. All of these elements
represent features of the

27

fee Riggs.

v.-n.^
r
more fully
A

1^

?f

analyses.

"Bureaucrats and Political Development:
^^^^ ^^^^^^ ^111 be discussed
later as it is a m.aj or theme in the conflict

I
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consensus .odel.

It would

unfair to l.ply that these

authors disregard the negative
effects of bureaucracy
because many of them note that
bureaucracy also has
disintegrative tendencies. However,

these theorists do

stress the Integrative functions
and usually only note that
the opposite tendency exists.
As such, this discussion has
highlighted the factors emphasised by
the theorists under
consideration.
The literatip^e^_o n__I.atin America

.

Bureaucracy in

Latin America has been neglected in
political studies to an
even greater extent than in the general
literature.
In
1959 George Blanksten went so far as to say that

bureaucracy had actually been ignored in studies
of Latin
America, thus making evaluation of its role a
difficult
task.

28

In fact the bureaucracy has been put under
some

scrutiny, but the data are rather scarce.

The consensus

theorists among Latin Americanists have been particularly

guilty of neglect on this issue.

Perhaps the reason is

that the consensus view on bureaucracy really does not fit

Latin America very well.

George I. Blanksten. "Political Change in Latin
America," The American Political Science Review LI I
(March. 1959), 106-12?, at r>. 108.
.

2^7

John J. Johnson once again
leads the list of
consensus theorists dealing
with Latin American
bureaucracy. He notes that the
bureaucracy has grovm in
size and scope and thus in
influence. Not surprisingly,
he finds a close interrelationship
between the middle
sectors and the bureaucracy.
Bureaucrats are part of the
middle sectors, 29 Remembering Johnson's
arguments on the

middle sectors outlined in Chapter

V.

it is not surprising

that he believes the present bureaucracies
of Latin
America to be committed to social change
and progress. ^0

Because the bureaucracy is in a very strategic
position, he
argues,, it tends to be very effective as a
modernizing
force.

It can and does spread the values of the
urban

middle sectors--as envisioned by Johnson.

Johnson believes that other aspects of the
bureaucracy are important besides the fact that bureaucrats
are largely from the middle sectors.

He argues that they-^

have also developed a loyalty to development programs for

John J. Johnson, Political Change in Latin
America: The Emerp-ence of the Middle Sectors (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1958), p. 13. and pp. 24-25.
To be fair, it must be noted that Johnson viewed the
bureaucrats as servants of the elite sectors in the period
of I8IO-.I85O, but he feels it has now become a force for
progress.
30

Ibid.

,

pp. 193-194.

.
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historical reasons as well
^x as econnmi
economic ones. In Uruguay
for example, he argues
that the Colorado
party helped
create a large bureaucracy
through the enactMent
and
implementation of .any social
welfare progran,s.31

This
fact along „ith the
creation of a widespread
middle sector
as a result of these
programs, has .ade the
bureaucracy
loyal to the Colorados-the
more liberal of the two
.ajor
Uruguayan parties. Arguing
a similar view, he feels
that the large number of
jobs created by progressive
programs throughout latin America
has created a tendency
for the middle sectors and
bureaucrats to become committed
to progressive development. 32
i„ ^^y^^^

m

appreciation for increased numbers
of Jobs and for
employment security, these groups
support development
policies.

While there may be some truth to
the argument,

it seems Johnson may be over-stating
the case when he says.-

31.

Ibid.

,

p. 59.

,

pp. I93.i9i(,,

32.

Ibid.

2k9

r^^rr
firn^

l^
converts

^^^reaucrats] have become

to progress through
technological advance. 33

The Pan American Union commissioned
a recent study

on administrative arrangements in
Latin America which was
grounded on many of the same presuppositions.^^
The basic

assumptions of the study were that efficiency
in the
administrative apparatus would produce a bureaucracy
productive of democratic stability.

Although the study

recognizes problems in latin American administration,
it
sets as a goal a bureaucracy on the order of the
Weberlan
or Western model.

Much of the concern is with economic

development, and an efficient neutral bureaucracy is
viev;ed as an instrument of economic development.

33

IbicU, p. 194.
Robert J. Alexander, Latin
American Politics and Government (New York: Harper and
Row, 1965) makes a similar point, pp. I33-I34.

3^

Pan American Union, Public Administration in
Latin America (V/ashington, D. C.
Organization of
American States, I965),
:

35

Ibid.
The assumptions are implicit in the
study's discussion of the limitations of Latin American
bureaucracies, pp. 13-23.
.
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Robert scotf s analysis
of Latin AB>erican
bureaucracy
inaicates ¥ha^
that some aspects of
y indicated
the consensus
model are found In the I.tin
American syste.. For example
the bureaucrats are drawn
mostly from the educated,
urban,
middle sectors. Urban values
and experiences are
predon^mant In the bureaucracies. 3^
The bureaucrats are
also effective forces for stability
but. as
Scott notes,

the reasons may be Inconsistent
with the consensus

assumptions on the issue.

While they

my

view themselves

as modernlzers, the bureaucrats are
in fact often trapped
by the fact that their Jobs depend
upon the continuation
of the system. 37 Thus, they tend to
support the status
quo from fear that change may cause loss of
Job security.
In a study of Bolivian policy-malcing,
Albert

I^pawsky is optimistic that Bolivian administration
will be
a force for effective development .
His view is
based

36

Robert E. Scott. "The Government Bureaucrats and
Political Chanp^e in Latin America," Journal of
Internatio nal Affairs XX (I966). 289-308, at
pp. 29^-295.
.

37

I^ld.

,

pp. 295-297.

38

Albert Lepawsky, "Revolution and Reform in
Bolivia: A Study of the Root and Branch of Public
Administration in a Developing Nation," in Siffln, op.
cit.
pp. 219-252.
.
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prlmrily

on the types of policies
developed by the

bureaucrats, indicating a belief that
bureaucracy plays
more than a policy Implementation
role.
He feels the
greatest problem will be in timing
public policies for
development in such a way that policies will
be

coordinated.^^

If too many policies are developed
at one

time, resources will be thinned out and thus
all may be

doomed to failure.

It may be comparable to the idea of
new

nations now having to face all six of Pye»s crises
of

nation-buildins at once.
once,

When too many demands come all at

the system tends to break down.

With greater

coordination of policies, the chances for effective
development will be Increased.
Because of the limited attention paid to

bureaucracy by Latin Americanists using the consensus
approach, the role of bureaucracy In such analyses is

difficult to evaluate.

Many analyses, as will be noted in

following sections, actually tend to accept more of a
conflict analysis approach to the bureaucracy.

Such is

the case concerning analysis of bureaucracy as it exists

now.

However,

Ibid.

the consensus theorists still believe

,

pp. 228-229.
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bureaucracy should play the
role assigned to it by
the
Weberian construct. The

problem, of course, Is that
the
acceptance of the Weberian
construct often .akes it
difficult to see the situation
as it exists.
It also .akes
it difficult to accept a
bureaucracy more attuned
to

pushing for political change rather
than to being the
servant of the political leaders.
The Effect of Bureaucracy on
Political

Development According to the
Conflict Model
The general literature.

The Marxian view of the

bureaucracy is not difficult to imagine.

Marx sees the

bourgeoisie as the holder of power in the system.

The

state, of course, is viewed as the instrument
of the

40
Scott, op. cit.

kl

.

pp. 298-299.

See "The Manifesto of the Communist Party," in
Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels and V. I. Lenin. The Essent ial
Left- (New York:
Barnes and Noble, I96I), pp.' 7-/^7, at
Also see Shlomo Avineri (ed,), Karl Marx on
pp. 16-17.
Colonialism and Modernization (Garden City: Doubledav.
196a j. pp. 125-13IT

.
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bourgeois capitalist class,

m

the power stru,.le
between

the capitalists and the
proletariat, the bureaucracy
is
unalterably opposed to the
proletariat. Marx stated that
the bureaucracy must be
destroyed because It Is the
instrument of the power centers-the
capitalists.'*^ With
the conflict model emerging
from Marx's Ideas, It Is only
natural that this model should
conceive of the bureaucracy

as operating In the Interests of
the elite elements of
society.
Some of the most Important work on the
bureaucracy

employing neo-Marxlan analyses have concerned
the United
States.
The work of C. Wright Mills, for Instance,
views
the economic Interests of the United States
as being in

league with the governmental bureaucracy to the

disadvantage of the poor or the people in general. ''^^
Kenneth Galbraith is another one who

coroes to

John

mind.^^

Although he probably would not be classified as a Marxist,

^2

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Correspondence
1846-189^ (New York: International Publishers. 193277"
p. 309.

C.

V/right Mills,

The Power Elite

Oxford University Press, 1959

(Boston:

(New York:

)

John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State
Houghton-Mifflin, 196? ).

254

his analysis of the
interlocking of governmental
and
economic interests is
supportive of Marx's Ideas.
With
evidence indicating such
collusion in a nation priding
itself on hu^nltarlan and
democratic values as does the
united States, it co.es as
little surprise that the
conflict
theorists find much evidence to
support the conflict thesis
in developing societies. A
measure of the potency of the
argument is the fact that many
consensus theorists concede
that the conflict analysis of
bureaucracy deserves a great
deal of credibility.
'

Barrington Koore. Jr., recognizes that

bureaucracies have had an integrative effect
on developing
societies because centralized bureaucracies
have overridden
the fragmenting tendencies of local
nobilities. ^'-^
In

addition to these integrative roles, according
to Noore»s
analysis, bureaucrats have also been the
instruments
of

the landholders and have actually provided
means of

attaining wealth.

Even though some Integrative functions

45

:^rrington Moore. Jr., Social Origins of
Dictatorship and Dem.ocracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).

p. 417.

46

Ibld^, pp. 168-170. and 179-180.
Milne, op. clt.
pp. 10-11 notes the fragmenting effects of
decentralization of administration in developing societies
suggesting that it tends to strengthen traditional power
bases.

.
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are served by burea^,cracles.
they have also acculred
a
position Bore concerned with
self m.erest than In
serving
the people as a whole.
They serve themselves
or
the elite

who put them in power.
power

Tn this sense,
«
In
bureaucracies do

not aid the process of
political development. These
practices of bureaucracies instead
become the focus of
radical, particularly Communist,
movement s.''?
On the surface, Dahrendorf

's

analysis presents a

Marxian interpretation-^the
bureaucrats are in league with
the capitalist class against the
laboring
elem^ents.^^

The

issue is further refined by Dahrendorf
in his suggestion
that constraint is the only way of
holding societies
together.
Since societies are held together in
the

interests of the upper economic levels of
society, the

4?

Moore, op. cit>

.

p. 169,

Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Cla ss Conflict ln
Industrial .Society (Stanford: Stanford "University
Press
1959). particularly the Introduction and first chapter.

k9

*

Dahrendorf. "Out of Utopia: Toward a
Reorientation of Sociological Analysis," in Lewis A, Coser
and Bernard Rosenberg (eds. ). Sociological Theory; A
Book of Readinp-s. 3rd ed. (Toronto:
1969). pp, 222-240. at p. 237.

The Macmillan Co.,
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bureaucracies which hold
the societies
oocietiP. together
do so as
inctru.ents of the
capitalist classes.
t-

A.ain. the

analysis is a fairly
clear application
of Mar.-s ideas
Many essentially
consensus

theorists, however, pay
homage to conflict
analysis in their
perceptions of
the bureaucracy,
s. N. Eisenstadt.
for instance, ta.es
a
consensus position but
recognizes that the bureaucracy

see

is

Often a roadblock to effective
development.^^

In its

original role in a newly
independent nation. Eisenstadt
sees the bureaucracy as a
defender of the status quo.
He
also Cites the rigidity of
the bureaucracy as an
inhibitor
Of development.^^

Others argue that it retains
this role,

while Eisenstadt, in the Weberian
tradition, feels it
eventually becomes a positive force
for political
development and is representative of
and responsive to the
people.

50
See Eisenstadt, op. cit.
and "Breakdowns of
Modernization. " jgcono
and Cultural nh.nc..
XII (July, 196^07355-307, and ''Bureaucracy
and Politica l
Development." in La Palombara. op. cit. .
pp. 96-II9
.

51

^}s^"s^adt. "Problems of Emerging Bureaucracies
.V, n
in
Developing Areas and New States,"
•,

p.

52

2^6.

Eisenstadt. "Bureaucracy and Political
Development." For the position that bureaucracy tends
to
remain a defender of the status quo. see Emmerich.
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The theme of the
<
rifl-iditv
J-giaity nr
of the classical
model of
bureaucracy is recurrent
In the development
literature.
The ar.u.e„t is .ade
that the classical
.odel e.phasi.es

procedures and legalisn,.

As a result, bureaucracies
In

developing societies often
follov, very rigid rules
and
regulations, thus bringing
constructive change to a
Virtual standstill.
Part- of
r.r +-u
part
the problem is traced
to
the idea that there are
too

mny

administrative

generalists in the bureaucracy
and not enough specialists
in particular problem areas.
The generalists tend to
stress legalism and procedure,
whereas it is felt the
specialist is more likely to be
pragmatic in reaching his
specific objective.
Whatever the motive, stress on
procedure and legalism obviously
leads to much red tape'
and slowing down of activity.
Many of these authors seem to make
a complete
turnabout in indicating that bureaucracies
in developing
societies do not follow the classical model
prescription

Fritz Morstein Marx, "The Higher Civil
P« 355?
Service As An Action Group in Western Political
Development," in La Falombara. op. cit.
pp. 62-95;
Hoselltz op. cit., pp. 168-169; and La Palombara.
op. cit..
PP» 55-59 among many others.
gP*

.

La Palombara, "Bureaucracy and Political
Development," pp. 5^-55; and Milne, op. cit. p. 9 are
just two of many who adopt this stance.
.
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of neutrality and prof e^oi
n
Pioieoslonallsm

(m terms of ethics)
nather. they often view
the bureaucracy as
highly
politicized and highly corrupt.
Of course.
/.

politlci.atlon .akes the bureaucracy
partial in U.
dealings with the people and
thus causes distrust
and
disruption,
corruption helps rake off
economic resources
and causes the system to
suffer in the long run.
it also
fosters distrust and increased
costs for the system.
The idea that bureaucratic
centralization Is an
mtef^ratlvo force was discussed
briefly above. However,

many scholars indicate that
centralization is a major
roadblock to over-all development.
They argue that too
much centralization of administration
discourages
development In the hinterlands. The
nation becomes too
oriented to the needs of the capital
or major cities and
Ignores other regions of the nation.
It is not
difficult to Imagine how some parts of the
nation can be
completely omitted from policy considerations
If

54

See La Palombara, "Bureaucracy and Political
Development." p. 59. and "An Overview of Bureaucracy and
Political Development." pp. 25-26; and Eisenstadt.
Problems of Emerging Bureaucracies in Developing Areas
and New States," p. PM5.
55

Emmerich, op. cjt. p. 356 makes particular note
Also see Eisenstadt, "Problems of Emerging
Bureaucracies in Developing Areas and New States," p. ?J^^,
,

of this.
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administration Is centered In one
spot and not accountable
to the nation as a whole,
addition,

m

conflict between

the bureaucracy and the rest
of the nation might
easily
emerge

Many conflict themes have been
noted in the
preceding analysis. Generally, it
might be said that the
conflict analyses emphasize the
relationship of the

bureaucracy to the upper economic groups
of society in
opposition to the poor. The other factors
mentioned
usually relate to this one main theme in
some way.

So.

for the conflict analyst, bureaucracy
serves the

conservative forces of the status quo and actually
inhibits productive change in society.

Some of these

themes are even more fully developed in the literature
on
Latin America, to which attention will now be directed.
The lite rature on I^tin America .

Because control of

government is commonly seen as the route to economic

prosperity in Latin America, the govermient is usually

viewed as the private preserve of the economic elite.

This

includes the bureaucracy, vjhich is often vievjed as the

instrument for retention of control by the economic
elite.

56

Andreski notes that conflict and Instability are

See Merle Kling, "Toward a Theory of Power and
Political Instability in Latin American Society," Western
Political Quarterly IX (March, 1956), 21-35 at pp.
.

.
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Inevitable in a situation
^J-on in whiov,
which governmental
power is
the major or only road
to
wealth.
p.
" wealth
Because
government
xvork is a route to
economic power
itai.o«.
-"-^ also
^
acquires a
certain a.ount of status
or prestige. Thus,
the .ureauorao.
Of latin A.erioa is
often described in te^s
of its display
of power, rudeness, keeping
people waiting, and
personalisno .^

m

.

»

In addition to the direct
acquisition of wealth by
the bureaucracy there is
another theme quite common
in the
conflict analysis of bureaucracy
Latin America. The
theme is that the bureaucracy
has. in fact, been absorbed
by the oligarchy. ^9 Because
the

m

oligarchy often controls

political life, it controls the
Jobs in government; and

57

The r^o.

Stanislav Andreski. Parasitism and Suhv^r .^nn.

ilf^SfHry^

(LoHdHHT-lviid^^

.

•

58

•

.

Richard N. Adams. The Second

Sowin^o-;

P nwf^-r

and

Irvinrilorowitz. Revolution
SoclGtv
in a DGvelopln;r~Tj;nT^
Tir-^-^^-^
TNeFl:ork; Button.
8j notes how the
bureaucracy is often more interested in splendor
prestige citing Brazil's new capital. Brasilia, and
as a
moniment to bureaucratic dysfunction."
S^.^t';

''"^S'n^'J^P^^^-^^^-

19oWTrT
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Among the many suggesting such are Fernando H.
Cuestiones de sociologla del desarrollo e n
America Latim (Santiago, Chile; Editorial UnlverTl tar la
S. A,, 1968), pp. 66-6?; Luis Mercler Vega, Roads
to
Cardoso,
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the theory is that
bureaucrats are unU.ely
to push for
very .uch social or
political chan.e for Tear
of losing
their jobs,
in addition to ordinary
bureaucracy, the
state involvei^ent in much
of Latin American
economic

activity provides a similar
type of control over
entrepreneurial bureaucrats as well.^O
when

Job security

depends on the oligarchy, the
bureaucracy is likely to
serve oligarchic interests.
This particular argument
goes hand in hand with the middle
sectors argument of the
conflict theorists. It will be
remembered
that

bureaucracy provides the means for
entry into the middle
sectors for many people, and the
conflict position on the
middle sectors thus carries over to
their conception of
the bureaucracy. ^1 Since the middle
sectors are viewed
as emulators of the upper sectors and
are not interested
in real change in the society, it is
logical to
conclude.

Power., in

latin^America (New York: Praeger. I969).
pp. 6263; and Charles Wagley. The La.tin American Trgditinn:
^ssays on the Unity and Diversity of Latin Anieri o.r. n
£iilt|re (New York]
Columbia University Press. 1968"). t^i
pp.
M- and
207,
60

Vega, op. cit.

.

pp. 6O-65.

61

Wagley, op. cit.

,

pp.

10^ and 207.
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.iven Its ^iaaie .eotor
cHaracter. that t.e
bureaucracy
would react similarly.
Because many conflict
theorists see control
over
the institutions of
government, including
bureaucracy a s
the road to economic wealth,
there is a tendency to
vi ew
the system as constantly
being in turmoil. Intense
struggles are the direct result
of the desire for
control
over this strategic element
of the system/^ Even
though
such conflicts emerge, conflict
theorists suggest that
instability exists primarily at
the political level and
that the bureaucracy only
changes its allegiance to
leaders. ^ New political leaders
In Latin America are
not usually faced with bureaucracies
intent on frustrating
their programs.
If the existing bureaucracy
refuses to
cooperate with the new leader, he
shuffles bureaucrats
around and increases the size of the
bureaucracy by

adding his ovm followers to

Vega,
•

op. cit.

.

pp.

it.^^^

64-65.

63

John Mander. The U nrevolutionQ rv Society:
(N^- York:
p.

yu

Knopf.

The

1^6<rrri^2^Ti:^m^

64

Laurln L. Henry, "Public Administration and
Civil Service." in Harold E. Davis (ed.). Governmont
PoIiUc s In I/ttln America (New York: Ronald Prcns. 19and
')0).
pp. 477-495. at pp. mr^Q^i and Scott, op. cit.
pp. 298-303.
.
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conflict theorists
frequently mention the
size of
bureaucracy in I^tin America.
As noted above,
bureaucracies are often increased
in
size so that the

leader can insure his control.

The Increasing scope
of

government activity also causes
increased
bureaucratization, v/hatever the

cause, the expanding

bureaucracy has a negative effect
on development because
it is an economic drain.
The money to pay

salaries and to

operate bureaucracies could perhaps
be put to better use
in needed programs.
The greatest criticism on
this issue
is directed at the increase in
size resulting from the

desire of political leaders to insure
their control over
the system by placing their friends,
relatives, and
cllentela in official positions.
No discussion of bureaucracy in Latin
America

would be complete without mention of
corruption.

The

political factors mentioned above provide an
atmosphere in
which corruption may flourish. The usual
descriptions of

bureaucracy in Latin America make the assumption that
no

action is free of favoritism.

Low salaries as well as

general acceptance of personalismo in government make

65

Henry, op. clt.

.

pp.

83-^84.

26k

corruption rampant/^

Ar-ain
Again,

regardless of the cause,

there Is little question
that government
oonduote. on a
basis or .avorltls.
benefits those «lth
economic power an.
eood connections and tends
to Ignore others.
As a result '
there Is also a tendency
for people to lose
faith In the
political system. Any attempts
at change .ay be accepted
With .uch sicepticis. if at
all. of course, the
argument
may also be made that this
type of corruption
is

functional in the sense of
generating loyalty to the
system among government workers.
Still another problem emphasized
by I^tin American
conflict analysts is the tendency
to worship procedures
and legalism. This is a result
of the adoption of the
Weberian model of bureaucracy with
no attention to the'
fact that there is a tremendous
cultural difference
between latin America and the Western
developed nations.

Another reason for this development is
that there are
many administrative generalists in the
bureaucracy and
technical specialists are us-aally few in
number.

Thus.

66
I^id^.

James L. Busey, latin America: Political
Institutions and Processp.c^ (New York; Random House.
1964}, p. 7; Roberto de Oliveira Campos, Reflections on
latin Am erican Development (Austin: University of Texas
Press. 1967). p. Z|7; and Wagley. op. cit.
p. 78.
.
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attention is
IS divorte^A
airocted +-«
to procedures rather
than to
substance .^"^ i:>ucn
Such attention
attpn^-^ r^v. to
procedure often has the
effect Of slowing the
governmental process down
considerably. A inore important
consideration is that
procedures do no good if the
+.

goal for which the

bureaucracy exists is not reached.

All are aware that

this is a problem hardly exclusive
to developing
societies.
But. because of the inordinate
power of
bureaucracies in latin America, it
creates a very
difficult problem.
Yet another concern of conflict
theorists is the
question of centralization of bureaucratic
authority.
Some suggest that It is the major
roadblock to development
in Latin Anierica.^^ One of the
reasons centralization of

authority is such a problem is that it
provides a means
of Insuring direct control by political
leaders.

Where

political power results in Intense competition
for
control,

it is not surprising that centralization
remains

6?

cit.

.

Scott, op» clt.
pp. 485-48^7

.

pp. 296-298. and Henry, op.

68
See Emmerich, op. cit.

clt.

.

pp. 484-485.

69

Ibid.

.

p. 356, and Henry,

op.

s
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a feature of the
bureaucratic structure.

The proble. is
that an efficient
bureaucracy controlled
by a dictator
can easily inhibit any
sort of progress in
political
development.
jr bureaucracy is
highly centralized,
it
tends to become isolated
fro. the nation as a
whole and
the effective nation
becomes that of the
bureaucracy
world no matter how limited
that world might be.
The conflict analysts (and
many consensus
analysts) adopt several different
approaches to the
»

analysis of bureaucracy in Latin
America,

m

general,

they tend to stress the
obstacles put in the path of

development by the Latin American
bureaucracies.
so. they tend to stress the
interlocking

In doing

of the

bureaucracy and the oligarchy.

Noting that the

bureaucracy is often middle class, the
middle sectors
argument of the conflict theorists is
accepted.
In
addition, emphasis is usUc'Uly placed on
the inefficiency
and corruption of the bureaucracy and
on its self.

interested and self-serving nature.

All of these factors

indicate to the conflict theorists that the
bureaucracy

70
Henry, op. cit.

.

p. k9k.

26?

cannot be counted on as
a
forcp for
fr>T^ .
.
^ lorce
constructive
social
and political change
in Latin America.
The Effect of Bureaucracy
on Latin

American Political
Development
Bureaucracies in latin America
display
Characteristics suggested by
both the conflict and
consensus models. Neither
model by itself provides
a
complete picture of the
situation.
This section will
outline some of the features
of bureaucracy in I^tin
America and their relevance to
the two models.
Both the conflict and consensus
analysts note the
constantly increasing size of
Latin American
bureaucracies.

The effects of increasing
size are the'

determinants of the differences between
the approaches.
For the conflict analysts,
increasing size represents an
increasing economic drain on the system
and increasing
control by the oligarchy through the
absorption of greater
numbers of people.
The consensus
analysts, on the other

71^

Emmerich, op. clt.; Horowitz, op. clt.
0R< OOP and Wagley, op.
^»5-2«b;
cit.
pp. 104 and 20?.
.

.

pp.

.
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*^ana.

note t.e increase.
oppo.t.nUy Tor aispers.on
or
n-icaie Class ur^n
values „Uh Inoreasin,

bu.-eauoratle
The evidence see.s
to Indicate that
the
bureaucracy's size Is
certainly
larp-er than
J xctxger
tnan n»
necessary and
that It does cause a
drain on economic
resources. ^3 The
suggestion that It provides
a foru™ for
dissemination of
.odern values does not see.
valid, especially

size.

ar„t

noted that this
middle sectors

v,hen It

Is based on the consensus

ar„t.

1.

.odeLs

Consensus theorists argue
that
the middle sectors, dominant
In the bureaucracy, cause
the
bureaucracy to be an Instrument
of progress.
The arguments
about the middle sectors,
with questions concerning
the

consensus model, have been discussed
In Chapter
limitations of that argument serve

V.

The

to limit the

applicability of their conclusions
about the bureaucracy.
Both models are wrong for ]U.tln
America.
To understand
latin American bureaucracy, we must
look at the functions
It actually performs.
Bureaucracy serves as a means
'

of

employment, as a social security agency,
as a patronage

72

Johnson, op_. clt., particularly
13 and pp.
>"
iQT
TO),
'i'" p.
193-19'*,
and Scott, op. clt. p. 303.
.

73
^^'^^y. PP- cit-., pp. 483-48/H Scott, op. clt.
-^no -,1%^
pp. 302-303;
and Pan American Union, op. clt. .
r-r,

.
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a«ency. and as a .eans
or buying off
political foe. l„
I^tln ..e.loa. The
oarrnn, out or erreotlve
developmental
programs .ay be a distinctly
secondary function.
The idea that Z^tin
American bureaucrats
tend toward
legalise and proceduralism
also provides for
dirrerent
perspectives. The conrilct
analysts stress the
rigidity of
such attitudes and ho« it
inhibits pragmatism
in the

development of new programs.

On the other hand,

consensus analysts emphasize
the idea that a neutral
professional bureaucracy is necessary
for effective
development policies. Since the
industrialized societies
have functioned Hell with the
classical bureaucracies,

analysts assume that the latin
American nations should be
striving for similar bureaucratic
'''5
systems.

It is very difficult to evaluate
this dirrerenoe in

the models because of the lack of
surfioient evidence.
However, it does seem that excessive
legalism becomes a
substitute for substantive programs in
many oases in Latin

7't

Horowitz, op. clt.
75

.

p. 287,

for instance.

Johnson, op. cit. p. igif, and p. 59. The Pan
American Union, op. clt. bases its analysis on the
assumption that administrative efficiency will produce a
society conducive to development in all sectors.
.

.
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Glen Dealy^s analysis
indicates that much of
the administrative and le.al
fra.ewor. of Latin America
.ay not represent what United
States scholars tend to
think
they do or ought to do.^^
The value systems of the
Latin
Americans may Indicate that the
institutions and legal
provisions of constitutions have
different purposes than
Anglo-Americans would assume. Nevertheless,
legalism

undoubtedly does provide some inhibitors
to the process of
development.
It may be found that, in
the long run.

the

bureaucracies actually produce a fusion of
modern values
throughout the society.
Related to the rigidity of bureaucracy is
the fact
that bureaucratic centralism is a fact of
life In Latin

America.

There seems to be no argument on this point.

Again, the effect is the differentiating factor
In the

analyses of the two models.

Centralization does have an

advantage in Integrating society in the sense that it can
assure universal practices throughout the system.

76

clt.

,

p.

Henry, op. clt.
296.

.

This'

pp. ^85-^86, and Scott, op.

77

Glen Dealy. "Prolegomena on the Spanish American
Political Tradition," The HlsDanlc American Historical
Review XLVIII (February. 1968), 37-58.
.
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contention is

^se.

on .He assumption
tHat tHe centraUee.
bureaucracy considers the
whole nation in its
policy.
leaking.
In reality, however,
the burePi....
tne
bureaucracy may limit
itsphere of activity to the
large
tge cities
citie<, or ^v.
the capital city.
When such Is the case,
there Is lutZe
stimulation of
.

strong regional
Institutionalization.
fragmented syste. ™ight emerge,

As a result, a

m

i^tln America, much of
the evidence Indicates
that bureaucracy Is
centralized for
the purpose of .ore
direct political control,
rather than
for purposes of political
integration.
it .ay be argued
that latm American government
systems are centralized
because they are Hlspanlc-Iatln-Iberlc.
not because they
conform to Weberlan or Marxian
models.
The role of the bureaucracy
In political development
Is dependent on many factors.
Some have been discussed In
detail but there are also many others
of Importance.
The
relationship of the bureaucracy to the
socio-economic

elites certainly raises questions as
to the likelihood of
bureaucracy being a positive force for
political
development. Petras notes that in Chile,
the bureaucracy

78

Henry, op. cit.. provides a particularly
good
discussion of the evidence.
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no« acu^esoea .n
representing .,e interests
or t.e .ia.ie
and upper sectors. He
argues that^ -Lu
It IS
Is actually
actualJv somewhat
schizophrenic in puMicX.
representing a modernizing
role
but in fact acting to
support the status
quo.^^
Scott echoes this position,
suggesting that the
hureaucrac.
or I^tin America sees
itselr as a modernizing
force,

.ut
out or fear or losing
Jobs, bureaucrats become
obstacles
to change.

People who degrade I^tln
American bureaucracies
Often forget that the United
States and Western European
nations went through some of
the same problems.
The

United States did not formally
embody the ideals of
Weberian classical bureaucracy
until passage of the
Pendleton Act of I883. Yet we analyze
Latin American
bureaucracies in developing stages in
terms of our
twentieth century "Weberian" model,
a model that does not
even correspond to our own situation.
No one can argue

79^

Petras. Politics and Social Fnvr.^. in
chM.rr. n
-^^-^^^ (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University
university
of n
California Press. I969). pp. 307-33?.
•

80
Scott,

op.

Pit.

,

p.

297.

81

rbid^, p. 298 makes this point.
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that corruption or
Inefriclency never existed
In our
systezn.
Perhaps we should view
the bureaucracies In
ter.s
Of the Whole social and
cultural value systems.
Certainly
bureaucracy can e.er.e as a
leader In the modernisation
process, but it is unrealistic
to think that it can
be
completely free of the values
of its society.
Indications
are that in most developing
nations it is in fact ahead
of
the other political institutions
in the sense of being
firmly implanted in and integrated
with the larger society.
Because it is often the only stable
Institution,
'

it

provides tremendous opposition to the
development of other
political institutions since it does not
want opposition
for political control.
It opposes development
of other

effective political institutions such as
political
parties, courts, or even effective legislatures
for fear
of losinr its own privileged position.

82

See Higgs, Administration in Developing
Countries;
The Theory of PriniT:at3c ^Jociety
.
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CHAPTERVIII
LATIN AMERICA AND POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT

Applicability of Political Development
Models for the Study of Latin America
Inslp:hts provided by t h e modelr. .

.

Both the conflict

and consensus models for the study of
political development
provide some valid insights for the imderstanding
of Latin

America.

Some mention has been made of such insights
in

the previous chapters, although the discussion
has

emphasized deficiencies of the models.
Both the conflict and consensus models tend to

accept the idea that societies are "progressing" or moving
toward societies like those in the modern Western

v^orld.

While much of the experience in Latin America indicates,
that a unidirectional movement toward political democracy
is not occurring,

the fact is that many of the governments

of Latin America have attempted to emulate the United

States or other Western societies and thus have adopted
this sort of progression as their goal.

To imderstand

275

the motives of the ffovernmpni-c.
governments i-io^™
t
themselves,
it is necessary
to understand what they
hope to accomplish.
Unfortunately
the consequences of latin
American governments
acceptance^
of the models have often
been negative.

The acceptance of Western
models by the Latin
American nations has usually
meant placing- an inordinate
emphasis on economic development.
Because both the models
tend to accept economic development
as a prerequisite to
or a producer of political
development, it is felt that
once economic development takes
place, all other problems
Will be easily solved. What usually
happens is that

economic institutions are developed
but political and
social institutions are ignored except

to the extent to

which they foster economic development.

Consequently, the

economic interests concentrate wealth in
their hands and
leave the rest of society outside the
system.

Supposedly,

the economic wealth is concentrated
primarily for the

purpose of providing for further economic
development a la
Rostow»s pre-conditions for take-off and take-off
stages

of economic growth."^

W.

(Cambridge:

W.

Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth
Cambridge University Press, I960).
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since economic power
is concentrated,
it is UKely
that political po«er
also beco.es so.
The political
system becomes a „eans for
achieving wealth, power,
and
status. As was noted In
the previous discussions,
the fact
that people acquire wealth
through politics .eans
that
they tend to bend to the
win of the economic elites,
secondly, of course, many of
the govern:„ent workers
are
directly dependent on the
economic Interests for their
livelihood and. theref
nrp nvo
uncxeiore,
are loyal supporters
,

of the

ruling groups.
The people left out of the
effective political

system provide another force.

The likelihood is that they

will come to resent the concentration
of pov^er in the hands
of the elite and eventually become
agents for chanee->most
likely violent change. Whether they
have in
fact

developed this stance at present is not
the question since
our interest is in what type of
development
can be

expected.

Of course, we have to recognize the
existing-

situation, as

i^ell,

for a full understanding.

It does seem,

though, that unless some change is made in
distribution of

wealth and political control, that those outside
the
system may eventually feel no stake in maintaining the
system.

When a group is outside the power system, it may

feel that it can afford to be radical and activist, but

t

2??

when It

some
me power
uov/or ifr.
,,^4
Its notlvlr^m
may be blunted for
foar
of lonlnpr what it has.
Yuir.

4

.

In t.rmr. of the ovor-all
charaotor of tho .ooloty
tho oonfllot modol.
,„any way., of for. a
better
per.pootlve than tho consensu,
.odol. Tho confUot .odd.,

m

analy.l. In

tor,„. of tho bl,-polarlty
of Latin Amorloan

society 1. very In.tructlvo.

It doo3 .cem that I^tln

American society and poUtlo. are
characterized by a .pUt
between tho.e who have aooc. to
wealth and po«or and tho.e
Who are out.ldo tho cy.tcm for
tho n,o.t
part.=^

m,oh of the

activity of the society can bo viewed a.
productive of
maintenance of power by thor^e who already
have It and
continued subordination of those without
power.
If and
when the subordinates feel they are being
exploited,

conflict may result.
While the general characterization of society

presented by the conflict model may provide valid
ln«i/Thtr>,

2

it docs not moan that the conflict model
is

For evidence on this point, see Richard N. Adams,
The Second TJow lnp-;
Pov7er and Secondar y Develo pmont in
lnt\n AmojiVca (/Jan Francisco; Chandler, 19^^; Kalman
^^•^vei't. Tho Conriic t .Sociot y (New York:
Harper and How.
I960); Luis Merc lor Vcp;a, Heads to Power in J/it in
Amor 1 eg (New York: Praegcr, I909 ); and "Claudio Vellz
( od . )
The Politics of Conformity in In in America
(London:
Oxford University Press, 196'7T.
.
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totally applicable.

'

The
ine base<,
bases n-r
of the consensus
model also
provide some points of
departure for analysis.
The

consensus approaches emphasis
on plurality of interests
has
some very significant
implications for the study
of Latin
American politics. There
is no doubt that more
and more
groups are emerging in Latin
America.
In analyzing the behavior
of the newly emerging
sectors in the society, it seems
necessary to combine the
ideas of both models.
For instance, the element
of self,
interest of these groups is
recognized by both models.

Each presumes that groups (or
people for that matter) will
operate to maximize their own self
interests. With the
consensus model this presumption means
that compromise
among groups takes place because they
recognize the

collective benefit of working together.

V7hat

often happens

in Latin America, however, is that these
groups perceive

their self-interests in aligning with the
elite elements.^
It is often argued that various groups
find that their

only hope for maintaining or gaining status is in
being

3

See James Petras, Politics and Social Forces in
Chilean Development (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University
of California Press, I969); Vega, op. cit. and Adams,
op. cit.
among many others.
;

.

,
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coopted by the upper
sectors.

This tendency Is

particularly true where
,over»„ent e.ploy.ent
Is the .ajor
road to economic success.
Thus, the argument
of the
conflict analysts that
economic dependence on
the upper
.actors creates a tendency
for alignment with the
elite
seen,s valid In analyzing
the Utln American
scene.'*
It seems that self-interest
certainly plays an
important role In the activities
of groups In latin

America.

Because of the structure of
economic and
political power, some of these
groups perceive their best
interests being served by maintenance
of the status quo.
TO do away with the system or
to change It too drastically
might mean loss of security or at
least a decrease in
economic benefits. Such pressures
have an Important
bearing on keeping the groups from
reacting as the

pluralists of the Western Anglo-American
tradition would
expect.

Stanislav Andreskl» Parasitism and Suhvf^r^inn.
mu
The Case o f latin America (London:
V/eldenfeld and
Nlcolson. 1966;; Fernando H. Cardoso. Cuestlones
de
ggclolop^ia del desar rollo en Ameri ca mtlna ?<^^n1-^^.'rr.^
Chile:
Editorial Universitarla . S. A.. I908).
66-6?;
Vega. pp. cit._. pp. 62-63; and Charles V/agley, pp.
The Latin
American Tradition; Essays on the Unity and Diversity of
i.atln Am erican Cu lture (New York;
Columbia University
Press. 1908). pp. 4 and 20?. All make this point.
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in looking at the
three Issue areas which
have been
examined In this .tudy it
becomes obvious that both
.odels

present some valuable
perspectives for the study
of
political development In latin
America.
Perhaps the best
way to review the value of
the models Is to reiterate
briefly the arguments on each
Issue area
for the t«o

models.
The middle

.sector...

Regarding the middle sectors,

both models have some important
contributions to make,
if
we look at the Latin American middle
sectors as they
behave today, it seems that the conflict
model often
provides a better analysis of what is actually
happening.^

Because the society of Latin America Is often
bi-polar. the
middle sectors find it easier and more advantageous
to

align with the ruling oligarchs as a way of
maintaining
economic security/

As

Batinoff argues, the middle

5

See Chapter V of this study for a review of these
issues.
Some excellent summaries of the character of
Latin American middle sectors of today are: victor Alba,
"Latin America:
The Middle Class Revolution." New
Politics . I (Winter. 1962). 66-73; James Petras~The
Latin American Kiddle Class." New Politics IV (Winter.
1965). 7^-89; and, of course. John J. Johnson, Politic al
Chanpre in Latin America:
The Emergence of the Middle
Sectors (Stanfordl Stanford University Press. 1958).
.

See Petras, "The Latin American Middle Class";
Vega, op. cit. ; and Veliz. op. cit. among many others.
.
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sectors tend to ally

„Uh

those groups which are
able to
provide the. with the best
chance of attaining
so.ethlrg
tangible from the syste.-at
one point It was the
lower
class Which see.ed .ost Ui^oly
to provide the middle
class
with some power.
But as the middle sectors
gained
In

size, access to the upper
sectors became available
and the

middle sectors perceived their
best Interests In allying
with the upper elen.ents.^ The
conflict analysis

perspective on this point seems
Instructive in understanding
Khat is presently happening in the
Latin American middle
sectors.
The conflict model does not provide a
complete

picture of the situation, however.

Instead the roles

played by the middle sectors seem to differ,
depending
upon the stage of development of the society.

At the stage

of development when the middle sectors are
extremely small

and outside the centers of power, they tend to ally
with
the laboring elements and tend to be more reform
oriented

See Luis Ratinoff. "The New Urban Groups:
The
Middle Classes," in Seymour Martin Llpset and Aldo Solar
(eds.). Elites in Latin America (New York:
Oxford
University Press. 196?;, pp. 61-93. at p. 69.
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than

sees

to be the case today

m

much of latin A.erica.^

The role played by the
middle sectors depends
on what they
perceive to be in their ovm
best interests. When the

middle sectors are outside the
system, they can afford to
attack it. once they themselves
are a part of the system,
they become coopted by the
oligarchy and/or ruling groups
which wish to reduce the negative
impact of the middle
sectors.
Then the middle sectors become
defenders of the
status quo,^ The time, context, and
political

circumstances have to be considered if
we are to
understand the role of the middle sectors

completely.

The

8

Two people employing vastly different
tend to reach this concluGion. Johnson, op. approaches
cit.
particularly Chapter 9 reviews some of thr^lTaTTies
of
labor and the middle sectors with analysis of the
shift
away from that alliance as times changed. Petras,
Politics and Social Forces in Chilean Develop^.pnt
!
particularly in Chapter ^ notes how the changing 'society
requires changing roles for the middle sectors.
Frederick B. Pike, Chile and the United States. 138 0-1962
(Buenos Aires:
Solar/Hachete. I967) makes similar
observations.

—

9

The author is indebted to Jane Lee Yare, a
graduate student in the Department of Political Science,
University of Kassachusetts, for some of the ideas here.
In a paper, "The Middle Class in I^tln America,
(Unpublished paper. Department of Political Science,
University of Massachusetts, 1971) and in discussions with
me, she helped me form some of these conclusions.
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laea Of .axl^lzlne
self-Interest .ay Involve
.o,„e decree of
Playlne the ga.e according
to the oonnensus
.odel. but
has been Illustrated 1„
present-day l.tln America,
the
middle .sectors see. to help
themselves .ost by playln.
the
role Of supporting the elitist
syste..
clearly, this role
is not In accord with T:ne
the patriotic,
t-n r^^
progressive picture
of the middle sectors as
painted by Johnson.
a

Obviously it would be only
speculation to suggest
What might happen in the future
with the Latin American
middle sectors, but some prediction
might
be in order,

it

seems that as the middle sectors
grow in size-something
which appears to be inevitable they
will be able to

—

exert ever-increasing influence over
public policies.
Guch an event, there may be more of a
tendency toward

In

liberalization of regimes, if Johnson's views
on the
values of middle sectors are correct. He
ascribes a
liberal democratic character to this sector,
although

noting that, for reasons of survival, such values
are
often suppressed.

If the society were to become

overwhelmingly middle class, hov/ever,
should come out.

tiiclr

"true" values

As people become more and more educated

and exposed to more alternatives, they are no longer

going to accept rigid control over their activities.
Thus,

it could be expected that the systems will move

toward greater democracy, although this does not mean thoy

2Qk

will copy United States
or

'
democratic processes.
The consensus theorists
who expect
^^P^cz the Latin American
.
middle sectors to mimic
their United
united States
Stat. counterparts
are .ost n.ceX, to
.l.appo,„tea. On t.e
ot.er .an.
those conruot t.Heo..3t3
«.o expect tHe
.,,aXe sectors'to
.amtam a state of war with the
lower classes are
probably also wrong. A
.ore realistic

view is to

reco«„l.e that they are
,oln, to do what
contributes „ost
to their positions and
self-mterests at the tl„e.
As
times and contexts change,
the middle sectors'
roles
change also.

The_urban CToup s.

Consideration of the urban

sectors In Latin America reveals
even more evidence that
neither model by Itself is
capable of giving a complete
Picture Of the situation. There
are many factors to be
considered In analyzing urbanization
In Latin America.
First of all. there are the
differences between urban
areas. The major city or cities
of a nation constitute
one element of the urbanization
factor.

However, there are

medium and small-sized urton centers
which must also be
considered.
The differences In life

style and political

practice between cities often provide
competition between
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ur^n

cente.s in I.tin ..e.ica.^O

^^^^^^^^^

^^^^^

there Is the split between
rural and urban sectors.
Usually, the conflict
theorists tend to simplify
the
analysis in ter.s of urban
versus rural elements.
Obviously, such an analysis
is incomplete.
The vast
differences between urban
elements .ust be considered.
There seems little doubt
that the urban areas
and
especially the primate cities
have dominated politics
to
the detriment of rural areas.
To understand the whole
story, however, the differences
among urban areas must
also be recognized. Perhaps a
certain amount of compromise
among urban areas occurs, thus
approaching consensus model
behavior.
In political life, the urban
areas have to
"

recognize one another's needs, although
there certainly
are instances in which one city may
overshadow
all of

national life, as in Uruguay (Montevideo)
or Paraguay
(Asuncion).
While the conflict theorists have a
valid point

concerning urban domination of political life,
the
evidence Indicates that the process of
urbanization

'

may

actually provide for greater integration of the
society.

10

See Adams, op. clt.

.

Chapters

particular.

3,

9.

and 10 in

11

See George I. Blanksten,

"The Politics of Latin
S. Coleman (eds.),

America." in Gabriel Almond and James

"
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The argunent is that as
^ore people .igrate fro.
rural
areas to urban centers
there is a greater amount
of

communication between
ween

thec^p
T;nese

t-^rr.
^«
*
two
major
sectors of society.

The new urban dwellers
transmit modern values back
to thl
families they have left behind
in the rural areas.
This
argument, of course, follows that
of Daniel Lerner who
says that urbanization provides
the stimulus for

modernization, with communication the
Instrument for the
spreading of modern values. "^^

Another feature of urbanization is the
change in
social structure which occurs simultaneously.

It had been

assumed that the conflict theorists were
correct in
suggesting that urban society creates breakdoivn

of primary

social units such as the family.

With such a breakdown

comes turmoil in the society with the dispossessed

elements becoming violent.

Recent evidence suggests that

The PolitlCG of the Developing Areas (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, i960), pp. ^55-531.
12

Lerner. The Passing of Traditional Society
Modernlzinfr the f^iddle East (Glencoe:
The Free Press.
See Chapter VI of this study—particularly that
1950 K
section dealing with consensus model literature for a
detailed discussion of this idea.
!

—
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this development may
not be
DC true In
in r..
Latin America.
While maioauons are
t.at t.o now u.^n
...Uers .avo not
lost ra^uui l.entuy
and are transputers
or ^o.ern
values to the countryside,
see^s Inevitable that
they
win also be instruments In
the revolution of
rlsln«
expectations.

n

u

Perhops the author's view
of hu^an nature clouds
his expectations
on. nere.
here but
v.n^ It
^ 4-

seems that as people
become
more aware of what jISq avnnnKi^
available In society, they
will want
It.
As they also come to
realize that It Is out of
their
reach In the present system,
they may turn to more
radical
«

movements to acquire It.

When people have nothing,
they

risk nothing in taking radical
action,

if urban slum

dwellings continue to Increase
In numbers. It Is expected
that the conflict model would
be most capable of predicting
what will happen. On this
particular Issue, the conflict

model may provide Insights on what
will happen, but misses
the mark on what exists at the
present time.
Once again,

there seems to be some validity to
parts of both models In
analyzing this sector of society.

T

l^^^yp^, "Urbanization Without
Breakdown:
AA P„
Case Study," Scientific Monthl y. LXXX
(July. I952), 31as one among many noting the situation jn
Latin
America.
See Chapter VI of this study for further
discussion of the Issue.
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^^^^^^^^^

The arguments on
bureaucracy are

quite Similar to those
regarding the .iddle
sectors.
Regardless of what value
systems bureaucrats take
into
their positions, it see.s
that enough pressures
exist to
bring them under the control
of the ruling elites.
Because
the ruling elites control
the livelihood of
the

bureaucrats, they also control
the roles played by
bureaucracy in the political
process.
With some similarity to the
arguments on the middle
sectors. James Petras argues that
the bureaucracy's role
changes as different periods of
national development are
studied.

1^

Generally, it seems that Uireaucracies
have

been Instrumental in integrating
political institutions in
Latin America, but out of personal security
and selfinterests, they have not been very active
in seeking social
and political change. Because the economic
security of the

bureaucrats may be dependent upon the support of
the
oligarchy, the tendency is for the bureaucracy
to support
the status quo.

In that sense,

the conflict model often

seems most appropriate to studying Latin American

1^

Petras, Politi cs and Social Forces in Chilean
De velopment , pp. 30?''33?*
For discussion of this point,
see Chapter VII in this study, especially the last

section.
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bureaucracy because it
emphasizes
pxiwjaizes th.
the .economic selfinterest of bureaucracies.
In reviewing the
three variables and
their
treatment by the two models
^oaeis. it
i
i .
.
is
obvious
that neither
model is adequate bv
oy ltc:(.ir
Itself,
on 4-u
the other hand, both
provide some instructive
insights into the
relationship of
the variables to I.tin
t-

American political
development.

Any model which can be
used to understand
I^tin America
would be expected to incorporate
some features of the
conflict and consensus models.
Ga ps in the mo d els.
.

Perhaps the greatest

deficiency in the models under
consideration is that they
both ignore the cultural
peculiarities of the Latin
American nations and the differences
between the Latin
American tradition and the Northern
European-Anglo American
tradition.
It is the latter, of course,
from which both
the conflict and consensus models
discussed here
were

derived.

It will be recalled that both
the conflict and

consensus models were developed in the
Northern European
or Anglo-American environment and
reflect the
value

systems found in that cultui-al tradition.

Many

refinements to the basic models of Marx and Weber
have been
made, but again this has happened in the
Intellectual

climate of the Western industrial nations and
their
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cultural tradltionc^
ainons.

^
The ^
major
advocates of these

respective models have
ve trad
ov,« t i
traditionally
been Northern European
or united States
intellectuals. Where l.tin
Americans have
used the .odels. it has
been a case of ,raftin,
the .odels
onto the I^tin American
scene rather than
developing the
models from the I..tin American
experience itself/^
This
i +- 1

.

Northern-European-Anglo-American tradition
assumes a
Protestant ethic toward work and
accomplishment.

It also

assumes a rational approach to
problem-solving with
carefully constructed plans for
the accomplishment
specific objectives.

of

The Iberian cultural tradition
of

Latin America differentiates it from
those societies on
which the models are based.
In order to Justify the assumptions
of the models,

certain circumstances have to be present
in the society.
Certainly, the populace. has to have a certain
minimum
level of physical satisfaction.
Intellectual reasoning
about rational goals does not occur if the
physical

necessities— particularly food— are not met.

Secondly and

Howard J. Wiarda, "Elites in Crisis; The Decline
of the Old Order and the Fragmentation of the New in Latin
America. A Dominican Case Study and the Corporativist
Model." an unpublished paper, n.d., presents an excellent
discussion of the cultural biases of the models.
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perhaps .ore importantly,
there has to be a
mini.am level
or education or at least
understanding in the
populace.
Without the ability to
perceive problems and
possible
solutions to them, this
process of making rational
plan,IS
for action to solve the
problems cannot
occur.

The
le

populace must have access to
information and have the
le
ability to digest that information.
This requirement is
particularly true for the consensus
model approach,
however, it also applies to the
conflict model in the sense
that the people in constant
battle with one another have
to recognize the source of
their problems in their
enemies.
Thus, even the conflict m.odel
requires some sense
of understanding of the problems.

For the consensus model to operate
effectively,
some special political conditions
must exist.

The

consensus model assujnes that channels for
communicating
needs and demands exist.
If the system is to accommodate
demands of varying groups, these groups must
have the

means for making their demands known.

A fairly free and

open system of communications would seem necessary.

More

importantly, it is presumed that people are free to

participate in the political process to bring about

satisfaction of their demands.
The advocates of the two models usually do not say

that such conditions exist.

Eventually they expect this

•
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particular order of soci^^fv
society i-^
to emerge as a
result of the
models they use for
perceivw
^ng sociei-«i
u
societal change.

The fact
however, that these
^nese mnriii-^
conditions are implicit
in the
analytical framework ^sed
used by
bv the
th^ advocates
of the models.
If the society is to
prorre<.<, in
^r.
.
^ progress
the unilinear
way they
propose, certain pre-existing
^xng conditions,
conditinv.o as outlined
above
are required*
Is,

The point of the current
discussion Is that the
value system of latin
Americans and the circuMstances
extant In their societies
are vastly different
fro. those
presupposed by the conflict and
consensus models. There
has been much discussion
of the colonial and
cultural
traditions of latin America and
the impact of these
traditions on societal development.
These traditions
have been extremely Important
in shaping political beliefs
and practices in much of Latin
America.
Some of the

characteristics most frequently noted
in studies of Latin

T

°^
^'"""^^ include:
Lewis
Hanke f«ri^r4^
'f^-TDo the Americas H«v e A Common Hl.tnr.v>
yI^I.
L°!^.'^;->?°Pf'..^96'). ;; .J. ri. Uarins. The
En^o lre
As^risa (New York: Harcourt, Brace , andSpanish
World. Inc..
Barbara H. Stein, The Colonial Hectare
T^^^
^'^^^i'--?. (Ne" ^ork:
Columbia-U niversity
'
1970'; and Ronald Glassraan, Political n.1 storv r Press
iHln
Arasrlca (Mew York:
Funk & Wagnalls. 19&9). Obviously
,
this Is only a very partial mention of
numerous such
wor K s

ITrL

'

^

*

293

America., poutioaz
development are that
t.e I.c.an
tradition lert latin
America wUK an
authoritarian,
centrau.ed. hleraro.lcal
system with

e.phasls on oa.te

and Class systems
throughout the soolety.lV
the Reformation had

I^tm America-even
Itself.

Therefore,

lutle Impact on

the tradition In

less than In the
Iberian peninsula
the Catholic tradition
of Latin

America was not modified
uxiiea as it hn^
had been in much of
Western
Europe.
Consequently, much of the
hierarchy of Latin
America remained extremely
conservative and orthodox in
theology. All of these
forces have critical
implications
for the development of
modern societies. The
so-called
"modernizing" forces identified
with the emergence of the
modern age and order in the
"West" took different forms'
in
I^tin America.
The Bourbon reforms, which
resulted in
liberal democracies in much of
the world affected by them,
had a very different impact in
I.ain America. The Cro.^i
extracted the ideas from the Enlightment
which helped
consolidate its power in the Latin
American colonies. As
was noted in Chapter II, the Bourbon
reforms in Latin
America helped create some of the forces
leading to

17

See Wiarda, op. cit.
for a fuller discussion of
these Issues.
In addition, of course, most Latin America
histories include accounts of these cultural
characteristics.
.
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independence, .ut the reror.s
were primarily oriented
to
improving the efficiency of
the colonial administration.
As a result, the conditions
and fundamental
framework. of

I^tm American

society are strikingly
different from tho se
of North America or most of
Western Europe.
To great portions, of the
population, the stratified

class system was considered
natural.

misfortune to be born poor,
Lord.

t'nat

If it were yoLir

was by design of the good

The Church taught the peasants
such, and there is

little doubt that the coincidence
of Church-^state

relationship in maintaining one another's
position played
a great role in such teaching.
The main thing
is that

people in Latin America were slow to question
the

naturalness or God-given inevitability of the rigid
class
system.

As a result, many of the modernizing ideas of

Western European society were fiirther retarded in Latin
America,

Although the clergy was often at the forefront of
education in Latin America, its influence on the life of
the population was limited.

Except in Brazil and a few

other instances where the Jesuits were Independent of the

conservative hierarchy, the Church resisted education of
the common man.

More importantly, the Church

vjas

able to

lend its ovm interpretation to the ideas of the

Enlightenment and because of its loyalty to the Crown, as
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described in uaapter
Cha-nter tt
II. +-v,«
the Church usually
used Its power
to support the Crown.
VhilA
+-h^v>«
l^nlie there
were many Jesuits who
did not follow the leadership
of the
/-.i

hierarchy, their

over-all impact on I^tin American
development was very
limited.
With such a situation, some
of the prime
ingredients for operation of the
models under consideration
are missing in latin America.
Illiteracy is still
extensive in Latin Am.erica and thus
the ability to perceive
problems and rationally pursue a course
intended to solve
them becomes impossible. With the
Church's hesitation to
educate the populace, much of human life
is built on

spiritualism and superstition.

Trying to pursue

rationally conceived processes becomes difficult
at best
under such circumstances.
Obviously, the authoritarian tenor of much of Latin

American society has meant that participation in the social
and political systems has been rather limited.

Participation is limited to those who agree to go alongwith the power structure.

As a result, the oligarchy or

elite elements usually tend to coopt the various sectors
of society as they emerge as identifiable forces in these

nations.

The elite elements are able to quiet any
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disruptive or opposing forces in
the society.
The
conflict and consensus models both
find It difficult to
explain such behavior. The consensus
model views emerging
groups as making demands on the
system which are
accommodated in some way. The conflict
model sees such

groups as struggling with the power
centers, but these
groups most often tend to become
supporters of the

elite

elements because of the advantages of
such behavior.
Wiarda has discussed this aspect as part
of

the corporatist

nature of Latin American societies

.

'"^

It was noted earlier that if political

participation is to occur, there must be minimum
physical
satisfaction. Even if all were permitted to
participate

in politics in latin America,

there is so much poverty and

hunger that large portions of the populace cannot
conceive
of anything beyond food for the next meal.

In addition.

18

See Wiarda, "The New Developmental Alternatives in
Latin America; Nasserism and Dictatorship with Popular
Support, an unpublished paper delivered at the Annml
Meeting of the Pacific Coast Council on Latin American
Studies, University of California at Santa Barbara, Santa
Barbara, California, November 6-?, 1970, pp. 5-6.
'*

19

Wiarda, "Elites in Crisis:
The Decline of the
Old Order and the Fragmentation of the New in Latin
America, A Dominican Case Study and the Corporativj st
Model,"
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™ost Of the poorer elements
are entirely outside
the
political and social systems,
their demands are
never even
expressed, let alone acted upon.

Perhaps the largest problem
in the cultural
gaps is
that the advocates of the
models are Just talking

latm

past the

Americans,

took of a common frame of
reference for
social science terms makes it
Impossible for
these models

to be effectively applied to
I^tin America.

The Spanish

language lacks a strong social
science tradition and, as
a
result. English terms are often
Just adopted by
Latin

Americans.
however.

Problems occur in the meaning of
such terms,
The same

term- "rights.

••

"dem.ocracy,

"

"representation," etc .-conjures up greatly
disparate
visions to United States and Latin American
social

scientists.

20

Social scientists studying Latin America

often mistakenly assume that when they
speak of democracy,
rights, or other such political concepts,
these words

correspond to the English meanings.

20

See

Jmn

F,

La^^n?- (Buenos Aires:

.

Unfortunately, such is

Marsal, Ce.mbio social en America
Solar/Hachete. I96?), pp. 225-226
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not the case and it has led to much
confusion and
misinterpretation of Latin American
politics.

Another problem of the models is
that they tend to
assume that changes in political leaders
mean

vast changes

in the power structure.

In fact, what usually happens
is

that changes occur only at the top
while the basic
structure remains Intact. Exceptions

exist, but even

regimes oriented to vast change such as
Castro's in Cuba
have had to accommodate many existing
power
centers and

have remained in the corporatlst-elitist
tradition.
Usually, coups mean replacing one group with
another

representing the same power groups in society.
One last point regarding the gaps in the models
is
in order.

Usually when the models are applied to Latin

America, we expect the Latin Americans to react to the

grafting on of our institutions in the same way we react to
them.

Both the conflict and consensus models tend to

forget that the societies of Western Europe and the United
States have not alviays existed in the form they take today.

See Glen Dealy, '*Prolegomena on the Spanish
American Political Tradition," The Hispanic American
Historical Review XLVIII (February, 1968), 37-58 for an
excellent and detailed discussion of the problem for
United States students of Latin America.
,
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Instead, there have been many
problems in the evolution
of
those societies.
The fact is that even if
these r..odels

were appropriate for understanding
latin Ai^erica. we would
have to take into account that

todays latin American

society is not comparable to our
own and so cannot be
evali^ted in terms of today's standards

'

in the United

States or V/estern Europe.

Factors which must be con sidered jn
Arrierica.

v.^r^^

The preceding discussion notes
some of the

important factors which must be accounted
for in any
framework purporting to provide for the
understanding of
latin American political development. From
the

discussion

of the cultural differences, it seems clear
that any

complete study of Ditin Am.erica must consider the

differences produced by cultural disparity.

There is no

question that cultural differences produce differing value
systems.

When value systems differ, the political system

is bound to differ.
It is folly to expect that Latin Americans will

react to efficient administrative or political systems In
the same manner United States citizens do.

The latin

American heritage puts more emphasis on familial factors.
It is more important that one take care of his family and

friends than to have a modern efficient political system.
Who is to question which value system is better?

.

300

Obviously if efficiency of operation,
impartiality, and
lack of corruption are the ends the
society is

striving for.
the political systems of Latin
America would rate low
on
any evaluation of them. However, if
the human factors of
concern for fellow beings is considered,
there would be a

difference in the rating of administrative
systems.
discussion is not meant to imply preference

This

for the Latin

American way of governing.

Rather it is meant to

illustrate how a difference in culture and
values can have
a very specific impact on the operation
of
the political

system.

More importantly, by evaluating I^tin
America in

terms of our own political system, we tend to
criticize
those systems because they do not measure up to our
standards.

Perhaps we should ponder whether our standards

are relevant to Latin America or. in any case, whether
they are the standards v/hich systems should be striving
to

emulate
The idea that the Latin American nations should all
be striving f or a democratic equality also conflicts with

the Latin American cultural tradition.

The implied

assumption of many students of Latin America is that
democratic equality is being sought by the elements outside
the realm of political power in Latin America.

As some

studies on urbanization have indicated, many of these

groups Just do not have an interest in participation in the
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political process. 22

The fact that .uch of the
historical

tradition of I^tin America is
based on a stratified
social
system means that inequality in
the political system
is
Often accepted as natural. People

Just do not question
the

inequality of power because they
have been acculturated
to
believe it is the natural state
of affairs.
It
must be

recognized that there are exceptions
to such a
generalization in that groups in some

Latin American

nations are demanding a share of the
Uruguay.

pov:er.

as in Chile and

But for many Latin Americans,
concern with

democracy is still of limited importance.

Another consideration which has to be
made is the
difference between the indigenous and the
colonizing

populations in Latin America.

Compared to the United

States and Canada, some Indian populations
of Latin America
were much larger and more highly civilized.
Most

importantly, some of the Indians in Latin America
were not

eliminated or assimilated by the society as they were in
North America.

As was noted in Chapter II, there was a

variety of Indian cultures in Latin America with a variety

See Joan Nelson, "The Urban Poor:
Disruption or
Political Integration in Third World Cities," World
Politics XXII (April, 1970), 393-4li^,
.

Of effects for the political
system.

There are so.e

nations, such as Parag^aay.
and some parts of
Colombia,
where the population Is still
primarily of Indian
culture.
As a result, some Intln American
nations have large

populations of Indians living
independently of the rest
of
the nation.
In other societies. Mexico
for Instance, the
Indian has become a part of the
society and his cultural
traditions have made an imprint
on the society,

m

cases

where the Indian has not been
assimilated, it must be
recognized that political integration
is extremely
difficult because two separate
societies exist side by side
but often with almost no Interaction.
The expectations of
the models concerning political
integration are certainly
affected by this fact.

Somewhat related to the "Indian question"
is the
geographic character of Latin America. Because
of its

extremes in geography, political integration
has been
difficult.

The United States, of course, has geographical

extremes as well, but it is not so chopped up as Latin
America.

The mountain ranges prove impassable barriers in

many nations of Latin America.

The problem of

communications and transportation across natural barriers
complicates political integration.

In addition to the

mountains. Latin America has almost im.penetrable jungles to
cope with.

In some of those regions live Indian tribes
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almost unknovm to the rest of the nation.

Obviously they

feel themselves no part of the over-all
political system.
In addition to the Indian populations
in these

inaccessible

areas, there is the problem of merely trying
to keep

communications networks across such barriers.

As a result

of the peculiar geography of Latin America,
there is a

great deal of Isolation of segments of the
population.
They just do not have much contact with the rest
of the
society.

Complicating the communications problem is the fact
that the technological revolution did not affect Latin

America as it did North America and Europe.

Latin

Americans do not have the communications or transportation
networks V7hich exist in the so-called "modern" nations.
As a result, the spread of common values and identities is
more difficult.

Certainly the transistor radio has

provided some impetus to such integration, but it has not
been able to solve all the difficulties

— particularly

the

integration of the various political units.
In short,

to provide an understanding of Latin

America, a framework must permit consideration of all of
the factors which make Latin America different from other

areas of the world.

This suggestion sounds like a plea

for the political cultirre approach and to some extent it
is.

General models can explain only so much.

To complete

the picture, differentiating factors
must also be

considered.

The discussion here has provided

sorae

suggestions on issues which must be considered
and which
have often been Ignored. Obviously it
is not
a formal

framework for the analysis of Latin America.

Instead, this

study has attempted to point out the
shortcomings of
currently used models and indicate what factors

should be

considered in formulating a framework uniquely
attuned to
the Latin Am.erican ambience.
Perhaps future work
will

provide more explicit analytical frameworks embodying
some
of these suggestions.
Implications of this study for Latin American

governmen ts* policies

.

The nations of Latin America have

often depended on the United States to Initiate programs,

and when these programs proved ineffective, they blamed the
United States.

Obviously many United States policies have

been tied to United States economic and political-

strategic interests, and as such have not taken the

Interests of the I^tin Americans very seriously.

As a

result, much bitterness toward the United States has

developed.

Perhaps the greatest problem, however, has

been that the Latin Americans themselves have accepted the

assumptions and expectations of the models which have been
discussed in this study.

Consequently, the Latin American
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government officials have also been guilty
of ignoring
special circumstances in Latin America.
As Victor Alta notes, before there
can be much hope
for change in Latin America, the
political leaders of the
area have to become committed to their
own nations.
Certainly, they speak in terms of progress
for their
nations through economic development and
increased

political participation, however, the actions
of the
political leaders belie a lack of confidence in
their
political systems.

More importantly, in Alba's view, they

often indicate a complete disregard for anything
but

personal gain for the leaders and their friends.

As

evidence. Alba uses the tendency of many Latin American

oligarchs to accept United States aid for investment in the
economy while putting their own money in Swiss bank

accounts for their

ov;n

future use.^^

In other words, they

are imwilling to invest their o\m funds in their own
economies, yet expect the United States to provide aid for

Victor Alba, Alliance V/ithout Allies (New York:
Praeger, I965), and The Latin Americans (New York:
Praeger, I969).
Alba, Alliance VJithout Allies
particular.

,

Chapter IV in
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such.

As usu?.l, there are many exceptions to this

situation, but the point is that the Latin Americans
have
to bring the chanj^es about themselves.
The United States

cannot do it for them.

In order for the changes to take

place, the Latin Aicericans must want them.

Because many of the young and the dispossessed have

become frustrated with democracy, it seems that the route
to change and stability in the region v?ill be different

from the democratic

vjay.

The young people have become

disillusioned because they see democracy supporting
oligarchs in their countries rather than aiding in social
and political reform.
Important that

vie

American society.
nations

it is even more

understand the character of Latin
The assumption that Latin American

v^ill em.ulate

no longer tenable.

As a result,

the United States political system Is

The Latin Americans will follow the

path calculated to serve their best interests.

Of course,

it is almost impossible to predict precisely what the path

Ibid.
Chapter I, Also see Wlarda, "The New
Developmental Alternatives in Latin America: Nasserism
and Dictatorship with Popular Support," and its discussion
of the frustration of Ju^an Bosch regarding the role the
United States played in killing a democratic experiment
Bosch is one of the better
in the Dominican Republic.
known "democrats" who has given up on the ideas of
democracy for his country.
,
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will be. but It Is likely to be unappealing
to the United
States unless attitudes here change
significantly.

Implications of this study for United 5^f..^oo_^wn^
toward I^-tm Amen.qa .

The most important implication
of

this study for United States policy
concerning Latin
America is that virtually all the assumptions
behind that
policy must be re-evaluated. As has been
noted several
times, the belief that our political style
will be copied
is based on faith rather than facts.
Partly because of

our policies, such assumptions have become invalid.

Alba makes a very good point in noting that
almost
all of our Latin American policies have been geared
to

keeping the oligarchy and the elite-oriented middle
sectors in control.

By building hospitals and schools, we

support the already existing political structure.

Alba's

argument is that the Latin Americans must decide on what
direction to take in their own societies and then commit
themselves to the necessary changes.

The United States

cannot bring the "revolution" about for them if it is to
be s"uccessful.

We must be willing to help, but the

26

Alba, Alliance Without Allies

.

Chapter III.

current policies of u^^ing our power
and influence to
prescribe policies of Latin Ai^erican
governments

or to

protect United States economic interests
at the expense of
the Latin Americans is doomed to
failure.
While the Cold War seems to be thawing
gradually

m

terms of the direct relations between
the United States
and the Communist nations, we seem to keep
the

Cold War as

a basis for much of our Latin American
policy.

Another

needed change in our approach to Latin America
is to
recognize that there are different routes to
modernization
in various political systems and that every
leftish

government is not automatically a part of the
so-called
Communist bloc.

Cuba and Chile, for example, are as much

Latin as socialist.

The assumption that they are

automatically a part of the Communist bloc is no more
valid than the idea that every democracy is a model of the
United States.

So to be realistic in our policy toward

Latin America, we must stop becoming hysterical about
every leftist who appears on the scene and instead treat

each government as unique.
Our support for any regime friendly to the United
States,

including many military dictatorships, is only

going to cause further strain in United States

American relations.

— Latin

To stop the polarization v/hich often

occurs between the United States and Latin America, the
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United States must re-evaluate its
assumptions about our
Latin American neighbors. With
our help, some of these
governments, as in Chile, may encourage
profound changes
Without engendering total alienation
from the
United

States.

Otherwise, we may drive them into
anti-United
States and anti-democratic positions
such as occurred in
Cuba,
our intransigence on the issues
only makes it more
difficult for the Latin Americans to
manoeuver out of

anti-United States postures even if they
should desire

to

do so.

There is no easy solution to the dilemmas
faced by
United States policy-makers.
It is also obvious,
though,

that past policies have been riddled with
unfounded

assumptions and expectations.

The current lull in interest

in Latin America is probably even more damaging
than all

the rest.

Kany Latin Americans seem to be wondering if

the United States cares at all anymore.

With a seeming

lack of interest on our part, the latin Americans may

become more alienated from us.

The rising popularity of

Castro among Latin Am.erican governments may be an

indication of such a tendency.
What is needed is a recognition that the United

States cannot dictate the character of development in

Latin America.

Instead, we have to demonstrate a sincere

desire to help in bringing about changes instigated by
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the

I^tm Americans

ther-.selves.

Secondly, „e have to

recognize that each Lntln A:cerloan
nation will foiXo„ its
o™ route to developr=ent depending
on Its ovm background

and needs.
Conclusion .

So far this chapter has
dealt with

conclusions about the specific models
under study and their
relationship to political development.
One further point

concerning the use of these models seems
in order.
themselves are aids in studying phenomena.

Models

It is not

expected that any system ever fully
replicates or is a
mirror image of the model. Secondly, the

general models

provide a very vague outline or order to the
study and
thus are not appropriate to very intensive
analysis of any
system.
To make in-depth analyses of specific
systems,

adaptation of the models becomes essential.

These

criticisms can be made of any general model or framework.
Indeed,

if the suggestions for study of Latin America made

in this study are ever formulated into a full-fledged

model, the criticism will undoubtedly be made that not all
the Latin American nations can be made to fit into it.
The model v/ould likely be more conducive to the study of
one nation than to that of all the others.

Consequently,

the only complete model for study of any nation or system
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Is the one prepared specifically
for the study of that

system*

While the preceding paragraph
notes the difficulties
of using models, it is not meant
to imply that models
are
useless.
Instead, the limitations of the
models should be

recognized by those

v7ho

use them.

not to reify the models we use.

We must also be careful

Rather than rely blindly

on the consensus and conflict models.
Latin Americanists

must develop new approaches, concepts, and
frameworks for
the study of Latin America consistent with
the history

and culture of Latin America.

I

312

BIBLIOGRAPHY

:

313

General Po litical Developinent Literature
Books

Alderfer. Harold F. Public Administration In
Newer
~*
Nations , New York
Praeger, I967I
:

Almond, Gabriel, and Coleman, James S. (eds.).
The
Politics of the Developing Areas , PrincetonPrinceton University Press, i960,

and Poviell, G, Bingham, Comparative Poli ticsA Develop mental Approach . Boston: Little, Brown"
,

.

*

19oo«

.

and Verba, Sidney. The Civic Cial ture^
t
Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations .
Princeton: Princeton University Press. I96JI

American Academy of Political and Social Sciences. The
Annals; New Nations; The Problem of Political
Development
Ph 1 ladelphia
The American Academy
of Political and Social Sciences, I965,
.

:

Apter, David E, The Gold Coast in Transition ,
Princeton University Press, 1955.
The Politics of Modernization
.
University of Chicago Press, 1965,

,

Princeton:

Chicago:

Asher, Robert E,, et al, . Development of the Emerging;
Countries; An Agenda for Research ,
Washington,
D, C,
The Brookings Institution, I962,
:

Associates of the American Universities Field Staff,
City and Nation in the Developing World
New York:
American Universities Field Staff, 19^,
,

31^

Avinerl. Schlomo. (ed.). Xarl Marx on Coloni c i^.n,
Modernization, Garden City: DouhledafTl^ZoT

^essi liC.^"^

Ideolo^^.

Glencoe:

The Free

Bendlx, Relnhard.
May Weber; An Inte llect^i^i portrai
Port^a1^t.
^
Garden City: Dou bleday, 1962. "^
'

—•^

N^tA on-Bulldlnp: and Citizenship .

New York:

Bennls, Warren G.. Benne, Kenneth D. and Chin, Robert
The Planning of Social Change; Readin g?^
in
the Applied Behavioral Sc1p£u>^.
Hew Yorkl Holt""
Rlnehart and Winston. 19^1,
,

*

Black, C. E,
Th_e_ D ynamics of Modernization .
~*
~~
Harper and Row, I966,
Black, Max (ed.).

New York:

The Social Theories of Talcott Parso ns.
Prentlce-Kall, 196I,

Englewood Cliffs:
Blau. Peter M.

The Dynam ic s of Bureau cracy.
University of Chicago Press, 1955.

Chicago:

Bralbantl, Ralph. Political and Administrative
Development . Durham: Duice University Commonwealth
Studies Center, I969,

and Spengler, Joseph J. Tradition, Value.
^,
and Soclo-Economlc Development . Durham: Duke
University Press, I90I,
Breese, Gerald.
Urbanization in Nevfly Developing:
Countries . Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall,
19^^^:

Connolly, William E, Polit ical Science and Ideology .
New York: Atherton, 1968".
Conti nuities In the Study of Social
Coser, Lewis A.
Conflict . New Yorkl The Freeze ss, 196?.
The Functions of Conflict
.
Free Press, 195^"^^

.

Glencoe

:

The

:

315
,

and Rosenberg, Bernard*

^ory:

A Book oT T^..,^r.Jt'
Macmllian, I969.

(ed«?

)

^3?|-^^ '

c:«„a

^Sf^^
Toronto:

Dahl. Robert A.

A Preface to Demo cratic. Theory
University of Chicago Vres^Tls^r^^'

\

j^o Governs? Demno.racy and
Amer ican Cit.Y.. I^ew Haven: Yale

mhrendorf

Ralf.

t

Poh^-p

rhino
Chicago

iv.

UnivTFHtTPress,

Class and Cla...<. Cn.ri^..
Trniii-t-n n
Stanford: Stanford UniversiTTPHilr^

—

ggsays on the Theory of Society^ *
•
Stanford University Press.

Stanfordoiamora.

Daland. Robert T,
(ed.).
Comparative Urba n Research:
The Administration and Politics of 'cTETeT:
Beverly Hills: Sage Publi'^tions* 196^97"

*

De Toqueville. Alexis.
D emocracy in America . Edited by
Richard D. Heffner. New York: The New American
Library, I956.

Deutsch. Karl W. and Foltz. William J. (eds.).
Building. New York: Atherton, 1964,

Nation-

Dlamant, Alfred. Political Deve l opment: APt^roaches to
"
Theory and Strate ^cj^. Bloomington, Indiana:
Comparative Administration Group, I963,

Easton, David. A Framework for Political Analysis .
New York: Wiley, 19^51

A Systems Analysis of Political Lif e .
York:

New

Wiley. I955,

Eckstein, Harry, and Apter, David E. (eds,). Comparative
Politics; A Reader . New York: The Free Press,

Elsenstadt. S. N. Modernization; Protest and Change .
Englewood CllfTsl Prentice -Ha 11, 19 66.
Etzioni, A. E.
Social Change;
Sources. Patterns, and
Consequences . New York: Basic Books, 1964.

316
^^''^^^

(ed.).

^-

.Basic Wrltlnpr.c. nn

u«xuen

Doubleday, I959.
Field. Arthur J,

p^ i^.^^^

Urbanization and WorV

uii^y:

iv^ ..^^^.

Finer. Herman J.

Th eory and Practlo^ nr
"^^^
Government . ^TT^t^n". ^TTFT 'l^'^O. Modern

T
Constitu^^l^^

Friedrlch. Carl J,
Democracy. LS:Hd5H1

Galbraith. John Kenneth. The New Indu^tn^i
Boston: Houghton-MriTli^:rT957:
Gerth. H. H.. and Mills.

C.

'^'^'n^ngu^^^'B^^J;. 11^3
Hartz. Louis.

^
and

M¥th{reir.*T95r:^

Wright,

(eds.).

^ -^^ental

c^^.y^

~'

Prom Max

Cent.ry .

The Founding: of New ^-^hMpj^.

HarcourtT^ace. and World.nL932rr

—

^

The Liberal Tradition In America .
•
Harcourt. Bra
and World. I955"

Heady.

Ferrel.
P ublic Administration:
Perspective. Engliwood Cllffsl

Heilbroner. Robert L. The Great Ascent .
Harper and Row, 19^3^

•

jjew

York:

New York:

A Commratlv e
Prentice-Hall.

New York:

Hirschman, Albert 0. Journey s Tov;ard Progress .
The 20th Century Fund. I963.
Haven:

Baltimore:

New York:

The Strategy of Economic Development .
Yale University Press. 1959.

New

Hoselltz, Bert F. and Moore, Wilbert E. (eds.).
Industrialization and Society
Paris:
UNESCOMouton, 1963*
,

.

'

31?

Hoyt, Homer.

World Urban j ^ ati nv.
Urban

-

^.Jil£lllilin£Wo>-ld.

i

ExmnHlnrr

International Union of Local Authorities.
D evelopin;^ Coimtrl^.c.
The Hague.
.

IfeFtinus rJlJhoff.

p^..,,-,

...

k ^Ff^rn^f-T^^

1968.

m

Urbanl7atlon
Nethflrilf—^
Netherlands:

Josephson» Eric, and Josephson. Mary
(eds.).
Man AloneAl^e^tio n in Modern Society . New Yorkr^^^lff

Kaut sky

John H.

(ed.).

Political Change_^2lJl!lilf-^'-^

—

•»

-rrd

Kebschull Harvey G. (ed.). Politics in Trar^.c^i f.i nv,ai
Societies. New York: Appleton-CenTI^ylCrort's.
Kornhauser. William. The Politics of Mas s Society
New York: The Free Press', I959, '
'

Kuper. Leo. and Smith. M. G. (eds.). Pluralism
in Af rica.
Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of CaTIfw'nia
Press, 1969,
La Palombara, Joseph (ed.).

Develppment.
Press. 1963.
Lerner, Daniel.
Glencoe:

Bureaucracy and Political
Princeton: Princeton University

The Passing of Traditional Society .
^
The Free Press, 1958.

Lindblom, Charles E. The Intelligence of Democracy .
New York: The Free Press, I965.
Llpset, Seymour Martin.
Doubleday, I960.

Political Nan

.

Garden City:

Lomas, G. M. (ed.).
Social Aspects of Urban Development .
New York: The National Council of Social Service,
1966.

)

318

McLelsh

John.
The_ Theory of Social Chan pre
Four Views
Considered. L^on: Rout ledge and Kegan
t

P^ToT^

Macrldia. Roy C, and Brown. Bernard E. (eds.
Comparativ e Politics: Notes and Read lnp.^,
ed.
Komewood, Illinois:
Dorsey, 19Pk~

Rev

Marx. Karl, and Engels. Friedrich.
Correspo ndence;
New York: Barnes and Noble. 1961.
182^.

Mayo, Henry B.

Introduction to Marxist Theory
Oxford University Press, i960.

.

m6

'

New York-

Merton, Robert K., et al. (eds.). Reader in Bureau orRnv.
~~
Glencoe: The Free Press, I952T
Michels, Roberto.
Political Parties
Press, 19^9.

Miller, S. M.

Max V/eber .

Mills, C. Wright.

New York:

The Power Elite .
University Press. 1959.

.

New York:

The Free

Crowell. I963.

New York:

Oxford

Montgomery, John D., and Siffin. William J. (eds.).
Approaches to Development; Politics, Administration
and Change s. New York: McGraw-Hill, 19^^37
Moore, Barring ton, Jr.
Social Origins of Dictatorship and
Democracy . Boston: Beacon Press, I966.
Moore, Wilbert E.
Order and Change; Essays in
Comparative SociologyT New York: Wiley, I967.

and Cook, Robert M. (eds.). Readings on
Social Change . Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall,
T9S77
,

Morteira, Giorgio.
Characteristics of the Demographic
St ructure of the American Countries *
Washington,
196^+,
Pan American Union,
D. C.
:

Translated by Hannah
The Ruling Cla ss.
Mosca, Gaetano.
Kahn.
Edited and revised by Arthur Livingston.
New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939.

319

Nelson. Joan.
Migrants. Urban Poverty,
D eyeloplrT/'MatloAs.
Camhr ia^eV
International Affairs. I969.

Nisbet. Robert A.

^^^^^^^

^r.^
'

Instabnit-, .
vara Center for

Social Change an^ m.^.^.,.

^""^'"'^

Jaceri935.-'"'
Parsons. Talcott. The Social Sy stem.
Free Press. 19511

Aspects nr

^^^^

New York:

The

Societies; Evoliitl nrnn.^;^ or.^ Comparative
Englewood Cliff s /'TFiHtiEFIllSIl.

||||£ecMves,
^1_2LLl»

Cambridge

;

Toward A General The ory of Action
Harvard University Press, 19517

Pitts, Forrest R. (ed.). Urban Systems and Econnm io.
Development . Eugene: University of Oregon.
School
of Business Administration. I962.

Presthus. Robert V.

The Organizational Society: An
New York: Random House,

A»^^y-'^^s ^rid a Theory,

Pye. Luclan W.
Boston:

Aspects of Political Development ,
Little, Brown. I966.

Commimi cat ions and Political Development .
•
Princeton: Princeton University Press, I965.
Riggs. Fred W. Administration in Developing Countries
The Theory of Prismatic Society ,
Boston: HoughtonMifflin, 196^.
;

Administrative Development; Notes on an
Elusive Concept and the "KEF-PRI" Model .
Bloomington. Indiana: The Comparative
Administration Group, I963.

320

on Development.
Honolulu:
:;i^^g~g74g-;^
Inst
itnt^-^TAd vanced Projec ts
^^^"^^^^t
Center.
University of Hawaii? I963!
'

Hustow.^r.n..^rt^A.^^A^

—.ton.

Schattschneider. E. E. Party G overnment.
Farrar and Rlnehart. 19^27

New York-

Shils. Edward.
Political De velopment In th e New
States
Gravenhage. Nether lands; Mo ut on,
1 90 2.

2:2ward_the_Coi^^

^^^^^""^nvnJ-i^T/:
Public Admjjijgtrati^
BlooSiTIit^^rr~lHdl5^^r^^
University Press, I957,
Sleslnger. Jonathan A. A_Model for the
Comparative
Study
"
of Public Bureaucracies.
Ann Arbo r
Bureau of
Government. Institute of Public Administration.
University of Michigan, 1957.
;

Theobald, Robert. The Rich and The Poor; A
Study of th
Economic s of Rising Expectatio n.^. New YorkMentor, 1961.

f>

'

Truman. David B. The__Governmen tal Process: Pollt iofti
Interests and Public Opinion . New York: KnoDf
~
^
1962 •

—

*

United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs.
Deigpgr aphlc Yearbook 1969 *
New York: 1970.
Von der Mehden, Fred R. Politics of the Developing
Nations . Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964.
Waldo, Dwlght (ed.).

Administration
1970.

.

Temporal Dimensions of Development
Durham:
Duke University Press.

•

:

321

Ward. Barbara.
The Rich Natlons^__t he Poor
New York: W. W. Norton. I962:

Nat-.^
onc
vaon

^.

'

Weber. Max,
The City,.
Translated and edited by
Martindale and Gertrud Meuwirth. Glencoe Don
The
me
^ ^^oe
Free Press, I958.
:
.

T]:^Tj?eory of Social and Economi
g^^e^4|ation. l^anslated by A. M. Hend"erson and
Taicott Parsons. New York: Oxford Unlversltv
^
Press, 1947,

Whltaker, Arthur.

The Western Hemisphere Idea:
Ithaca:
Cornell University
1954?^^"^^"^"*

T t<.

Rioe

I>ress.^ "

Articles
Almond, Gabriel A.
"Comparative Political Systems
Journal of Politics . XVIII (1956), 391-409.*
,

**A Developmental Approach to Political
•
Systems." World Politics . XVII (January, I965).
183-214.

Ashford. Douglas E.
"Bureaucrats and Citizens," The
Annals; New Nations; The Problem of Pol itical
Development The American Academy of Pol ft "leal and
Social Sciences, CCCLVIII (I965). 89-100.
.

Berry, Brian J,

"Some Relations of Urbanization and Basic
Patterns of Economic Development," Urban Systems
and Economic Development . Edited by Forrest R.
Pitts.
Eugene: University of Oregon, School of
Business Administration, I962.

Braibanti, Ralph.
"The Relevance of Political Science to
the Study of Underdeveloped Areas," Tradit ion,
Value and S oc io-Economlc Development . Edited by
Ralph Braibanti and Joseph J. Spengler, Durham:
Duke University Press, 1961,
"The Conception of the Middle Classes,"
British Journal of Sociology I (December, 1950)
275-290.

Cole, G. D. H.

,

322

Dahrendorf

Half.

«Out of Utopia:

Toward a Reorientation
Analysis. " Soclolo^ical^r^
loof
Book Of
of Re adings.
3rd ed.
Coser and Bernard Rosenberg,Wt^^TTi^TTrA^--^
Toronto: Macmtilan.

Holt.

Daland. Robert.
"Comparative Perspectives on Urban
Systems." Comparative Urban Research; Th^
Administrati on andP^litics of Citl^.c; . vf^^^.^
Robert T. I^lai^IT Beverly Hillsl ^ce
Publications. I969.

—

v,„

Deutsch. Karl W.
"Social Mobilization and Political
Development." American Political Science R f^vipv.r. ry
No. 3 (September,
493-5llf.
,
"

Eisenstadt. S. N.

"Breakdowns of Modernization."

Deve_lo prnent and Cultural Change . XII

(July.

Econorai c

l^Wf^

"Bureaucracy and Political Development,"
Bureaucracy and Political DeveloTPment . Edited by
Joseph la Palombara. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, I963.
"Problems of Emerging B\ireaucracies in
Developing Areas and New States," Politics in
Transitional Societies . Edited by Harvey G.
Kebschull. New York: Appleton-Century-Crof ts.
1968.

Emmerich, Herbert.
"Administrative Roadblocks to
Coordinated Development." Social Aspects of Economic
Development in Latin America . Edited by Egbert
De Vrios and Jose Medina Echavarria. Paris: UNESCO.
1963.
Foltz, William J.
"Building the Newest Nations: ShortRun Strategies and Long-Run Problems," Natio nBuilding . Edited by Karl W. Deutsch and^Willlam J,
Foltz. New York: Atherton, 196^.

323

Goode. William J.

"Industrialization and Family Change
and Society . Edited by Ber? p*

.Ind ustrialization

Mou?on!\963/^''''''''

^^^^"^

"

UNESCO-

Guessous. Mohammed.
"A General Critique of
Theory " ReadinAcs on Social Char.^P, Equilibrium
Edited by
^"""^ Robert M. Cook.
Englewood
nn^^r^
Hauser. Philip M.
"The Social, Economic, and Techno!
opcical
Problems of Rapid Urbanization," Industrialization
and Society. Edited by Bert F. Hoselitz and
Wilbart E. Koore. Paris: UNESCO-Mouton, I963.

Hirschman. Albert 0.
"Obstacles to Development: A
Classification and a Quasi-Vanishing Act," Economic
Development and Cultural Change , XIII July,"T9^577~
(

3"5*~393 •

Horovjitz,

Irving L.
"Consensus, Conflict and Cooperation:
A Sociological Inventory," Social Forces XLI
"
(December 3. 1962), 177-188,
.

Hoselitz, Bert F.
"Generative and Parlsitic Cities,"
Economic Development and C ultiiral Chanere. Ill
(1955). 278-294.
"Levels of Economic Performance and
Bureaucratic Structures, " Bureaucracy and
Political Development . Edited by Joseph La
Palombara. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
1963.

Huntington, Samuel P.
"Political Development and
Political Decay," ""^
V\forld Politics . XVII (April,
1965). 385-^30.
Kuper, Leo.

"Plural Societies: Perspectives and Problems,"
Pluralism in Africa . Edited by Leo Kuper and
M. G. Smith.
Berkeley: University of California

Press, 1969.
"Some Aspects of Violent and Non-violent
•
Political Change in Plural Societies: Conflict and
the Plural Society:
Ideologies of Violence Among
Subordinate Groups," Pluralism in Africa . Edited by
Leo Kuper and M. G. Smith. Berkeley: University of
California Press, I969.

Llpset. Seymour Martin.

"Bureaucracy and Social Ch.y.
h
Edited by Rob^^f K^^Mef
'^^^^^^^
in
Free Press. I952.

ll^l^^-lnBu^^
et__al_j_.
Glencoe: The

"Some Social Requisites of Democracy:
Economic Development and Political
Legitimacy

LIII (March,

flf^ff^^gi^^^
Lltwak

«

Eugene.
"Models of Bureaucracy Which
Conflict." America n Journal of S ocinlncrvPermit
rvviT
i^^!:^' "tVII
(September, l9^Tu T7T^mu

^

McCrone. Donald J., and Cnudde, Charles F.
"Toward
Communications Theory of Democratic Politicala
Development: A Causal Model." America n
Political
Science Review LXI (March. 19677771:797-

~

.

Marx, Karl, and Engels. Friedrlch.
"The German Ideolop;y
ms lc_Writln<7s on Politics and Philosop
hy
Marx
andjn^els. EditecTbV L. S. Feuer. G&diFcTtT'
^
Doubleday, I959.

"
*

:

—

Meusel, Alfred,
"Middle Class." Encycloped ia of the
Social Science s. X (1951). 4071^^15.
Milne, R. S.

"Comparisons and Models in Public
Administration," Political Studies X (February.
.

o2 )

.

1"* 1^

•

Moore, Wllbert E.
"A Reconsideration of Theories of
Social Change," Am erican Sociological Review. XXV
(December, i960), 010-818.
Morstein-rferx. Fritz.
"The Higher Civil Service as an
Action Group in Western Political Development."
Bureaucracy and Political Development . Edited by
Joseph La Palorabara, Princeton: Princeton
University Press. I963.

Nelson, Joan,
"The Urban Poor:
Disruption or Political
Integration in Third World Cities." World Politics
XXII (April, 1970), 393-^14.

Packenham. Robert A.
"Approaches to the Study of
Political Development." World Politics XVII
(October. 1964). 108-120.
.

.

325
.

"Foreign Aid and the National
Interec,^

«

Parsons. Talcott.
"Suggestions for a Sociological
Approach to the Theory of
Organization I "
Ad|»lnlstratlve Science On.....n^ ,,
i

Presthus, Robert V.

(j^^^ ^^^^^^

m

"Behavior and Bureauoraov

v„v„

Pye. Lucian.
"The Political Implications of
Urbanization
and the Development Process."
Social /rol
ggZeloHI^e nt^and Urbanization .
States papers prepared for the V^I^J^rTT-^Hlfd^
United Nations
Conference on the Application of Science
and
Technology for the Benefit of the Less
Developed
cve^opea
Areas. Genoa. I963,

ilTiT

Riggs. Fred W.
"Agraria and Industria; Toward a
Typology of Comparative Administration."
Toward
^^^-Comj;arative...St^
Pub lic Admini.^tr. tTn—
Bioomlngton. IndTana:
-^1^?? SJ-^^i^Indiana n
University Press, 195?.

f

»»Bureaucrats and Political Development:
Paradoxical View," Bureaucracy and Polit ical
Development. Edited by"j'oseph La Falombara.""
Princeton: Princeton University Press. I963.

A

"The Theory of Political Development."
Co ntemporary Political Analysis .
Edited by
C.

Charlesworth.

New York:

James
The Free Press, I967.

Rothman, Stanley.
"Earrington Moore and the Dialectics
of Revolution," American Political Science Review.
LXIV (March. 1970). 61-62:
Smith, M. G.
"Social and Cultural Pluralism," Annals of
the N ew York Academy of Sciences LXXXIII (I960),

iW^W.

.

Sovani, N. V.

»»The Analysis of •Over-Urbanization,
Economic Development and Cultural Change XII
.

(January, 1964). 113-122.

.

326

Strayer. Joseph H.
«The Historical Excerlpnoo of »
Building
Europe," Natlon-iuUdlng

m

...

EditPrtT"
J-orK.

Atherton, 1964,

Thompson, Warren S.
-Urbanization,- Encyclopaedl a nr
Social Science.c. XV (193^
^^^-^^^-^
189 ri9| .

^^

.

) ,

Verba, Sidney.

"Organizational Membership and
Democratic

Walzer, Michael.

"The Only Revolution:

Notes on the

Wellenmann. Hermann.
"The Interlocking of Nation
Personality Structure," Natl on-Bulldinpc. and
Edited by
Karl Dsutsch and William P. P^ItT:
N^YorkAtherton, 1964.

—

Weissraann. Ernest.
Urba.n

65-82

"The Urban Crisis in the World "
Aff airs Quarterly . I (September, I965),

Wlnham. Gilbert R.
"Political Development and Lerner's
Theory:
Further Test of a Causal Model,"
American Political Science Review LXIV
(September, 1970), 8lO-8lS^
.

Wirth, Louis.
"Urbanism as a Way of Life," Amer ican
Journal of Sociology . XLIV (July. 1938771^^

Woodhouse, Wilfred.
"Urban Development:
Some
International Comparisons," Social Aspects of
Urban Development . Edited by G. M. Lom.as, New
York:
Council of Social Services, I966.

—

:

*

327

Latin American Political

Development Literature
Books
Adams, Richard N.
The. Sec ond Sewing
Power and Secondarv
Development in Latin America . ^^r;rTv^7r;rr77^
Chandler, 196?.

^

:

—

Alba, Victor. Alliance Without Allies .
Fraeger, I965.
•

I.as

Mexico:
•

New York-

—

ideas soclales contemporlaneas en M nvi 00
Fondo de Cultiara Economlca. 19^07^
'

The La tin Americans;
Praeger, 19597"

New York:

^

011p;archy and Chancre

Alexander, Robert J. Latin American Politics and
*
Government . New York: Harper, I965,

Today's Latin America .
Doubleday, I962.

Garden City:

American Academy of Political and Social Science. The
Annals; Latin America Tomorrow . Philadelphia:
American Academy of Political and Social Sciences.
1965.

American Assembly. Population DlleroTna in Lat3n Ameri ca.
Washington, D. C.
Potomac Books, 19^6.
:

Anderson, Charles W., Von der Mehden, Fred R., and Young,
Cra wf o r d .
Issues of Political Development •
Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 196?.

Politics and Economic Change in Latin America .
Princeton: Van Nostrand, 195^7.
»

Andre ski, Stan is lav. Parasitism and Subversion: The Case
of Latin America.
London:
Weldenfeld and
Nicolson, 1966.
Beckinsale, R, P., and Houston, J. M. (eds.).
Urbanization and Its Problems. Oxford;
Blackwell, I968.

Basil

—
328

Bene, Adolf

A.

New York:

Americ a:
Harper. I962I

.lati n

DlolorriarM^H
^"-^ nea
r^^i.,^
11 1.^,

Beyer, Glen, (ed.).
The Urban E y-dI n.<.i
Ithaca:
Cornell University F i
Bosch.
Boxer,

nr.

in Tq^-i„

,

^TrMT^^--^^^^'

.

J^n.^^pe^unpi^^
C.

R.

London:

New York:

Tl2e^rtugu. e5e Seabo rne Enpir^.
^
Hutchinson. 19^9:

Burnett. Ben G.. and Johnson. Kenneth

^J4i2g:2:_5orces^^

P.

Burns. E. Bradford. A. History of Brazil .
Columbia University Press, I970.

li^i^.iPo.
irJO^iOil^.

(eds.)

New York:

Busey. James L.
Latin America: Pol Uical Insti tutions
and Processes. New York: Random House, '"19^

Campos. Roberto de Ollveira.
Development. Austin:

Reflections o n Latin American
University of~Te^as PresT;

Cardoso. Fernando H.
Cuestlones de sociolop:ia del
d esarrollo en America Latina .
Santiago: Editorial
Universltaria, S. A.. I968.
Collver. 0. Andrew.

Birth Rates in Latin America; New
Estimates of H istorical Trends a nd Flue tu.it ions .
Berkeley:
Institute of Interna uTonal Studies.
University of California. I965.

Council on Foreign Relations.
So cial Chang:e in Lat in
America Today: Its Implications for United States
Policy . New York: Harper, i960,
Crawford. W. R. A Century of Latin American Thoutrht .
2nd ed.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1961.
Davis, Harold E.

America .

(ed.).
Government and Politics in Latin
New Yorkl Ronald Press, I958.

—
329
Deraas,

William G.
Montreal:

The Econnrolrc

McGlll

^-r

n

UnlWifffPFlTsfWr^^^^-

De Vrles, E., and Eohavarrfa,
J. Medina (pA^

P7^glri969.

^^^^^^^

c

\

,

UnlversltT^rrF^s

Dorselaer Jainie. and Gregory, Alfonso.
La urbanl?aclr;n
en Anierica I.^tina, tomo II.
^"^^-tigacionef Sociales de
FERES?^1962!'

Bogot^T^^F^

Echavarrfa, Jose Medina, and Hlggins.
Benjamin (eds.)
America:.

Vol. II.

Pa rTFT^lJNESCOr 19217"^=^

Economic Commission for Latin America.
United Nations
Economic and Social Council. Social
DeveloDment

^^J^L^^lll^^JlLj^h^^^ - War
Plata. Argentina:

IP^^U^d T^i^jr-^

—
of

UNE3C67T9^3:

Eisenhower. Milton S. The Wine is Bitter:
The United
Spates and Latin America. Jjew York:

Doubleday".

Fitzgibbon. Russell H. (ed.). The Constitution
of Latin
Amer^. Chicago: University ofl:hicago Press.
s-

Flinn, William L. Rural>to~Urban Migration; A Co lombian
Case.
Madison:
Land Tenure Center. University o7
Wisconsin. July. I966.

Furtado. Celso.
Development and Underdevelopment .
Translated by Hicardo W.~De Aguiar and Eric Charles
Drysdale.
Berkeley:
University of California
Press. 1964.
Gerassi. John.
1963.

The Great Fear .

New York:

Macmlllan.

Gino.
Politica y sociedad en una epoca de
transicion . Buenos Aires: Ed. Paldos. I962.

Gerraani.

330

—

S o.colo^ia de la modernlzacion
'
r
I^gllS.P-gj-J'et odologrlcos y

Latlna.

Buenos Aires:

!

V.^^.^^r^^ r.^

ayTn^rTT^-fwrr'

Ed.

Gibson.^Charles.^ Spain In Amerjoa.

Paidos7~T9^
New York:

Glassman, Ronald,
Pgllttcal History of TAt.in
New York:
Funk and Wagnalls. 1969."

Harper and
An,>.^..»,
"

Greenberg. ftotin Henry. Bureaucracy and Developm enh
Mexican Case Study. Lexington, Massachusetts^
Heath, 1970.
Halmos. Paul (ed.). The Sociological Review Monogra ph
Latin Ame rican Socio lo'gT cal Studies . Keele,
Staffordshire: University of Keele, I967.

a*

H'

Hanke, Leviis.
Contemporary Latin America: A Short
History
Princeton; Van No" strand, 196ST
.

Do the Americas Have a Common History ?
Knopf, 1964".

New Yorkl

Hardoy. Jorge Enrique, and Tobar. Carlos (eds,). La
urbanizacion en America Latlna . Buenos Aires:
Editorial del Instituto, I969.

Raring, C. H.

The Spanish Empire in America .
Brace, and World. 19^7.

New York:

Harcoiirt,

Hauser, Philip M.
Urbanization in Latin America . New
York:
International Documents Service, I96I,
Heath,

and Adams, Richard N. (eds.). Contemporary
Cultures and Society in latin America . New York:
Random House, 1965.
Dx-iight,

Herri ck, Bruce H. Urban Migration and Economic
Development in Chile . Cambridge: Massachusetts
Institute of Technology Press, I965.
Hlrschraan, Albert 0.
Journeys Toward Progress: Studies
of Economic Policy-Making in Latin America .
New York: Twentieth Century Fund, I963.

Latin American Issues; Essays and
(ed.).
Comments . New York: Twentieth Century Fund, I96I.
.

——

:

331

Horowitz

Irving L., et al. (eds.).
New York:

RMicali^m.

Latin American

VlntasTB^fl^

^^s'^^s in Latin Aroerina

rrr'
University

Press, 1970.

Revolution in Br azil;

.

^-22veii5Si3itiiEr^^

~~ .

Mew York-

politico

anri

n-rtny^A
Oxford

c!^„4^4.

.

Humphreys. R. A., and Lynch. John (eds.).
The Oric;ins of
the^^tin. American Revolutions.
New-T^^fr^ff

Inter-American Economic and Social Council.
Pan American
Union.
Cau^sas y efectos del exodo rura l
en
Venezuela .
V/ashin^t^. - i). c.
Pan AmeTiTa-n
:

Union.

Jaguaribe, Helio. Economic and Political
Develo pment,
Theo retical Approach and A Bra^Tlian Ca^^^T'stTIdT: a
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 196^";;
Jane.

Cecil.
Liberty and Desp otism in Smnish America .
New York
Cooper Square Publishers, 1<^66'.
:

Johnson. John J. (ed.).
Continuity and Changre in latin
Amer ica.
Stanford:
Stanford University Press
196^.

Political Change in Latin America; The
Emergence of the Middle Sectors . Stanford
Stanford University Press, I958*.
•

Simo'n Bolfvar and Spanish American
1783.18^ 0. Princeton: Van Nostrand.

In dependence:"

Lambert, Jacques. Latin America;
Social Structures and
Political Institutions . Translated by Helen
Katel,
Berkeley: University of California Press,
1968.

Lieuwin, Edwin. Arms and Politics in Latin America .
New York: Praeger, i960.
United States Policy in Latin America;
•
Short History . New York: Praeger, 1965.

A

)

332

Lipset. Seymour Martin, and Solarl,
Aldo (eds

Madden. Marie H.

Polltlcal

Thf^n-rv

y.^^^

)

and Law ln Mo^i

Maler, Joseph, and Weatherhead,
Richard W. (eds.

Mander

John.
The Unrevolutlonary SocjPt.v. tw.
p^^er of
;atln American Con s_ervat l.m In-T-Ch^;;^
-^^^
t:iJiii.J12£iS.«
New York: Knopf, 19^9:

?^^

Marsal

Juan B. ^mblo.s ocial en America
I^tina .
Aires:
Solar/Hachette 1967,
^

Buenos
-ouenos

^

,

Martz, John D,

(ed.).

The_Dynamlcs of Chancre

45S2±£SIL2oUtlcjr^2nd
Prentice-Hall, 1971.

i n Latin
ed. "EFJiTF^T^^TTilffiT*

Monteverde, Alonso Aguilar. Teoria
y politica del
lesar rgllo latino Americano ." nfiiH^n nn^.,pf ^n.,,^,^^
Mexico: Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, *
Morse, Richard M.

From Community to Metropolis; A
Biography of Sao Paulo > Brazil: Gainesville:
University of Florida Press, I958.

Needier, Martin C. Latin American Politics in Persp ective,
~*
New York: Van Nostrand, I968T

Political Development in Latin America
•
Instabil ity, Violence, and Evolutionary Chano-e .
^
New York: Random House, I968.
;

•
.

(ed.).

Princeton:

Political Systems of Latin America .
Van Nostrand, 1964.

Pan American Union. Public Administration in Latin
America
V/ashington, D. C.
Organization of
American States, I965.
.

:

Pendle, George.
Paraguay; A Riverside Nation .
Oxford University Press, I967.

London:

—
Petras

JaTces.

Pol ltl_cal and Social V^orr... i. pk .-..,^
^^^^-^-ity Of Calif^ia
'"^^

iiSfllfr^'

Zeitlln

Maurice (eds.),
New York:

pTt:/''^
Heforro
or Revolution?

I^tln Americ a.
196^ 7

F^wcett?

Pierson. William W. and Gil. Federico.
Governments of
Latin America. New York: McGraw-Hill,
.

19y^,

Pike. Frederick B.
Chile and the United States:
I fifln^
Notre IXme~ Indiana
ii22«
University of Notre
Dame Press, I963,

^

:

Poppino. Rollie E. _Br.a zll: The Land and P^op lP.
York:
Oxford University Press, I968.

New

Ray, Talton F.
The Politics of the Barrios of Ven^ ^ijPlA
Berkeley:
University of California Press, 19'6~'*

Sanchez. Luis Alberto. Exista America Latlna ?
Fondo de Cutura Econoraica, 19^5.

Karl M., and Burks. David D.
New York: Praeger, I963.

Schffiitt,

Mexico:

E\'-olutlon or
~
"

Chao^*?
^"

Schurz, William Lytle.
Latin America: A Descriptive
Survey . New YorkT Dutton, 1963,

Slgmund, Paul E. (ed.). Models of Political Chanp:e in
Latin America . New York: Praeger, 1970.
Silvert, Kalrcan.

The Conflict Society:
Reaction and
Revolution in 3>itln America . Rev. ed. New York:
American Universities Field Staff, I966.
•

Expectant Peoples *

New York:

Vintage Books,

19^7,
Smith, T. Lynn.

Latin American Population Studies .
Gainesville: University of Florida Press. I966.
•

(ed.).

New York:

Agrarian Reform in latin America.
Knopf,

19^.

Stein, Stanley J., and Stein, Barbara H.
The Colonial
Pleritage of Latin America .
New York: Oxford
University Press. 1970.

*

33^

^^^^^^^Ayerican Politics,

^"'"''''•cJJoweU?

Szulo. Tad.^ The Winds of R^vnl

New York:

New York:

Tannenbaum Prank. Ten Keys to Latin
Vintage Books, I962.

Am^v^r^.^
"

.

Praeger.

New Yorkxopk.

Tomasek. Robert D. (ed,). latin Americ an
Politics *
Garden City: Doubleday, I966.

—

Vega. Luis Mercier.
Roads to Power in Lat in America
~~
New York: Praeger,

19^

Veliz. Claudio (ed.).
Obstacles to Chajige in Le.ti n
America.
Cambridge: Oxford Uni'verslty pFe"ss, I965.
(ed.).
The Politics of Conformity in latin
London: Oxford University Press7~Tt^.

America .
Wagley.

Charles.
The Latin American Tradition; Essays on
the Unity a nd Diversity of Latin American Culture
T'
New York: Columbia University Press, 19^^^
(ed.).

Social Science Research on latin
New York:
GoliMbla University Press.

America .
19^2^

Whiteford, Andrew Hunter. Two Cities of Latin America .
Garden City: Doubleday, 1964.
Wiarda, Hov^ard J. Dictatorship and Development: The
Meth ods of Control in Tru.UHo's Dominican
Republic Gainesville: University of Florida
Press, 1968.
.

Dominican Republic:
New York: Praeger, I909.

Nation in Transition .

Winnie, V/llliam W., Jr. La-tin American Political
Development . Los Angeles: University of
California at Los Angeles Latin American Center,
1967.
V7ise,

George S.
Caudlllo .
Press, 1951.

New York:

Columbia University

:

335

Wolf. Eric R,
Sons o f Shakincr Earth
of Chica go Press. I959?

Zavala. Silvio.
Arr-erlca

.

En gages sobre
Phllidelphia
:

Pr^7^1963.

la

ph^^«

^^^^^S^'-

colonlzaci

-

nrn

University
F«r^ov,

Un
l veSllf^^§S^"-T^^^
university
ox Pennsylvania

Zea. Leopoldo.

The Latin Am erican Min d.
Translated hv
Abbott and Lov^elT-DlIHteni.
University of Oklahoma Press. I963 Norman^

^

Articles
Adams. Richard N.

"Political Pov;er and Social Structure.

T^oJ^Mxsof^^^

.

THHTon:

I967.

"

llllU

oxford UHITinrty Press.

Alba. Victor.

"Latin America:
The Middle Class
Revolution." New Politics I (Winter, I962).
.

66-73.

Ames. Barry.

"Bases of Support for Mexico's Dominant
Americ an Political Science Review LXIV
^f/^^:"
~
~(March. 1970). 153^0^77^^
,

Anderson. Charles W.
"Political Factors in Latin American
Economic Development." Journal o f International
Affairs. XX (I966). 235-253.

Andrews. Frank M. . and Phillips. George W.
"The Squatters
of Lima:
l-Zho They Are and What They V/ant,"
The
Journal o f Developing Areas IV (January, 197077
211— 2
.

^li'^'*

Batllori. Miguel. S. J.
"The Role of the Jesuit Exiles."
The Origins of the Latin American Revolutions .
Edited by R. A. Humphreys and John Lynch. New
York: Knopf, I966.
Beezley. William H.
"Caudillismo
An Interpretive Note."
J ournal of Inter-American Studies XL (July, I969),
3^^-357.
:

.

Blanksten, George I.
"Political Groups in Latin America,"
American Political Science Review LIII (March,
1959). IO6-I27.
.

—
336

"The Politics of Latin America. «
The Politics
pf Develo,T.ln^^Areas.
Edited by Gabriel Al mond and

~

Princeton Un?versUy

5iess.'i96o''"''-

Borah. Woodrow.
«Colonial Institutions and
Latin America: Political and EconomicContemporary
Life."

The
XLIII (AugHit.

?^l|f2iy£ieri^^
1963), 371-379.

Burr. Robert.
"The Balance of Power in Nineteenth
South America: An Exploratory Essay." The Century
Ameri can Histor ical Review, XXXV (February'. Hispanic
19551"'
37—60.

Cornblit, Oscar. Di Telia. Torcuto, S.. and Gallo,
Ezequlel.
"A Model for Political Change in Latin
America." Social Science "Information VII (April
1968). 13-Ii87^
.

Cornelius. Wayne A., Jr.
"Urbanization as an Agent in
Latin American Political Instability: The Case of
Mexico," American Poli tical Science Revie w. LXIII
(September, 1969). 833-857^
Dealy. Glen.

"Prolegomena on the Spanish American
Political Tradition," The Hispanic Ameri can
Historical Review XLVIII (February, 196^77^37-58.
.

De Lattes,

Zulma Recchini.
"Aspectos demograficos de
proceso de urbanizaclon en America Latlna," La
m-'banizacion en America latlna .
Edited by Jorge
Enrique Hardoy and Carlos Tobar. Buenos Aires:
Editorial del Institute, I969.

Delgado, Oscar.
"Revolution, Reform, Conservatism,"
Latin America; Reform or Revolution ? Edited by
James Petras and Kaurlce Zeltlln. New York:
Pawcett, 1968).

•

De Tobar, Kargot Romano Yalour.
"El proceso de
socializacion urbana," La urbanizac lon en America
Latlna . Edited by Jorge Enrique Hardoy and Carlos
Tobar,
Buenos Aires: Editorial del Institute,
1969.
Dl Telia, Torcuato S.

"Stalemate of Co-existence in

Argentina," Latin America; Reform or Revolution ?
Edited by James Petras and Maurcle Zeltlln. New
York:

Fawcett, 1968,

337

Dos Santos, Teontonio.
»The Chanirino- q4-^„^^,
investment in Latin Ler!of "^
Reform or Revolutln n? Edlt4d hvT^lTnZlZJ.''^''^''
T^L,"F

r~

KauriH^-ziltTETTTiw Yorkr'f^Le?tri968r'

Eohavarrla. Jose Medina.

"A Sooiologlsfs Vlev

"

SoMm

Edited by Jose Medina
E^hS^F^HTS-^TJOS^jfsiH^"
Hlgglns. Paris: UUESCO. 1963,
Eder, George Jackson.
"Urban Concentration. ARrloultupp
and Agrarian Reform.
S^l^toml^jf^f„
Tomorrow. American Academy of Politioal^lfFl^.i
Philadelphia: American
lllnr^k. and Social Science. July,Acad:m;'S?
Political
I965.
'

••

Form. Floreal H. «Aspectos sociales de la
urbanizaciSn
ja3rbanlza cion.en America Latjn n. Edited
Jorge Enrique Kardoy and Carlos Tobar.
Aires: Editorial del Institute. I969.

by

Buenos

Gibson. Charles.
"Colonial Institutions and Contemporary
Latin America: Social and Cultural Life "
The
^^^^ll^£n^cB.n Historical Review. XLIII (XTliust,
Gillin, John P.
"The Middle Segments and Their Values,"
latin Ame rican Politics , Edited by Robert D.
Tomasek.
Garden City:
Doubleday, I966.
"Some Signposts for Policy," Social Change
Its Impli caFion.^ V"^
United States Policy. Edited by Richard N. Adams
for the Council on Foreign Relations. New York:
Harper, i960.
in latin A merica Today;

•

Griffin, Charles C,
"The
The Ori g ins of the
1808--182O .
Edited
Lynch. New York:

Enlightenment and Latin America,"
Latin American Revolutions
by H. A. Humphreys and John
;

Knopf, I966.

Halperin, Maurice.
"Growth and Crisis in the Latin
American Economy," Latin America; Reform or
Revo l ution ? Edited by James Petras and Maurice
Zeitlin. New York: Fawcett, I968.

inLroauctlon.

"

Contemporar y Culturp<^

Richard N. Ada.s.
Henry, Laurin L.
Service,"
Edited by

New York:

anri

BaSdo/rouse?1o65.

"Public Administration and
Civil
Government and Politicc:
r^t-Vi

a

KSFSirErSFiiT-^M^^i^Pt^^

**The Search for Paradifrms
as a Hindrance to
V^;2^^standins." World Politic.<. XXII VAprii,
(Aprtl
1970). 329-3^3.
.

Hobbswawm E. J.
"Peasants and Hural Mipcrants
Politics," The Politic s of Conforir-lt inin T.^t-^v.
y
^
ALn|ri£a
Edit^rW^li:TIdir Veli2. London
Oxford University Press. I967.
i

Horowitz. Irving Louis.
"Electoral Politics. Urbanization,
and Social Development in Latin America."
The
Urban Exj^losion in Latin America. Edited
by~Glenn
Beyer,
ithaca:
Cornell University Press. I967.
Houston, J. M.
"The Foundations of Colonial Towns in
Hispanic America." Urbanization and Its Proble ms.
Edited by R. P. Beckinsale and J, M.~ Houston.
Oxford:
msil Blackwell, I968.

Kenworthy, Eldon.
"Argentina: The Politics of
Industrialization," Foreifrn Affairs XLV (April,
.

Kling, Merle.
"Toward a Theory of Power and Political
Instability in Latin American Society," Western
Political Quarterly . IX (March. 1956). 21-25.

—
339

Lepawsky Albert.
"Revolution and Reform In Bolivia:
Study of the Root and Branch of
Public
Administration in a Developing Nation."

a

Toward the

university P;essri9;7)f 219i2f2!"''
Lewis. Oscar,
jl'^lll

"Urbanization Without Rreakdovm: A Case
S^^entlfic Monthly. LXXV (July,
1952).

McAlister. Lyle N.
"Social Structure and Social Change
in
New Spain." The Hismnic America n Historical
"
Review, XLIII {August, I963 ) 3^9-3707'

—

.

Mangin, William,
"latin American Squatter SettlementsProblem and A Solution." I^MnAmerlcanRe search A
•Review, II (Sujomer, 19S7),^^Z§r.
Kartz. John D.
"The Place of Latin America in the Study of
Comparative Politics," Journal of Poll tjc.c!. XXVIII
(February, I966). 57-80.

—

'

Mecham, J, Lloyd.
"Latin American Constitutions:
Nominal and Real," Journal of Politics , XXI (May.
^*
-*
1959). 258-272.

—

^

Micklin, Michael.
"Demographic, Economic, and Social
Change in Latin America: An Examination of Causes
and Consequences," The Journal of Deve loping Areas.
'
IV (January, I970), 173-196';

—

Miro,

Carmen A.
"The Population of 20th Century Latin
America," Population D i lemma of La tin America.
American Assembly. Washington, D. C.
Potomac
Books, 1966.
:

Montalva, Eduardo Frei.
"The Alliance that Lost Its Way,"
Fore i pen Affairs . XLV (April, I967), 437-l|^8.
Moore, Wilbert E.

"Rural-Urban Conflict in Argentine
Sociological Theories," Rural Sociology VI
,

(mi). 138-W*

Moreno, Frank J.
"The Spanish Colonial System: A
Functional Approach," V/estern Political Quarterly ,
XX (June, 1967). 308-320.

340

Morray

Joseph Parker.

«The United States and Latin

f

i^etras--^Hrite^-T5rz^tHH7^
^^-^in,
M^w York: ^^^"^
New
Fawcett. I968.
Morse. Richard M.
"latin American Cities:
Function and Structure." Comparative Aspects of
s^ud'^.L
Societjy.and Hictory.. iv { J
uTfr

19^7^7 fS^^

"Recent Research on Latin American

Some Characteristics of Latin American
Am^rixarQ lntorical Revie w. LXVII
(January, 19 627731?^ 3F.~~
.

History."

"Toward a Theory of Spanish American
JQ^^^Jthe Hi ^-t.nvy
(195J^'^'^7l'93

XV

Needier. Martin C.
"Political Development and
Soc3 oeconomic Development:
The Case of Latin
America." Amexlcan_ Pol itical Science Rev iew.
LXI'
(September. ^:9r8TrF89-897.'

~

Nun, Jose.

**A Latin American Phenomenon:
The MiddleClass Military Coup." l atin America; Re form or
Edited by James Petras and Kiurice~
I^£I2l!ition?
Zeitlin. New York: Fawcett, I968.

"The Middle Class Military Coup." The
tics
poli
of Conformity in latin Am erica.. Edited by
Claudio Vellz. London: Oxford University Press.
1967.

Obregon, Anibal Quijano,
"Tendencies in Peruvian
Development and in the Class Structure." Latin
America
Reform or Revolution ? Edited by James
Petras and Maurice Zeitlin. New York: Fawcett,
1968.
;

Petras. James.
"The Latin American Middle Class,"
Politics . IV (Winter, I965). 74-85.

New

3^1
.

—

.

••Revolution and Guerrilla Movements
in

Ta^-iv.

Colombia. Guatemala and'^erS
in America;
^^t?n'5m.ry^r'^p'^
Mt
R^^for m or Revoluti nn ?
Edited bv

^s^-tras^and MSTinraniHT~New follT
Pike, ^ederlck B.

"Aspects of Class Relations in
Chile:
-^-^-^S-Amerjjca^^

l^^t}^t?'r
Edited by JameTTitHFi:Hdlfe^^
York:

Fawcett, 1968,

-^^-^xn,

rjew

Polit. Gustavo.
-The Industrialists of Argentina «
J^tin A merica: Reform or RevnIjrMnn?
James Petras and Maurice ZeitllH: New Edited bv
York:
Fawcett. I968.

Potash, Robert A.
••Colonial Institutions and Contemporary
latln America: A Commentary on Two Papers.
'The
S1^^3anjx_ American Historical R eview. XLIII
»•

(AugustTlW).

390-395^.:

Prado, Caio Jilnior.
"The Economic Interpretation of
Brasilian Independence." The Origins of the I^tln
hinGTican^ Revol utions
1808-182(3 ': Edited "hrRTT^
Humphreys and John Lynch, New York: Knopf, 1966!
:

Raat, William D.
•Leopoldo Zea and Mexican Positivism:
A Reappraisal," The Hispan ic Ame rican H i.^to^lr.Al
~
Review, XLVIII. No. 1 (February. 196^^), l-T^

Rabinovitz, Prancine F.
"Urban Development and Political
Development in Latin America," Comparative Urban
Re search: T he Administ ration and^Politic^ of
Citie s. Edited by Robert T. Inland. Beverly
Hills:
Sage Publications, I969.
Ratinoff, Luis.
•The New Urban Groups:
The Middle
Classes," Elites in Latin Ameri ca. Edited by
Seymour Martin Llpset and Aldo Solarl, New York:
Oxford University Press, I967.
Romero, Jose Luis,
"La cludad latinoamerlca y los
movlmientos polltlcos," La urbanlzacion en America
Latlna . Edited by Jorge Enrique Hardoy and Carlos
Tobar.
Buenos Aires: Editorial del Institute.
1969.

«

3^2

Scott, Robert E.

"The Government Bui^eaucrats
and
Political Change in Latin America,Journal of
International Affairs, XX, No. 2
l9^l7flF9r§o8.
(

^^i^ America," Nation^
Edited by Karl W. Deutsch ani
Willfif^
w^J-ilam J.
New York: Atherton, 196^.

|uUdin£,
Foltz.

Silvert

Kalman.
"Leaders, Followers and Modernization
ir,
Latin America," Com^a_ rative Politics:
Mn' ^^'f!^/^

|e|dl^

Rev.

edTEdrtirbrR^TcTl^

Bernard E. Ero.m.
Smith, Robert F.

Class,"

Homewood.

"Disciission

New Politics

.

:

Illinois:

Dorsey.

The Latin American Middle
IV (Spring, I965), 83-87.

Scares, Glaucio, and Hamblin, Robert L.
"Socio-economic
Variables and Voting for the Radical Left:
Chile
AiTLerican Political Science Review
}?;52."
LXI
(1967). 1053-10^

—

.

"The New Industrialization and the Brazilian
Political System," Latin .Ajnerica; Refcrn or
Revolution? Edited by James Petras and Maurice
Zeitlin.
New York: Fawcett, I968.

Stavenhagen, Rodolfo.
"Seven Fallacies About Latin
America." Latin America: Reform or Revolution ?
Edited by James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin. New
York:
Fawcett, I968.
Stepan, Alfred.
"Discussion:
The Latin American Middle
Class," New Politics IV (Spring. I965}, 87-90.
.

"Political Development Theory: The Latin
American Experience," Journal of International
Affairs XX, No. 2 (I966). 223-23"¥;
.

Stycos, J. Mayone.
"Opinions of Latin American
Intellectuals on Population Problems and Birth
Control, " The Annals;
Latin America Tomorrow .
The American Academy of Political and Social
Science.
Philadelphia: Academy of Political and
Social Science, 1965.

^

343

Teubal

Miguel.
"The Failure of Latin America's
Eonn.n,.
"^^^
Integration." .latin Ameri ca
Reform or
Revolution? Edit^FbrjrmTTpi^^
^^^^^^^e
Zeitlin. New York: Fawcett, 1968.
r

Vanger

Milton.
-Politics and Class in Twentieth r^r^fn.
latin America," The Hismnlc a L;!:T^^^
u?^.^!?^^?^
Review, XLIX (February, I 9g9
^^^^^
^0^93!
),
"

'

Veliz. Claudio.
-Centralism and Nationalism in
Latin
America," ^^^^^^^^^^
Foreign /ffairc?
t twtt
//^ f"^-^''-^"
^
^
LIXVII
i.£S
(October,
I968),
68-83.
.

Vitale. Luis.

^^

"latin America:

j^MnAmerlca^_R

^^^^C^''^^'^^

»

Feudal or Capitalist?Revolution ?^ FH^'f^V
Zei-tTCTew York:'

Wagley, Charles.
"The Brazilian Revolution:
Social
Changes Since I93O." Socl_al Chan;:re
Latin
AS2£icaTod^. Edited by Rnh^N7-tdi:irf or the
Council on Foreign Relations. New York:
Hamper,

m

-The Dilemma of the Latin American
Middle
Proceedint^s of the A cademy of Political

XXm^Ife^TTo^^

Science,

Wlarda, Howard J.
"law and Political Development in Latin
America: Toward a Framework for Analysis "
^Q"^P^^^y;Z£j£w> XIX (siunmer. 197I),

^l463

"Review of Political Development in Latin
America by Martin C, Needier." Journa] of
Politics XXXI (August, 1969). 82I-822T
'

.

Wiarda, leda Siqueria, and Wiarda, Howard J.
"Revolution
or Counterrevolution," Massachusetts R eview. VIII
(Winter, I967), 149-I65.""
Wolf, Eric R.
"Aspects of Group Relations in a Complex
Society: Mexico," Contemporary Cultures and
Societies of Latin America . Edited by Dwlght
Heath and Richard N. Adams, New York: Random
House, 1965.

and Hansen. Edward C.
"Caudillo PoliticsStructural ^"i^ijc^Ac.
Analysis. « j^ompararive
Comparative St
udipt In
Studies
Society and Histgrjr, IX^knuary,
.

'

1967771^179.

Wolfe, Gregory B.
"Education. Economic Development
the Private Sectors." Journal of TnterlA^.^^ and
"""^"^^^
Studies. VIII (April.
-

^

Worcester. Donald E.
"The Spanish American Past: Enemy
of Change. " Journal of Inter-Ameri r>.»n .gi-,,^...
(JaniAary.

196977^^^^^.

~

Zeitlin. Maurice.
"The Social Determinants of Political
Democracy in Chile." latin America; T^.^.fn^m
or
Rev^iiition? Edited ^v^a^^rT^tT^:r'^:^:r^
Zeitlin. Nev7 York: Pawcett, I968.

Unpublished Material;
Wiarda, Howard J.
"Elites in Crisis: The Decline of the
03.d Order and the Rragmentation of the New
in
latin America: A Dominican Case Study and the
Corporatist Model." Unpublished paper, n.d.
"The New Developmental Alternatives in Latin
America: Nasserism and Dictatorship with Popular
Support." Unpublished paper prepared for delivery
at the Annual Meeting of the Pacific Coast Council
on Latin American Studies, University of
California at Santa Barbara, November 6 and 7.
1970.

"Toward a Framework for the Study of
•
Political Change In the Iberic-Latin Tradition:
The Corporative Model," Unpublished paper prepared
for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American
Political Science Association. Chicago, September
7-11. 1971.

Yare, Jane Lee.

"The Middle Class in Latin America."
Unpublished paper. University of Massachusetts
Department of Political Science, 1971.

